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ECLECTIC EDUCATIONAL SERIES 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



DESIGNED ESPECIALLY FOR YOUNG TEACHERS 



BY 

EDWIN C. HEWETT, LL.D. 
u 

President of the Illinois Stale Normal University 








XLbe Bclectfc ipress 
VAN ANTWERP, BRAGG, AND COMPANY 

CINCINNATI AND NEW YORK 
0-9 



13 ion 



Copyright, 1889, by Van Antwerp, Bragg, & Co. 




The author's aim in this little book is to set before the 
reader, in a simple and compact form, some of the lead- 
ing facts of the human mind, — its power and capabilities, 
the laws that govern its working and growth, — and some 
truths concerning ways of strengthening and cultivating 
its powers. 

He has not been ambitious to make a large book. On 
the contrary, it has been his constant purpose to use the 
fewest words that would enable him to make his thought 
clear. He has tried to say just enough to set forth the 
leading points of his subject, and to pave the way for a 
more extended pursuit of the study. In short, the aim 
has been to make a text-book, that is, a book of texts. 

The book is written, not for philosophers, learned men, 
or controversialists, but for young people of moderate ac- 
quirements, who are likely to need the facts of Psy- 
chology as a guide to the practical work of the teacher. 
It is hoped, moreover, that they will be induced to read 
deeper and more pretentious books on the subject, as well 
as to continue the study by means of their own observa- 
tion and introspection. And the author hopes that this 
book may assist in preparing them for future study. 

One of the reasons why many books on Psychology 
are hard to understand, is the lack of sharp, formal defi- 



VI PREFACE 

nitions. It has been a purpose of the author to supply 
this lack. He does not expect that all his definitions will 
be accepted ; but he believes they are tolerably clear, and 
he hopes that where they are defective, they may start 
inquiries which will result in something better. 

He holds that Pyschology is an inductive science; but 
in this book he has not made the least attempt to develop 
it inductively. Yet he most earnestly urges all who study 
the book to test its statements for themselves. In a 
science that is derived by induction from the study of 
facts, no one can speak with any authority other than the 
authority of a witness. The author has put his state- 
ments in a dogmatic form for the sake of clearness and 
brevity, and because he believes them to be true. But 
he cheerfully invites his readers to test their truth. 

He lays claim to no originality in the book. In the 
course of many years of teaching he has given much 
attention to the study of mind; he has also read some of 
the many books that have been written on the subject. 
In this book he has stated as well as he could, some of the 
most important facts of mind just as they now appear to 
him. He has not hesitated to take from any author any 
statement that commended itself to his judgment. When 
the form of the statement has been retained, he has used 
quotation marks; but it has not seemed worth the while 
to give the name of the author in every case, for, as was 
said before, nothing in Psychology rests upon authority. 

Such as the book is, it is submitted to the public with 
the fond hope that it may be found of some use, especi- 
ally to young teachers. 

Edwin C. Hewett. 

Illinois State Normal University, 
Normal, June 4, 1889. 




CHAPTER 
I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 

XVII. 

XVIII. 



PAGE 

Definitions, and General Statements - - 9 

The Nature of Mind - 19 

General Powers, — Consciousness - - 29 

General Powers, — Attention and Conception - 36 
The Intellect, — Definitions and First Principles 47 
The Presentative Powers, or the Senses - 54 

The Presentative Powers, Concluded - - 63 

The Representative Powers, — Memory - 75 

Memory, Concluded - - 86 

Imagination, and Constructive Conception - 96 
The Reflective Power, — Concepts and Terms 108 

Judgment, Proposition, and Reasoning - 118 

Reasoning, Concluded - - - -126 

The Sensibility, — General Statements - -137 

Specific Feelings - 146 

Conscience and Morality - - - 157 

The Will - - - 165 

Conclusion - - - - 176 



(vii) 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 




CHAPTER I 

DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 

HAT is Mental Philosophy? — Philos- 
ophy literally means love of wisdom. 
But, as the term is commonly used, it 
means the explanation of things, or 
giving the reasons for them; for in- 
stance, to give the philosophy of a pump is to show 
in what way it produces its results. 

By Mental Philosophy, we mean an explanation 
of the action and growth of the human mind ; it in- 
cludes a knowledge of the facts of the mind, — that 
is, of its powers of knowing, feeling, and willing, — 
and a statement of the laws according to which it 
acts and grows. 

A text-book on Mental Philosophy should state 
these facts and laws exactly, clearly, and concisely. 
Psychology. — This word is derived from two Greek 
words, one of which means the soul, or mind, and the 
other means a discourse, or science. Hence, Psy- 
chology, the science of the soul, is a good name for 
Mental Philosophy. 

(9) 



IO ELEMENTS OE PSYCHOLOGY 

Several other words are sometimes used to designate this 
science; among them are Anthropology and Metaphysics* 
But Anthropology includes much more than the philosophy 
of the mind; and Metaphysics is used in several senses, some- 
times meaning more than Psychology, and sometimes less. 

What is a Science? — A Science is the body of 
knowledge concerning some subject, systematically 
arranged in accordance with general principles or laws. 

Two Kinds of Science. — In some cases, the gen- 
eral principles, or laws, are first laid down, and then 
the science is derived from them; such a science is 
termed a deductive science. 

Geometry is a good example of a deductive science; a few- 
general principles, viz., the definitions and axioms, are given, 
and the science is built up from them. 

Other sciences are formed by first collecting a 
large number of facts, and then deriving the laws and 
general principles from a study of these facts. Such 
a science is termed an inductive science. 

Botany is a good example. 

How Developed? — In developing an inductive sci- 
ence, we may recognize four steps: 

First, The collection of a large number of facts. 

Second, A comparison of the facts, noting resem- 
blances and differences, and an arrangement of them 
in classes accordingly. 

Third, A discovery of laws, or uniformities. 

Fourth, Careful, formal statements concerning these 
facts and laws, or uniformities. 



*Let the student consult the Unabridged Dictionary, and study carefully 
the etymological meaning of these words, and difficult or scientific terms. 



DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS I I 

By the word "law," in Science, is meant simply A uniformity. 
It is a law of plant-life that every plant must have root, stem, 
and leaf. But to write this-^ra/, is only another way of saying 
that every plant does have root, stem, and leaf. 

Psychology, an Inductive Science. — We class 
Psychology among the Inductive Sciences, because 
its facts are gathered by observation, and its laws 
are discovered by a careful study of the facts after 
they have been scanned and classified. Thus, Psy- 
chology conforms to our definition of an Inductive 
Science; and it is built up in the same way as other 
inductive sciences are. 

It may be claimed that there are some facts and 
laws in Psychology which may be reached by deduc- 
tion ; but the same thing is true of the other induct- 
ive sciences. And these exceptions do not invalidate 
the statement that the general truths of the science 
are established mainly by induction. 

For the reasons given above, we claim that Psychology is 
an Inductive Science. And, unless we deny that Mind is a 
part of Nature, we must allow that it is an Inductive Natural 
Science. But, in general, the term Natural is confined to 
those sciences which treat chiefly or entirely of matter. 

How are Facts in Science Obtained? — Facts in 
science are learned by observation; but this observa- 
tion is of two kinds. Every careful student of sci- 
ence knows some facts of his science from personal 
observation; some he learns from the observation of 
others, reported to him orally, or by writing or print- 
ing. Hence, it may be said that his knowledge rests 
upon two foundations, viz. , obsenmtion and testimony — 
the term observation being confined usually to per- 
sonal observation or experience. 



12 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Facts in Psychology are learned in both these 
ways ; careful observation of the gestures and actions 
of others will reveal much respecting the operations 
of their minds, while their words, written or spoken, 
will reveal much that is additional. 

A Striking Peculiarity. — The field of observa- 
tion in all the sciences excepting those that relate to 
sentient man, is wholly external to the observer him- 
self. But, in Psychology, by far the most important 
field of observation for any student, is his own mind. 
The mental phenomena shown by his own mind, re- 
vealed to him by his own consciousness, claim his 
most careful attention. Here is a field of observation 
quite different from any found in most of the other 
sciences; and knowledge gained in this field rests 
upon experience alone. No other than the observer 
himself can aid him here, save only as he may be di- 
rected in making his observations. 

A student of Psychology should test every statement made 
in a text-book, or by a teacher, comparing it with what he 
knows of his own mental operations. If he finds that his own 
experience does not attest the truth of the statement, he may 
conclude that the statement is false entirely, or that it is true 
of some minds only, and not of mind in general — provided he 
is qualified to exercise sound judgment in the case. 

In fact, a little reflection will convince us that we can know 
absolutely nothing of other minds, except through what we 
know of our own minds. All expressions of countenance, all 
gestures, all words, in so far as they reveal to us anything of 
the operations of other minds, reach this result through the 
interpretation which we give to them in the light of our own 
mental experiences. Let no student of Psychology lose sight 
of the truth here stated. 

Psychology, a Noble Science. — One way of de- 



DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 13 

termining the rank of a science is found by determin- 
ing the rank of the subject to which it relates. Min- 
eralogy has to do with dead matter; Botany deals 
with plant life ; Zoology has for its subject, animal 
life; Physiology treats of physical man. Here we 
have an ascending series of subjects of scientific 
study. But Psychology has to do with man as an 
intellectual, rational, and moral being. Judged on 
this basis, then, Psychology must be regarded as a 
very noble science. 

Again, mind is the organizer of all the sciences ; 
and of some of the deductive sciences, like geometry, 
it may be said to be the creator. Surely, we must 
accord a very high rank to that science which has 
mind itself for its subject. 

Sciences differ greatly in rank, according to their 
value in aiding to make human life successful and 
happy. From this practical point of view, we think 
it can be shown that Psychology should be given a 
very high place. 

Relation to Personal Interests. — The success 
and happiness of every one depend largely upon the 
wisdom of his thinking, the right control of his ap- 
petites, impulses, and emotions, and the character of 
his purposes and actions. The better he understands 
his mind, its powers, capabilities, limitations, and the 
laws which govern its action, the more able he is to 
control himself rightly in all the respects just named. 

Some sciences, like Astronomy, are very interesting, but they 
have little to do with the affairs of one's every-day life. We 
may watch the movements of the heavenly bodies with an in- 
terest similar to that with which a spectator, standing on the 



14 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

shore, would watch the movement of ships far out on the ocean. 
But, if he were a passenger on one of those ships, — moreover, 
if he were responsible for the safe navigation of the ship on 
which he was sailing, — his interest would be of quite another 
kind. It would be an interest similar to that which we should 
have in Psychology, when its practical relation to our life and 
destiny is duly appreciated. 

SPECIAL VALUE TO DIFFERENT PROFESSIONS 

The Clergyman. — One's Theology, his ideas and 
beliefs respecting God, are largely determined by his 
system of Psychology. The qualities of the Divine 
Mind, as we conceive them, are qualities of human 
minds refined and enlarged in our conception. This 
aspect of Theology is sometimes criticised ; but there 
seems to be no alternative, unless we boldly assume 
that we can know nothing about God. Further- 
more, if we accept the ideas of God which the Bible 
gives us, this view of God is the correct oner 

But the clergyman must have a theory of human 
duty and human responsibility. This theory will be 
determined by his theory concerning human thought, 
and the relation of the human will to life and con- 
duct. For instance, if man has no power to direct his 
thoughts and feelings, if he has no liberty of choice 
and action, has he any duty or responsibility at all in 
respect to his life and character? These questions 
clearly belong to Psychology. 

Again, it is an important part of the clergyman's 
business to influence the thinking and action of men. 
His success will depend largely upon his knowledge 
of the laws of human thought, and of the use of ar- 
guments and motives. 



DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 15 

The Teacher. — It is the teacher's special work to 
lead his pupils to know, and to train them into right 
habits of thought and action. How can he do this, 
unless he understands the processes by which the 
mind comes to know, and the processes by which 
growth in right habits is secured ? 

To suppose that one will be a good teacher simply because 
he knows well the subjects which he is to teach, is very shal- 
low, and it is the cause of a great deal of poor work in the 
school-room. Some one has compared such a teacher to a per- 
son who should attempt to play a piano, knowing only the tunes 
he is to play, but entirely unacquainted with the instrument. 
The illustration is good as far as it goes, but it is very inade- 
quate. To reach the case of such a teacher in an ordinary 
school, we must suppose the musician to attempt to play on 
thirty or forty instruments at the same time. Nay, we must 
suppose that these thirty or forty' instruments, no two of which 
are quite alike at the start, are daily growing, each into some- 
thing a little different from what it was the day before. 

The Physician. — The relation between mind and 
body is such that a physician can hardly hope to deal 
successfully with bodily weakness and disease, if he is 
ignorant of mental phenomena, and of the influence 
of the mind on the body. 

The Lawyer. — No man needs to know more clearly 
than the lawyer, the movements of the human mind, 
and the way in which men are led to different opin- 
ions and courses of action. How, otherwise, can he 
unravel his "cases," or how can he bring judge or 
jury to decide in his favor? 

The Orator. — The orator's success in arousing, con- 
vincing, and persuading those who hear him, must be 
determined by his ability to play on that most won- 
derful of all instruments, the human soul. 



l6 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

To Men, in General. — The success of any man in 
dealing with his fellows will depend largely upon his 
"knowledge of human nature." But three fourths 
of one's knowledge of human nature is a knowledge 
of the capabilities and modes of activity of the hu- 
man mind. 

A Mental Discipline. — Few studies are better 
calculated to give good mental discipline than Psy- 
chology. This study demands: (i) Close observa- 
tion; (2) Careful reflection; (3) The making of fine 
and critical distinctions; (4) Precision, and exactness 
in the use of terms and in the making of statements. 
These are the exercises that are especially calculated 
to sharpen and strengthen the intellectual powers. 

Common and Scientific Knowledge. — It must 
not be inferred from what has been said, that no one 
but those who have studied formal Psychology in 
school or college can possess any of the advantages 
that we have claimed for this study. Here, as in 
Botany, Zoology, and every other science, one may 
have a great deal of knowledge "picked up" in a 
hap-hazard way, crude and unorganized, but which 
may be very useful so far as it goes. 

In every field of human thought, the difference 
between scientific knowledge and common knowledge 
is not a difference of kind, but of precision, order, 
and efficiency. 

Neglect of Psychology. — Notwithstanding all 
that is claimed for Psychology, it must be confessed 
that, as a general thing, it is not a very popular 
study in the schools, nor among studious men who 
conduct their studies in private. Nor does it offer 



DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 17 

much that is attractive to the great multitude who 
are not students. It may be said that one reason 
for this is that the subject is usually presented in a 
dry and unattractive way. While this may explain 
the fact in part, there seem to be several other rea- 
sons. 

Why Neglected. — First, The practical value of 
Psychology, its relation to the common affairs of life, 
is not seen so readily as in the case of some other 
studies. Arithmetic teaches how to compute inter- 
est, Geography aids in trade and travel, Chemistry 
teaches how to deal with soils, medicines, and ex- 
plosives, Physics has to do with the making and us- 
ing of machinery, etc. But the value of Psychology 
does not so readily show itself in the outward and 
visible. 

Second, This science can make no show of speci- 
mens and apparatus, like some of those mentioned, 
and others that might be mentioned. An appeal to 
the senses has a wonderfully attractive power to most 
minds. 

Third, Psychology is a very old science; much 
that is most valuable in it has come down from the 
old Greeks, or from remoter sources. This science 
has little of the charm of novelty — nor is there much 
hope of making any new discoveries here. In Geol- 
ogy, Botany, Chemistry, Electricity, etc., astonishing 
discoveries and inventions are often made, and men's 
names are sent down to posterity in connection with 
them. But who expects to discover a new mental 
power, or to invent a new process of thinking? 

Fourth, In a new country like ours, the pursuits 

Psy. — 2. 



15 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

that have to do with taming and controlling nature, 
with furnishing food, clothing, and shelter, may al- 
ways be expected to receive the largest share of at- 
tention. But, as better provision is made for sup- 
plying the most urgent needs of our bodily existence, 
it is to be expected that men who are willing to think 
at all, will turn their thoughts more and more to those 
subjects which are more intimately connected with 
man's inner life and well-being, although they appeal 
less strikingly to the senses. 

Among those who are teaching and guiding in the 
work of our schools, there is an increasing interest 
in questions of Psychology. This is one of the most 
cheering facts in the whole field of public education. 




CHAPTER II 



THE NATURE OF MIND 



::n 



IND and Matter. — Man is curiously 
made up of mind and matter, so won- 
derfully blended that no one can tell 
exactly how they live and work to- 
gether. Of the real nature of both 
mind and matter, we are profoundly ignorant. No 
one can tell what either is; we can study their phe- 
nomena only. Man has a body, and he has a mind ; 
he has, also, powers that belong to the body, and 
others that belong to the mind. 
Power is the ability to do something. 
For distinction, we may call the powers that pertain 
especially to the body, as the muscular powers, phys- 
ical; and we may call those powers that pertain es- 
pecially to the mind, as the power to remember, the 
power to love, etc., psychical powers. To be sure, 
the mind's powers do not show themselves wholly 
independent of the body; all mental activity is prob- 
ably attended by movements among the molecules 
of the brain. The truth seems to be that, in some 
way not fully understood, the mind uses the brain as 

its instrument. 

(19) 



20 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Our best philosophers teach us that the mind itself is one 
indivisible thing; it does not possess organs, as the body does, 
nor is it a bundle of powers; but it has many powers, which it 
can exercise in various ways. When we love, it is the entire 
mind that loves, and not part of it, although it may work with 
more or less force in the act. The same is true when we re- 
member, when we will, etc. 

Grand Divisions of Mental Power. — The pow- 
ers of the mind are numerous, but they may all be 
arranged in three classes ; viz. , intellect, sensibility, will. 

Writers on Psychology differ greatly on many 
questions; and their discussions about some of them 
are very fierce. But, on the division of mental pow- 
ers into three groups, as here given, there is almost 
complete unanimity among all modern writers. 

Definitions. — The Intellect comprises those pow- 
ers by which we are able to know. 

The Sensibility, or the Emotions, is that group of 
powers by which we feel. 

The Will is the power to choose and execute. 

In speaking of the psychical powers of man and their phenom- 
ena, we are obliged to borrow our terms from the body and its 
phenomena. This is somewhat unfortunate, as the terms thus 
borrowed are likely to be misunderstood. The word feel, which 
we have just used, is an example of such a term. When one 
speaks of feeling sorrow, he means something very different 
from that which he means when he speaks of feeling the table 
with his finger. In the latter case, he means an affection of 
the mind through the nerves of the body. This is perception, 
or an exercise of one of the knowing powers. In the former 
case, he means an affection of the mind independent of the 
nerves, as when he feels sorrow for the loss of a friend. This 
is an exercise of sensibility. 

Illustration. — The action of the three grand classes 



THE NATURE OF MIND 



21 



of mental powers may be illustrated in the following 
way: You take up a newspaper and read of the floods 
in the lower Mississippi valley. You are able to un- 
derstand what the writer says — to think his thoughts 
after him — and his thoughts awaken new thoughts of 
your own. Thus, you see that you have the power 
to know, to think, — or, you have Intellect. As you 
read of the sufferings the floods cause the people, 
you begin to pity them, and to desire to relieve their 
suffering. You thus see that you have the power to 
feel, — or, you possess Sensibility. You learn that 
others are sending money to aid these poor people; 
moved by your feelings, you determine to join in the 
contribution; and you do contribute. Thus, you see 
that you have the power to choose, to determine, and 
to execute, — or, you have Will. 

Order of Action. — These are the three grand 
classes of mental powers; nor is there any mental 
faculty that can not be properly grouped under one 
of the three classes. Moreover, these classes of men- 
tal powers always act in the order here given. It is 
inconceivable that we should have feeling in regard 
to any matter until we know something about it, or 
think we do. Nor do we ever put forth any activity 
of the will till we are prompted to it by some feeling. 

This is illustrated in the case of the "prodigal son." He 
"came to himself," and thought; he felt, in respect to his 
wretched condition, and the plenty at his father's house; he 
then resolved to arise and go to his father. 

A wise writer, or orator, or teacher, who wants to 
lead men up to a resolution, always observes this order. 
He strives first to awaken thought, — to make people 



22 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

know something about the matter in hand. He then 
seeks to arouse their feelings in view of what they 
know and think. It is only after both these results 
are reached that he hopes to bring them to any res- 
olution, or choice, or action, respecting the matter. 
Division of the Powers. — By the earlier philos- 
ophers, the mind's powers were divided into two 
classes instead of three. They were termed the con- 
templative and active, or the cognitive and motive ; that 
is, powers exercised in knowing, or the Intellect, as 
we now say, and powers concerned in action or in 
motives to action, including what we now call both 
the Emotions and the Will. 

Observations. — We give a few general observations con- 
cerning the three Grand Classes of mental powers. 

The Intellect. — A writer says: "The infant soul contains 
implicitly all the faculties of developed intelligence ; reason is 
there with all its essential characteristics, but it is there only in 
its intuitive form." 

He says again: "Each faculty has a primitive state corre- 
sponding to its spontaneous development. Primitive judgments 
form the basis of all our knowledge." A " primitive judgment" 
is defined by another as the "judgment of a relation between 
the conscious subject and the immediate object of conscious- 
ness." An act of sense-perception is such a judgment; a child 
can make it long before he can make the formal judgment 
called a thought, — that is, a judgment of agreement or non- 
agreement between two concepts. 

Again, it is well said, "That our intellectual faculties may 
exist in two distinct states of development, seems to have been 
overlooked by teachers, as well as by educational writers. We 
have no hesitation in saying that the higher faculties, in their 
first or simpler forms, may be healthfully exercised at an early 
age. A child of seven years readily forms simple abstractions, 
and reasons clearly about concrete things." 



THE NATURE OF MIND 23 

The Emotions. — Another able writer says: "We demand 
that we feel towards objects in proportion to their rank and 
worth. To be interested solely in physical goods, is the mark 
of an animal life. To be enthusiastic over the insignificant, is a 
form of folly that finds its perfection in the fool. To be cold 
and indifferent towards the highest, indicates either an atrophy, 
or a distortion, of the emotional nature. The indifferent must 
be treated with indifference ; the commonplace must not be ex- 
alted; enthusiasm and devotion belong only to noble objects ; 
and wrath must be reserved for injustice, baseness, and degra- 
dation." 

The Will. — Of the will, another keen writer says: "When 
exercised only in the gratification of animal appetites, it is 
brute-will ; when fulfilling the ends of free, spontaneous (vol- 
untary) thinking, it is the scientific will ; and when executing 
the imperatives of the reason, it is the spiritual will in liberty." 

Nature of Mind. — Although we claim to know 
nothing of the real nature of mind, or of matter, still 
it is important that we have certain clear, fundamental 
conceptions regarding each, and regarding their rela- 
tions to each other. 

Mind, a Unit. — We should think of the mind as 
one indivisible thing, neither made up of parts, nor 
an aggregate of powers or capabilities. And yet it 
has the power of acting in various ways ; and to these 
several ways of acting, we find it necessary to give 
names. Hence, we speak of the mind's Powers or 
Faculties ; but we must not think of these powers as 
things in themselves, nor as being parts of the mind. 
For instance, the mind has the power to remember, 
which we call Memory. But Memory is not a part 
of the mind ; it is the ability of the mind to do a spe- 
cific act. An act of memory is an act of the whole 
mind, in accomplishing a certain result. 



24 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Mind, an Entity. — We believe that the mind is a 
real thing, and that it will live after the body is dead. 
Although we know nothing of human minds discon- 
nected from bodies, we see no reason to doubt that a 
soul may be thus disconnected without any essential 
change in its nature or function. Even Mr. Bain says : 
"For anything we can see, the body might have its 
bodily functions without the soul, and the soul might 
have its psychical functions in some other connection 
than our present bodies." 

Differences of Mind and Matter. — There are good 
reasons for denying that mind and matter are the 
same thing viewed from two different stand-points, or 
that mind is a product of matter. 

(i.) Matter manifests itself only by its qualities; 
mind manifests itself only by its acts. 

(2.) The characteristic quality of matter is its occu- 
pation of space ; it is impossible, perhaps, even to 
conceive of mind as occupying space. 

(3.) The law of matter is Inertia, — it never moves 
unless some force moves it; we are sure that mind 
has the power to originate its own activity. 

(4.) The characteristic of mind is consciousness; 
wherever there is consciousness there is mental activ- 
ity, or mind. But there is no evidence that con- 
sciousness is ever found in dead matter. 

(5.) Mind has the power to know its own acts; 
only mind knows the qualities of matter. 

Mind, a Product of Matter •? — There are philoso- 
phers who teach that mind is the product of molec- 
ular movements in the brain, — that a "little agitation 
of the brain" is thought, — that the "brain secretes 



THE NATURE OF MIND 2$ 

thought as the liver secretes bile." But to suppose 
that matter in any way produces mind involves the 
absurdity of supposing that something totally inert 
and unconscious can produce that which is both con- 
scious and self-active. Can anything be greater than 
its maker? Can any effect exceed its cause? 

Mind and Body Closely Related. — But, while 
we believe that mind and body are not the same 
thing, nor one the product of the other, yet in the 
living human being they are very closely related. A 
keen writer says : ' ' Body and mind are so closely 
connected that it may be doubted whether anything 
ever takes place in the one without being registered 
in the other." 

We all know how intense thought shows itself in 
the bowed head, the contracted brow, or the clenched 
hand ; it may even make one unconscious of physical 
discomfort. Strong emotion, as anger, joy, or fear, 
will not only show itself by involuntary movements 
of the muscles, but will seriously interfere with the 
vital functions of the stomach, the heart, etc.; nay, 
will sometimes even cause death. The action of a 
strong will shows itself in the whole bodily attitude 
and movement. Almost every form of mental activ- 
ity has its appropriate outward bodily manifestation ; 
in this fact lies the significance of gestures. 

On the other hand, causes that belong in the body 
alone, have much influence on mental states and activ- 
ities. Who can think well, or be perfectly calm and 
serene, when suffering from toothache? Whose mind 
is clear when his stomach is struggling with an over- 
load of indigestible food? And a mental state, or 

Psy.— 3. 



26 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

form of mental activity, may often be induced by the 
performance of the appropriate bodily act. 

Mind and Brain. — While there is a close connec- 
tion between the mind and the whole body, the con- 
nection is most intimate between the mind, and the 
brain and nervous system. The brain seems to be 
the mind's instrument; probably there is never any 
mental activity that is not accompanied by move- 
ments and changes in the brain. 

A description of the brain and nervous system be- 
longs to physiology. But all teachers should feel the 
importance of having the brain nourished with good 
blood ; this is impossible without good food, good air, 
and exercise. Nor should they forget that the brain 
always demands rest after labor. Especially is this 
true of the brains of children, for the child's brain, 
like his muscle, has not the power of endurance that 
belongs to the adult. The best rest for the brain is 
sound sleep. 

It is well-known that the muscles of children can not, with- 
out damage, be put to the hard work which the muscles of a 
man can safely perform. But physiologists tell us that the 
child's brain grows more rapidly, proportionately, than his mus- 
cles; is there not, therefore, much greater danger of overtaxing 
the child's brain than of overtaxing his muscles ? 

Culture of the Mind's Powers. — The specific 
work of the teacher is the cultivation of the minds 
of his pupils, — not simply giving them knowledge to 
be memorized. And even the knowledge acquired, 
useful as it may be, should confer a greater benefit 
upon the pupil by the mental culture it gives than by 
the practical ends it may serve. 



THE NATURE OF MIND 27 

TEN PRECEPTS OF MENTAL CULTURE * 

1. The object of mental culture is the fullest de- 
velopment and highest right activity of the faculties 
of the mind. 

2. One of the primary conditions of mental culture 
is a well organized and healthy brain. 

3. The mind is cultivated by the right activity of 
its faculties. 

4. The mind requires objective realities for it to 
act upon. 

5. Each faculty of the mind requires a culture 
adapted to itself. 

6. The culture of the mind should be adapted to 
the order of the development of its faculties. 

7. The culture of the mind should aim at a har- 
monious development of all the faculties. 

8. The culture of the mind should be modified to 
suit the different tastes and talents of the pupils. 

9. The culture of the mind is not creative in its 
character; its object is to develop existing possibili- 
ties into realities. 

10. The ultimate end of mental culture is the at- 
tainment of the threefold result — learning, develop- 
ment, and efficiency. 



* These ten precepts of Mental Culture have been taken from Dr. Ed- 
ward Brooks, and slightly changed in phraseology. 



General Powers. 



f i. Consciousness. 
\ 2. Attention. 
[ j. Conception. 





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Note. — In this Scheme, we have included only such of the sensibilities 

as have special importance for the teacher. 
(28) 




CHAPTER III 

GENERAL POWERS, CONSCIOUSNESS 

N order to bring before the mind of the 
reader clearly and distinctly, the psychic- 
al powers and their relation to each 
other, we give the foregoing scheme. 
General Powers. — We have already 
defined a Power as the ability to do something ; but 
some philosophers make a distinction between a mental 
Power and a mental Faculty. 

A Faculty is a power under the control of the will, 
having a specific work of its own to do. 

According to this definition, we must class Seeing, 
Memory, Judgment, Love, etc., as mental faculties. 
But the mind has three very important powers that 
do not answer to the definition of faculties ; these are, 
Consciousness, Attention, and Conception. 

The powers of Consciousness, Attention, and Conception 
never act separately from each other, nor from some one or 
more of the mind's faculties. These powers are not co-ordi- 
nate with the faculties, but are connected with them all. Hence, 
in the Scheme, their names are written across, opposite a brace 
that includes the faculties in all the three Grand Divisions. 

(29) 



30 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Definition. — Consciousness is the power the mind 
has to know its own actions and states, and to know them 
as belonging to the Ego. 

This is not a faculty ; it is not under the control of 
the will, nor does it perform any specific act of itself; 
it gives cognizance of the acts performed by the fac- 
ulties, and of the Ego as their subject. 

Dr. Hopkins says: "We would define consciousness to be 
the knowledge by the mind of itself as the permanent and in- 
divisible subject of its own operations. Consciousness holds 
the whole in unity by a constant reference of the different acts 
and states of the mind to the indivisible self or Ego." Thus, 
consciousness is the ground of the idea of personal identity. 
We think this is true ; but we believe consciousness includes 
both the state, or act, and the Ego. 

Necessary to Mental Activity. — Consciousness 
is necessary to any mental activity ; it is the charac- 
teristic of mind. Two persons direct their eyes to the 
same landscape or picture; the same image is upon 
the retina of the eye in both. But both do not see 
the same things; each sees what he is conscious of 
seeing, — no more. In fact, he may be so absorbed 
in thought, or so overpowered by emotion, as to see 
absolutely nothing. A burst of harmony from several 
instruments or several voices may fall on the ear ; the 
hearer may be conscious of the harmony as a whole, 
or he may be conscious of the individual tone of one 
voice or one instrument. He hears just what he is 
conscious of hearing. So of all other mental acts, — 
there is no unconscious mental activity; not to be 
conscious that you remember, is not to remember. 

Consciousness has sometimes been compared to a light, show- 
ing to one's self what is in his mind. It puts nothing into the 



GENERAL POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS 31 

mind ; it simply shows what is already there. We can not will 
to be more or less conscious ; we shall be more conscious when 
we have more in the mind to -be conscious of, — in no other way. 

Objects of Consciousness. — In other words, of 
what can we be conscious? 

i. The Ego. — We may be conscious of the Ego, 
as thinking, feeling, or willing. 

2. Acts and States. — We may be conscious of the 
activity, or state of the mind, in perceiving, remem- 
bering, loving, choosing, etc. 

3. Products. — We may be conscious of the prod- 
ucts of these actions, — our concepts, our thoughts, 
our feelings, our choices, etc. 

4. The Non-Ego in Contact? — Some hold that we 
may be conscious of the Non-Ego, as in the case of 
something resisting our muscular effort; Sir William 
Hamilton thinks so, if we understand him. 

All these objects of consciousness, except the last, belong 
strictly to the Ego. Nor can we be conscious of anything ex- 
cept that which is before the mind at the present instant ; con- 
sciousness can not deal with the past nor the future. In re- 
membering, we are not conscious of that which we remember; 
we are conscious only of the concept of it which is now before 
the mind. You may be conscious that you were conscious 
yesterday, — that is, you are conscious of your present concept 
of the former consciousness. You may be conscious of a pres- 
ent concept of that which is future. 

Testimony of Consciousness. — We know most 
thoroughly that of which we are conscious. You 
know that you are hearing when you are conscious 
that you hear; and, if you are asked how you know 
you are conscious, there is no further answer to be 
given, — consciousness is the "bottom fact." When 
one forms a judgment, he is conscious of the result; 



32 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

that is, he knows what decision he has made. The 
decision may be false or true, consciousness can tell 
him nothing as to that; but consciousness can not 
mistake as to what the decision is. 

Mental Activity without Consciousness? — We 
have said that consciousness is the characteristic of 
mind. If this be true, there is no exhibition of mind 
apart from consciousness, — there can be no uncon- 
scious mental activity. "Unconscious knowing and 
unconscious willing are phrases which defy all inter- 
pretation. " But cases are often cited where there 
seems to be mental activity without any conscious- 
ness; at least, there is no remembrance of any con- 
sciousness. It is said that a reporter in the House of 
Lords became very weary, and fell into a state of un- 
consciousness; but that he made a correct report of 
all that was said during the time he was unconscious. 
The explanation, doubtless, is either that he was not 
entirely unconscious, but was simply unable to re- 
member the slight degree of consciousness that he 
had, or that his action in reporting was purely auto- 
matic, — that his fingers, through long habit, responded 
correctly to the impressions that fell upon his ear, 
without any mental action whatever. 

"Unconscious knowledge" seems to be contradictory in 
terms. Yet much of our knowledge, doubtless, has not been 
consciously formulated ; a child or a savage knows that a part 
can not equal the whole, and still he may not be able to state 
his knowledge to another. Perhaps his mind has never con- 
ceived such a statement. 

Unconscious Cerebration. — Such action as the 
supposition about the reporter implies, would be a 
case of "unconscious cerebration", — that is, brain 



GENERAL POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS 33 

activity unaccompanied by mental activity. All mus- 
cular activity is prompted by an impulse from the 
nervous system ; but often this is attended by no 
mental activity. An involuntary kick when the foot 
is tickled, is a movement of this kind. It is called 
"natural reflex action," which is- an involuntary re- 
sponse of the motor nerve to an excitement of the sensory 
neroe. The limbs of a dead man may be made to 
move in this way, by an electric shock. 

Habit. — But it is found that movements which 
were at first guided by the mind may become so fa- 
miliar that they become reflex, and require no more 
thought, or mental activity, than natural reflex action 
does. It is so in walking; and, with an expert mu- 
sician, the playing on an instrument may be of the 
same kind. Muscular habit is induced reflex action ; 
that is, it is prompted by unconscious cerebration. In 
this consists the value of such habits: they enable 
us to do things correctly and rapidly without any out- 
lay of mental power. 

And it is very important to notice that mental hab- 
its may be formed, which tend to become similarly 
automatic, perhaps because, by long continuance, the 
action of the brain becomes reflex, like the action of 
the muscles. This shows how a result of the multi- 
plication of two small numbers appears without effort 
in the mind of one familiar with the multiplication 
table. Thus, you think "twelve" whenever you hear 
"four times three." Anything in which one is thor- 
oughly educated has taken on the form of habit ; and 
it is the true business an.d aim of education to form 
right habits, — physical, intellectual, and moral. 



34 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Some very curious phenomena, aside from those that result 
from known habit, may be explained, perhaps, by unconscious 
cerebration. You grapple with a difficult problem in the even- 
ing ; it baffles you, and you give it up, retire, and sleep. In the 
morning, the solution is perfectly easy and clear. You try to 
recall the name of a person ; you fail, and give it up. An hour 
after, when all desire- or use for the name has passed, it sud- 
denly comes before your mind with provoking clearness. In 
these and many similar cases, it may be that movements in the 
brain, having been started in a certain direction, have continued 
until they have wrought out the result, simply by unconscious 
cerebration, — without any mental activity until we become con- 
scious of the result itself. 

What we Know. — In the strictest sense, we know 
nothing except what is before consciousness at this 
moment. In a looser sense, — which is the common 
one, — we know all that we can recall into conscious- 
ness. When the child truthfully says, ' ' I know, but 
I can't think," he means that it is possible for him to 
bring the thing in question into his consciousness, but 
that he can not do it at this moment. 

Our knowledge now in consciousness is like our money in 
hand; all our other knowledge is like our money in the bank. 
And the one who can not recall what he knows, at the moment, 
is like a depositor after the bank is shut. 

The Ego in Consciousness. — Our definition of 
consciousness implies that each act of consciousness 
has two sides; one relates to the thing known, the 
other relates to the Ego as knowing. But attention 
may be directed more fully to the one or to the other. 
The expression " I am conscious that I see," may in- 
dicate to which side the attention is directed, by the 
word on which the emphasis is placed. Place the 
emphasis on the last word, and note the meaning; 



GENERAL POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS 



35 



now place it on next to the last word, and note the 
striking difference in meaning. 

All consciousness is of necessity self-consciousness, 
but, when undue attention is given to the Ego, we 
have what is commonly called self-consciousness, or 
abnormal consciousness. Every thoughtful person 
knows how much such consciousness of self interferes 
with our best performances, and how ridiculous and 
contemptible it sometimes makes one appear. For- 
get self, if you would do your best before your fellows. 
Such unfortunate and mischievous consciousness of 
self may be due: — 

i. To morbid "sensitiveness", — the result of he- 
redity or of bad education. 

2. To a real, or supposed, feeble or morbid condi- 
tion of the body. 

3. To undue pride, vanity, or self-love. 

4. To a knowledge of personal defect, ignorance, 
or unworthiness. 

Can Consciousness be Cultivated? — Conscious- 
ness is not under control of the will, — it can "pro- 
duce" nothing. Hence, to speak of its products or 
its cultivation, seems to be an abuse of language. 




*,s*wb 




CHAPTER IV 

GENERAL POWERS, ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 

EFINITION. — Attention is the power the 
mind has to bring all its force to bear on 
one thing. 

Important as this power is, it pro- 
duces no result alone, and of itself. 
Hence, it is not to be considered a faculty, although 
it is under the control of the will. 

When we say that attention is under the control of the will, 
we do not mean that it never acts except in obedience to a 
mandate of the will, but simply that the will can cause it to 
act. The same is true of other voluntary powers ; we often re- 
member without willing to do so, but memory can be moved 
by the will. 

Mode of Action. — If it be asked how the mind 
turns its force to one thing in an act of attention, 
the answer seems to be that it is done by not allow- 
ing the mental force to move towards anything else. 
This restraining, or limiting, of the mental force is 
the act of attention. 

Illustration. — The mental current may be compared 
to a stream of water — it flows constantly. In revery 
and absence of attention, it is like that stream flow- 
ing down the mountain side, and spreading, unre- 
(36) 



ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 37 

stricted, over the meadows ; it may be pleasant 
enough, but it does no work. When one wishes to 
put the stream to work, he puts a dam across it, and 
allows no place of escape, except at the point where 
he puts his wheel. So we put the mind to work by 
confining the mental force to one point of escape. 
If we can do this completely, the attention is per- 
fect, — no force is lost; if not, the power in part es- 
capes, like lost water through a leaky dam. 

Meanings of the Word. — When we speak of At- 
tention, we always have reference to the direction in 
which the force and activity of the mind are turned. 
It may be spontaneous, — it is always so in the case 
of the child, — as when something attracts us power- 
fully; or as in the case of revery or day-dreaming, 
although the latter is often called lack of attention. 
Or the attention may be voluntary, as when one reso- 
lutely sets himself to the performance of a task. We 
properly mean, however, by attention, either the 
power of the mind to direct its course by the force 
of the will, or the act which this power thus performs. 
There is a close connection between interest and at- 
tention ; it is very easy to attend to anything that in- 
terests us deeply. Interest may even compel us to 
attend against our will. But, on the other hand, if, 
through a sense of duty we oblige ourselves to at- 
tend to that which does not interest us at present, 
interest is very sure to follow. Attention is always 
due to interest or will, or to both. 

The word "attention" is often used to signify the mind's force 
itself, rather than the power of the will over it ; as when one 
says, "Give your whole attention to this subject." 



38 elements of psychology 

Power of the Will over the Mind's Action. — 
In what respects has the will power over the mind's 
activities? First, it may arouse and incite the mind 
to activity; or, in other words, the mind may arouse 
itself through the action of the will. Secondly, the 
mind may direct the course of its activity, by will- 
power; this is properly the power of attention. 

And one who has complete control of himself in 
this respect, can call off his mental forces from any 
object with the same readiness that he can direct 
them towards any object. 

The true conception of the operation of the will in an act of 
attention seems to be, not that the will seizes the mind's powers 
and turns them towards a certain object as the hand uses a 
crow-bar, but that the will prevents the mental force from 
moving in any but the desired direction, as in the illustration 
just given. And, in consequence, the mental force, by virtue 
of its own essential activity, goes in the way desired. This 
" liquid theory," if we may so call it, seems to be preferable to 
the " crow-bar theory." 

Mental Activity without Attention? — There 
can be no mental activity without some expenditure 
of the mind's force in a certain direction; hence, there 
must be some degree of attention. Some of our ac- 
tivities are thoroughly habitual; in such cases, there 
is no attention, for there is no mental activity, — the 
movements are purely automatic. For instance, take 
the case of a mechanic at familiar work, of a person 
walking and reading, or of a musician playing a tune 
and talking with a friend at the same time. 

Can we Attend to More than one Thing at a 
Time? — Much has been said on this question; many 
learned men have declared in the negative. They as- 



ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 39 

sert that, in cases where the mind seems to attend to 
more than one thing, the fact is that the mind vibrates 
rapidly from one to the" other ; and they tell us that, 
in the comparing of two objects, we can detect this 
vibratory movement. They seem to be clearly wrong. 
In a case of perfect attention, the mind's forces are all 
brought to bear on one thing, but experience shows 
that in imperfect attention the mental force is divided ; 
in the case of comparing, no conclusion could ever be 
reached, if, in the vibration, only one of the objects 
was the point of attention. The mind must have 
both before it, in order to decide. 

Every one must have observed that in reading or conversa- 
tion there is often an under-current of thought passing in his 
mind, of which he is vividly conscious. 

Objects of Attention. — As attention has refer- 
ence to all the mind's activities or force, and as the 
word often means the mental force itself, of course the 
objects of attention will include everything on which 
mental force can be made to bear. 

Can be Cultivated. — As the will has the power 
to direct the attention, attention can be cultivated; 
and the success of a student will be almost propor- 
tioned to the degree of that cultivation. This is 
equally true of the pupil in school, and of the pro- 
found scholar. How shall it be done ? By a com- 
plete, continued, persistent exercise of sheer will-power 
over the mind's movements. 

In order that a teacher may be of any service to 
his pupils, he must have the power to secure their 
attention. For securing attention in recitation, we 
offer the following rules: — 



4° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Rules. — I.' Look the pupils squarely in the eye. 

2. Say nothing till you have the attention of your 
class; stop, if you lose it. 

3. Talk slowly and clearly. 

4. Say a thing but once. 

5. Hold the pupils strictly responsible for what you 
have said. 

6. Do not put questions to your class in a fixed 
order; propound the question, then name a pupil to 
answer it. Do this habitually. 

7. When the class need such discipline, stop the 
one who is reading or reciting, in the middle of a sen- 
tence, and require another to begin exactly where he 
left off. 

Attention of little children must accompany every successful 
mental effort. There are two ways in which the man may be 
led to give attention : one is by attracting it, so that he attends 
without effort ; the other, by inducing him to attend through 
sheer force of his will-power. The attention of the child can 
be gained in the first way only. It can be attracted and held 
for a short time ; but his will is not strong enough to enable 
him to attend against his inclination, nor after he has become 
weary. And yet he must attend, if he is to do anything to any 
purpose. Nor can his attention be secured by frequent calls 
for attention, nor even by authority. It must be attracted at 
first, and its object must be changed frequently. It is a grad- 
ual process, by which he gets the power to command his atten- 
tion, and this power must be gained by a judicious course of 
training. 

To the teacher there is no subject more important than this 
of attention. Dr. Rosenkranz says: "To education, the con- 
ception of attention is the most important of all those derived 
from Psychology." 

Conception. — It is not easy to frame a short sat- 
isfactory definition for Conception, but there is little 



ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 4 1 

difficulty in naming the particular things that it does. 
It is the power by which we see with the "mind's 
eye" absent objects; by which we perceive the ab- 
stract relations of things ; by which we get clear no- 
tions through discourse or thinking; by which we 
understand why and how things may be, etc. 

When a teacher, after explaining a problem in algebra, asks 
the pupil if he " sees it," he means to ask if it is clear to his 
conception ; of course, he has no reference to the act of sight. 

Perhaps the best short statement for Conception, is 
to say that it is the power by which we see with the 
"mind's eye." When we conceive of a thing fully, 
we see all around it, as it were ; we become acquainted 
with all its limitations; we "take it in"; we compre- 
hend it. But we often apprehend things that we can 
not comprehend ; just as one may see something of a 
mountain when much of it is hidden in clouds. 

We must not limit the possibility of things by our power to 
comprehend them. Many possible things are inconceivable ; 
for instance, the matter of this earth must have been created 
out of nothing, or it must always have existed in some form, 
without any beginning ; both these things are utterly inconceiv- 
able, and yet not only is one of them possible, but it is certain. 
On the other hand, some impossible things are perfectly con- 
ceivable, as the passage of a flying ship to the moon. 

Not a Faculty. — Conception is largely under the 
control of the will, but it accompanies all the other 
mental powers, and produces no specific results alone. 
Hence, it is not a faculty. 

There is a special use of the Conceptive power in forming 
abstract, general concepts ; for instance, when the ideas of sur- 
face limited by three lines, are combined, we have the abstract, 
general concept signified by the word " triangle." This combina- 

Psy.— 4. 



4 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tion is made by Conception acting with the Reflective Power ; 
such a use of the Conceptive Power may be called Logical Con- 
ception. More will be said of this hereafter. 

Meanings of the Word. — Dr. Haven says, "This 
term (Conception) has been employed in various senses 
by different writers. I conceive of a thing when I 
make it a distinct object of thought, when I appre- 
hend it, when I construe it to myself as a possible 
thing, and as being thus and thus. This form of 
mental activity enters more or less into all our mental 
operations; it is involved in perception, memory, 
imagination, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, etc. 
For this reason, it is not to be ranked as one of, and 
correlate with, these several specific faculties." 

It seems to us that these statements are eminently 
just, and that we must reckon conception as a general 
mental power; but it is not a faculty, for the reason 
given by Dr. Haven. 

We think common language shows that in the minds of men 
in general there is such a conception of this mental power as 
is expressed above. Take such expressions as " I have a dis- 
tinct conception of his personal appearance," — " I have no con- 
ception how that can be," — " This is my conception of the mean- 
ing of the statement," etc. Common language is the expres- 
sion of common knowledge, and of common modes of thought ; 
and it often deserves great weight in considering a thing in its 
scientific aspect. Note what is said on page 16, about common 
knowledge and scientific knowledge. 

What is Conception? — From Dr. Haven's state- 
ment of the several uses of conception, it is readily 
seen that a short and comprehensive definition for this 
power is not easily found. We venture to propose 
the following, as a tentative definition : Conception is 
the minds power to represent things to itself. 



ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 43 

What is a Concept? — A concept is a product of 
the conceptive power ; it is the elementary unit of the 
mind's operations. Or, A Concept is a mental product 
whose expression is a single term. 

The concept may be simple, as that expressed by the word 
"redness"; or it may be complex, as that expressed by the 
words, "A man in uniform, riding rapidly, on a spirited black 
horse "; but the expression makes but a single term in language. 

A concept of an object of sight is perhaps the most 
readily recognized, as the concept of an absent friend's 
face, or of some familiar scene. But we certainly 
have concepts of sounds, odors, tastes, sensations. 
Nor are our concepts by any means confined to prod- 
ucts of the senses ; we have concepts of all our mental 
activities and states. We also have concepts of the 
abstract qualities of things, as well as of relations of 
all kinds, — for instances, the relation of eight to 
twelve, or of crime to ill-desert. 

Many writers use the words "idea," "picture," "image," 
etc., where we would use the word " concept." These words all 
refer to the sense of sight. " Idea " comes from a Greek word 
which means a form ; hence, these words may do very well for 
concepts of objects of sight, but they are not strictly appropriate 
when applied to other concepts. "A picture of an odor" is a 
strange use of words, to say the least. 

The Concept, an Intellection. — We may readily 
form a concept of an emotion or a volition, but the 
concept itself is a pure intellection. Your present 
concept of a sorrow felt a year ago is not sorrow, is 
not an emotion. It may give rise to a new feeling of 
sorrow, or you may have learned that the sorrow was 
causeless, and so have no present feeling in regard to 
it; or, again, it may have been caused by something 



44 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

which turned out to be ludicrous, and so it now may 
give rise to a feeling of mirth. 

Truth of Concepts. — Our concepts in themselves 
are neither true nor false ; we can predicate nothing 
of truth or falsity concerning them till we have some 
judgment or belief respecting them. I may conceive 
of a horse with wings of silk ; this concept is neither 
true nor false. But if I judge, or believe, that such 
a horse really exists, it is quite probable that my 
judgment concerning that concept, is false. 

Logical, or General, Concepts. — Many writers 
attempt to confine the word " conception," exclusive- 
ly to that use of the power by which we form general, 
or logical, concepts. But very few of them, so far as 
we have observed, fail to use the word repeatedly in 
their writings, as though it meant what we have ex- 
plained above ; we think they show in this way their 
mistake in attempting to restrict its meaning to only 
one of its uses. 

A logical concept, such as is expressed by the word 
' ' man " or the word ' ' triangle, " is not a concept of an 
object, but of a bundle of attributes that belongs to 
every one of the class to which the term may properly 
be applied. The term itself serves as a cord or strap 
to hold the bundle together. 

If one uses, in speaking to you, the phrase " a man," he asks 
you to respond with the concept, or "image," of an individual 
man; but if he says "man," he asks you to respond with a 
concept of a bundle of qualities common to all men. Rarely 
are all the elements of such a concept distinct and perfectly 
clear in the mind of the one who uses the term, or of the one who 
hears it ; and still it serves very well for ordinary purposes. 
Were it not so, our language would become very meager and 



ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 45 

very barren. Even a child, who could do little or nothing to- 
wards analyzing and denning the general concept expressed 
by the word " cow," must have that concept in his mind with 
some fair degree of distinctness. How, else, could he place an 
animal in the class " cow," so readily, on seeing an individual 
specimen of the class ? 

Cultivation of Conception. — The will has great 
control over our conceptions; hence, the power can 
be highly cultivated, both in its common use, and 
in its use to form and analyze general and logical con- 
cepts. And the work of the wise and earnest teacher 
will show no more profitable results in the culture of 
any other mental power of his pupils. A bright mind 
is one whose conceptive power is clear and strong. 
Dullness is due to lack of this power. "Parrot" reci- 
tations are of words without their accompanying con- 
cepts. Mechanical reading is calling over words, in 
this way, from a book. Mechanical, meaningless 
mathematical work is the blind following of rules 
while the conceptive power is asleep. Much of our 
school work, we are sorry to say, is performed in such 
a way as to put this power to sleep; and the more 
we work with tongue, or pen, or hand while concep- 
tion sleeps, the more soundly it will sleep while we 
thus work. This is the process by which many little 
children, who entered school bright, keen, and inquis- 
itive, are made dull and stupid after attending the 
school for a few months. 

A really "lively" school exercise of any kind is 
not to be measured by the noise made, nor by the 
amount of manual activity; but by the fullness and 
clearness of the conceptive power used. No reading 
by older or younger pupils will be correct, — except, 



46 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

perhaps, with the correctness of mechanical imita- 
tion, — until conception gives life to the words spoken. 
No Geography lesson is worth anything that does not 
fill the mind with correct and lively pictures. No 
mathematical work is anything but a mechanical 
"grind" till the pupil "sees" the relation of the 
parts with his "mind's eye." 

Our concepts of sensible things must be based on our sense- 
perception of them; hence the importance of careful and cor- 
rect perceptions, in order that our concepts derived from them 
may be correct. These concepts are to be the material with 
which the mind must work, in all its thought and reflection 
concerning objects of sense. 



CHAPTER V 

THE INTELLECT, DEFINITIONS AND FIRST PRINCIPLES 




HE Intellect. — The group of knowing 
powers, or the Intellect, is subdivided 
into four groups; viz., the Presentative 
Powers, the Representative Powers, the 
Reflective Powers, and the Intuitive 
Power. This division is exhaustive. 

The Presentative Powers give us knowledge of the out- 
side world through the senses. 

The Representative Powers give us concepts of absent 
objects. 

The Reflective Powers show us the relations and con- 
nections of objects, or of their concepts. 

The Intuitive Power is the power by which we knoiv 
certain fundamental things without being taught. 

The word " object" must not be confined to material things. 
When we say that these powers do these acts, we must remem- 
ber that the powers themselves are not entities. It is the mind, 
— the one indivisible mind, — that performs all these acts ; but 
its power to do one thing is called by one name, and its power 
to do another thing is called by another name. It is the mind 
that perceives through the senses, that represents, that reflects, 
that has certain ideas and thoughts without teaching. 

(47) 



48 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The Intuitive Power. — Because of its funda- 
mental character and the intimate relation of its action 
and products to the other intellectual powers, it seems 
best to say something about this power and its prod- 
ucts, before we proceed to speak of the other divis- 
ions of the Intellect. 

It is said that the Intuitive Power acts in only one 
way, but that its products are of two kinds. By this 
power, we have certain fundamental notions, ideas, or 
concepts; and also certain necessary, self-evident truths. 

Some assert that we get all our knowledge, of every sort, 
through experience and reflection ; they claim that this is as 
true in regard to what we have called the ideas and truths of 
intuition, as it is of our knowledge of the qualities of objects. 
We hold, however, that observation and experience merely 
furnish an occasion for this kind of knowledge; they do not 
cause us to have it. 

Truths. — Thus, we know that a part can not equal 
the whole ; we know that the same thing can not be 
in two places at the same time ; we know that a state- 
ment can not be both true and not true at the same 
time and in the same sense. All such truths every 
sane and sound mind knows at once, as soon as it is 
capable of comprehending clearly what is said. We 
can not disbelieve them, if we try. No attempt at 
proof can make us believe them any more firmly. 
In fact, no proof of them is possible ; we may illustrate 
such truths by individual instances, but we can not 
demonstrate them. Many of these truths are included 
in the axioms of mathematics; but there are axioms 
which do not belong to mathematics. 

All necessary, self-evident truths have these three 
characteristics: ist, They are true everywhere, and 



THE INTELLECT 49 

at all times ; 2d, They can not be demonstrated ; 3d, 
The contradictory of any one of them is manifestly 
absurd. To illustrate, take the axiom that a whole is 
equal to the sum of all its parts. This must be true 
everywhere, and it must be true at all times. We 
may illustrate it, — that is, we may show it to be true 
in any given case; but we can not prove that it will 
always be true in every case. The contradictory, viz. , 
that the whole is not equal to the sum of all its parts, 
is seen to be absurd at once by any one capable of 
understanding the statement. 

Ideas. — Philosophers do not agree as to the num- 
ber of fundamental ideas given us by Intuition. We 
may safely say that there are seven of them, at least ; 
viz., Being, Time, Space, Beauty, Cause, Right, and 
Personal Identity. 

Being. — By the intuitive idea of Being, we mean 
that all men naturally and always believe in the ex- 
istence of themselves and of other things. None 
but crazy men and some philosophers ever think or 
talk as if there could be any doubt about this. 

Time. — The intuitive idea of Time is the nec- 
essary notion of time as passing whenever we think 
of the occurrence of events. We can not rid our- 
selves of this idea; in thought we may empty time 
of every event, but we can not think the time away. 
In respect to definite amounts of time, we exercise 
our judgment and experience; but the idea that there 
must be some amount of time, is intuitive. 

Space. t — The intuitive idea of Space is very similar ; 
when we think of bodies, we are compelled to think 
of them as existing in space. We judge of the amount 

Psy -5. 



50 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

of space in any particular instance, but we can not 
get rid of the idea that space is, and must be ; we can 
empty it in thought, but we can not think it away, 
nor think of it as finite. 

Beauty. — The intuitive idea of Beauty is that there 
is, and must be, such a thing as beauty ; or, in other 
words, that some things are beautiful and some are 
not. The child shows that he has this idea very early ; 
"pretty" is one of his first words. The judgment 
decides as to the beauty of'any particular thing, and 
the decisions differ very widely. 

Cause. — We believe intuitively that every effect 
must have a cause; the child shows that this idea is 
inherent by his questions "Why?" "What makes 
it?" etc. A cause that is not itself caused is incon- 
ceivable to him ; is it not beyond the comprehension 
of any one? Judgment pronounces as to what the 
cause is, in a particular case. 

It is highly important that we do not confound the occasion 
of a thing with its cause. The occasion of a thing allows it to 
be or to be done ; the cause makes it to be or to be done. To 
illustrate : The expansive force of steam is the cause of motion 
in the locomotive ; the opening of the valve, or throttle, is the 
occasion of the motion. 

Right. — The idea that there is such a thing as 
Right, — that some things are right, and others are 
wrong, — seems to be intuitive. "Is it right?" is a 
question that has a meaning to a very young child; 
parents and teachers would do better to ask it more 
frequently. Judgment decides whether a% specific 
thing is right or not. As in the other cases named, 
these decisions vary greatly. 



THE INTELLECT 51 

Personal Identity. — No sane person can divest him- 
self of the idea that he is himself, — the same person- 
ality that he always has been. It is intuitive; he is 
conscious that it is so, and that is the end of all 
question. Nor would the testimony of a thousand 
strengthen his conviction. 

We may say that a knowledge of these fundamental, 
intuitive truths and ideas, is innate; that is, we are so 
constituted at birth that, as soon as the occasion arises 
for this knowledge, we have it, and that without any 
instruction or study. And we take it for granted that 
every one else has this knowledge the same as we 
have; we pronounce one an idiot, or insane, if he is 
lacking in this respect. For, a recognition of these 
products of Intuition constitutes what we call natural 
reason. Reason, as we here use it, must not be con- 
founded with the Power of reasoning; some insane 
people can reason most logically, but they have lost 
their reason, as they show in various ways. 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTELLECT 

The Mind knozvs by its owji Activity. — A writer 
truly says, ' ' Every concept or idea is formed in the 
mind that -possesses it, by the mind's own activity. It 
is not received; it is produced." A skillful teacher 
will cause a pupil to know what he did not know be- 
fore. But he does this, not by transferring his own 
concepts and thoughts to the learner, but by causing 
the learner to produce in his own mind the same con- 
cepts and thoughts that are in the teacher's mind. 
Hence, knowledge can not be imparted, in the strict 
sense of the word ; it can only be induced, or awak- 



52 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ened. It is sometimes said that knowledge differs 
wonderfully from money or material goods, in that the 
one who imparts it has no less than he had before. 
The wonder disappears when we see that knowledge 
is never imparted at all. The mind that gets knowl- 
edge must produce it for itself, under proper condi- 
tions and with proper helps. This is a fundamental 
principle of mental acquisition that no teacher can 
ignore without disastrous consequences; some of the 
greatest evils in our schools are due to the false no- 
tion that words convey knowledge. 

What the human Mind is Like. — On the one hand, 
the human mind is, in some of its aspects, like the 
minds of intelligent animals. There seems to be the 
clearest evidence that the mind of a horse or a dog per- 
ceives through the senses much as a human mind does; 
and some of the acts of animals in remembering seem 
to be exactly like similar acts of memory in man. But 
there is no evidence that the animal can perform the 
higher acts of abstraction and reasoning, nor that he 
has an intuition of right, nor any sense of obligation, 
nor any conscience, nor any religious capacity. 

On the other hand, the fact that man can under- 
stand the laws of nature, that he can in some cases 
demonstrate their necessity by mathematical formulae, 
seems to show very clearly that man's mind is akin 
to the Mind that made and governs the Universe. 
Who can doubt that the old astronomer was right, 
when he said, "Oh, my God, I think thy thoughts 
after Thee!" Any student of natural science who 
clearly comprehends one of its laws, thinks the 
thoughts of God after him, — in some degree, at least. 



THE INTELLECT 53 

Three Steps in the Intellectual Process. — The mind 
gathers the crude material of its knowledge by the 
use of the perceptive powers. The exercise of sense- 
perception is also the occasion of the development 
of those fundamental ideas and truths which the mind 
has through the intuitive power. Conception after- 
wards brings before the mind the concepts of that 
knowledge which has been gathered by the use of 
the perceptive powers. Then, by the reflective 
power, or the "Elaborative Faculty," the significa- 
tion, the relation, and the use of what has been gath- 
ered, are discovered. The three steps, then, are Per- 
ception, Conception, and Reflection, or Thinking, 
as that word is used by philosophers. It is an old 
saying that, "There is nothing in the Intellect that 
was not first in the Sense." This is very true, if we 
except the products of intuition, or the "Natural 
Reason." All the highest thoughts of the philoso- 
pher or the poet have been elaborated from the crude 
material obtained through sense-perception. A failure 
to recognize these three necessary steps in their order 
is the reason why so many teachers are vainly striv- 
ing to build up conceptions or to induce reasoning in 
the minds of their pupils, by the use of mere words 
which have never been filled with meaning through 
a proper use of the perceptive powers. 

Mr. Tate says, "All our knowledge is derived from three 
sources; viz., sensation, reflectio7i, and the primitive laws in- 
volved in our mental operations." By the last, he means the 
ideas and truths given to us by Intuition ; that is, by the very 
nature of the mind itself. 




CHAPTER VI 

THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 

HE Presentative Powers. — The Pre- 
servative Powers, often called the Per- 
ceptives, seem to get their name in this 
way: Since the days of the old Greeks, 
men have divided the Universe for every 
man, into the Ego and the Non-Ego; the Ego is the 
man himself, and the Non-Ego includes everything 
except himself. The Presentative Powers, or the 
senses, present, as it were, the things of the Non-Ego 
to the Ego, shut up, as he seems to be, somewhere 
in this bodily tenement. They are a kind of " intro- 
duction committee." 

The Senses. — The senses are commonly said to be 
five in number : — Feeling, or the sense of touch, See- 
ing, Hearing, Tasting, and Smelling. To these, some 
philosophers add a sixth sense, which they call the 
Sense of Resistance to Muscular Effort. 

Feeling is the most general of all the senses, as it 
extends over the whole body, wherever the nerves 
are found. There is some propriety in saying that 
the other senses are modifications of feeling, because 
they all require special nerves for their action. All 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 55 

these special nerves are located in the head. Two of 
the senses, seeing and hearing, in addition to the spe- 
cial nerves, also require curiously constructed organs. 

Most of the words used to designate the powers of the mind, 
may also signify the acts which the powers perform, and often 
the products of the acts ; thus, Feeling may mean the power to 
feel, or the act of feeling. The same is true of Memory, 
Judgment, etc. Whenever we use one of these words, we do 
well to think carefully whether we mean by it the power, or 
the act which that power is able to perform. 

The sense of feeling makes us acquainted with such 
objects only as are close to us. It also acts slowly, 
from the parts to the whole ; this is illustrated by the 
actions of a blind man as he studies objects that he 
handles. We all act in a similar way when we grope 
in the dark ; hence, feeling has two limitations. 

Seeing is very different; it shows us objects that 
are near or very distant, and it acts rapidly ; it gives 
us notions of things as wholes at first, and afterwards 
studies their parts. The special nerves of sight are 
called the optic nerves. But sight can not act when 
light is absent, nor when the rays are obstructed by 
opaque objects; hence, sight has two limitations. 

Hearing. — The medium through which we hear 
must always be present where life is possible, for it is 
the air we breathe ; nor do intervening objects wholly 
prevent our hearing. No other sense affects the emo- 
tions so quickly or so deeply as hearing; this is seen 
in the effects of music, and of the tones of the voice. 
The auditory nerve is the special nerve of hearing. 

The senses we have considered make us acquainted with the 
size, shape, position, resonance, etc., of bodies; in other words, 
with such qualities of bodies as have relation to space. 



5°" ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Tasting and Smelling. — But tasting and smelling, 
by means of the gustatory and olfactory nerves, enable 
us to learn much of the composition and condition of 
bodies. We judge by the use of these senses whether 
substances are fit to be taken into our organism or 
not. Hence, the special nerves for these senses are 
found in the mouth and nose, the gateways to the 
stomach and lungs. 

Sense of Resistance. — When you allow an object 
merely to touch your hand, you simply feel it; but 
when you let it rest upon your hand, and put forth 
muscular effort to sustain it, your sense seems to give 
you something besides simple feeling; you have a 
sense of something resisting your muscular effort. 
This is why some philosophers say that there is a 
sixth sense ; and they say that no other sense makes 
us know so soon and so certainly that there are ob- 
jects outside of our own organism. 

Teachers can teach young children a great many truths about 
the "five senses," but they had better say nothing to them 
about the sixth sense. Children should understand that it is 
the mind that acts through these nerves and organs of the 
senses. The eye does not see; but the mind sees by means of 
the eye, using it as an instrument. 

Because the Sense of Resistance to Muscular Effort is not re- 
garded by all as a separate sense, distinct from mere feeling, 
we have placed an interrogation mark after it in the Scheme. 

More about the Senses. — Having briefly defined 
each of the senses, it is now proper that we study them 
more closely, to ascertain their mode of action, and 
to see exactly what we derive from their use. 

Sense- Perception. — This is the foundation of all 
our knowledge, or mental activity, (i) Because men- 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES $7 

tal activity begins with sense-perception ; (2) Because 
sense-perception furnishes the crude material for all 
our mental activity, as has just been said. A study 
of a baby will soon convince one that the first signs 
of mental activity appear in the use of his senses. 
Probably the first step, beyond the mere cognizing of 
impressions on the nerves, is an act of discrimina- 
tion, — a cognizing of differences. 

Were an infant entirely deprived of the use of all 
his senses, there is no reason to suppose that he would 
ever show any indication that he possesses a mind. 
We have said that his first mental act is a cognizing 
of impressions on the nerves ; that is, the first thing 
he knows is a sensation. 

A sensation is a cognized affection of the nerves. 

Conditions of Perception. — (1) There must be a 
perceiving mind. (2) This mind must be connected 
with a nervous organism, that can be affected by the 
external world. (3) There must be an external world 
— the Non-Ego — to affect the sentient organism. 
(4) The external world must affect the nervous or- 
ganism. (5) The affection must be cognized and in- 
terpreted by the mind. If any one of these five con- 
ditions be wanting, no perception is possible. 

What Each Sense Gives. — The acquisition which 
the mind gains through each of the senses is distinct 
and separate from anything acquired by the use of 
any other sense. 

Touch gives us tactual sensation, or feeling, with 
all its varieties. 

Sight gives us a knowledge of color, with all its va- 
rieties. 



58 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Hearing gives us sound, with all its varieties. 

Taste gives us savor, with all its varieties. 

Smell gives us odor, with all its varieties. 

All the knowledge that the mind gets directly- 
through the "five senses" is included in these five 
short statements. 

Is It Much or Little? — From the above bald 
statement of the case, it might seem at first as though 
we get but little through the senses ; but, if we will 
reflect upon the vast amount that is implied in the 
phrase, "all its varieties," we shall see that our ac- 
quisitions through sense are not small. At any rate, 
they are all we have; and they are enough. 

But Dr. Hopkins maintains that, if we had only 
what these senses would receive, were we deprived 
of motion, and the senses were passively acted upon 
by the outer world, we could never know that there 
is an outer world, — a Non-Ego; we could not deter- 
mine that our knowledge relates to anything objective. 

But when we exercise our power of motion in. con- 
nection with sense-perception, we begin to be aware 
of the Non-Ego as affecting us. This knowledge of 
the Non-Ego comes first and most powerfully through 
the sense of resistance to muscular effort, — a sense 
which would be impossible without the power to 
move. Motion also reveals the Non-Ego by the sense 
of feeling, as when we put one finger on some part 
of the body, and another finger on a stone ; in one 
case the sensation is double, in the other it is single. 
Motion, also, enables us to decide that colors, sounds, 
odors, and savors belong to the external world, and 
are not merely subjective affections of our organism. 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 59 

That is, the outer world is revealed to us when the 
mind begins to act upon it, but not so long as we 
passively receive impressions from without. 

Probably, the infant's first impressions are not dis- 
tinguished as having any connection with anything 
outside of his organism; but he soon begins to act 
upon the external world, and gradually to discover 
the sources of his sensations. In the adult, his senses 
have so long acted together, and in connection with 
his power to move, that it is a little difficult to dis- 
tinguish what each sense gives alone, or to realize 
how much he would be limited, were he deprived of 
the power to move. 

Direct and Acquired Perceptions. — So true is 
this that, in common language, we are accustomed 
to say that we perceive directly, through one sense, 
all that we are enabled to know from what that sense 
gives us when interpreted by all the light of former 
experience, aided by other senses. We say that we 
perceive a rose by the smell, or "We smell a rose." 
All that we smell is the odor; the rest we know 
through experience. One may say, "I hear Mr. 
Brown's wagon, driving rapidly towards the south, 
and it is empty." Does he perceive all this through 
his hearing? All that he hears is a peculiar sound; 
the rest he knows from experience. 

Sense of Touch. — It is usually said that four 
things are involved in a perception through the sense 
of touch. These are: (i) Simple sensation ; (2) Cog- 
nition of its character; (3) Reference to the part of 
the body affected ; (4) Cognition of the object touched. 
These do not differ psychologically; that is, we do 



60 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

not have one of them without the others, excepting 
that the fourth is sometimes wanting. But, logically, 
they are different steps in the complex process ; that 
is, each may be a subject of separate thought. 

It is commonly said, too, that these steps do not differ chron- 
ologically, — that they are synchronous. But, in a case where 
the perception is violently painful, it would seem that there is 
a slight difference in the time of these four steps. Suppose one 
to step with the bare foot on a hot iron; he exclaims, "Oh, I 
burned my foot on the iron." Is there not a perceptible differ-, 
ence in the time of the four steps, as expressed by the order in 
which his words are pronounced ? First, there is a violent 
sensation of pain, expressed by "Oh"; next, the sensation is 
cognized as a burn; then it is referred to the foot; lastly, the 
cause of the trouble is referred to. 

Sensation and Cognition. — In every perception, — 
by touch or by any other sense, — there are involved 
an affection of the nerves, — a sensation, — and a cog- 
nition and interpretation of that affection. 

It has been said that these two bear an inverse ra- 
tio to each other, and the remark is doubtless true, 
to a certain extent. An overpowering light, sound, 
odor, or taste has a mastery over us to such a degree 
that the intellectual element in the perception be- 
comes very small. On the other hand, we may sup- 
pose a philosopher so intent in studying a painful ex- 
periment upon himself, as to become almost uncon- 
scious of the pain. For instance, he might allow a 
bee to sting him, and be so much interested in com- 
paring the sensation he feels with some other remem- 
bered sensation, as hardly to feel the pain of the sting. 

This seems to be merely an example of the general 
truth that intense feeling and intense thought can not 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 6 1 

co exist. One partially or completely neutralizes the 
other; and this is equally true whether the feeling be 
a sensation of the nerves or pure emotion — a man 
violently agitated by any feeling can not think well. 

Is the Body Ego or Non-Ego? — We have seen 
that every act of perception has two sides, the side of 
sensation and the side of cognition or interpretation. 
In sensation we involuntarily regard the body as Ego ; 
but, so far as cognition is concerned, the body appears 
as objective, — Non-Ego. 

Questions as to Sight. — Does sight give direct 
knowledge of surface ? As sight gives color, and as 
color can not be confined to a point, it would seem 
that sight necessarily involves the notion of surface. 
Practiced sight, re-enforced as it has been time and again 
by the testimony of the other senses, not only gives 
notions of surface, but of solidity. Hence, we know 
or infer from sight alone, that a body is a sphere 
or a cube. That this inference is due simply to our 
perception of colors, is proved by the -deceptive ap- 
pearance of frescoes and other paintings which have a 
well-managed blending of shades and perspective. 

Does Sight Give Distance ? — This question is 
ambiguous. If it means to ask if sight gives an imme- 
diate knowledge of the amount of distance, the an- 
swer is clearly in the negative ; only after long expe- 
rience can we judge accurately of distance. But, if 
the question inquires whether we see objects as apart 
from us, the answer is just as clearly in the affirmative. 
The infant does not think that his rattle touches his 
eye, nor has the chicken any doubt that the corn 
must be reached after. 



62 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Other Questions. — The image upon the retina of 
the eye is inverted; and it is asked why objects are 
not seen inverted. This is an idle question; until we 
can tell how we become cognizant at all of what is 
pictured on the retina, it is not worth while to discuss 
the peculiarities of that cognizance. 

Having two eyes, why do we not see double ? We 
may, if we hold the object very near the eyes, or if 
we press one of the eye-balls and throw the axis of 
the eye out of its usual position. Ordinarily, nature 
has arranged the axes so that the images appear to 
coincide. 

Some books on Psychology give many pages to the 
discussion of these questions; but we think we have 
said all about them that needs to be said in a book 
on mental science. 





CHAPTER VII 

THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS CONCLUDED 

BOUT Hearing. — It has been said that 
hearing is the most internal sense. This 
is literally true, in that the organ of 
hearing is more internal than the organs 
or nerves of the other senses. But it 
is also true that no other sense has such power to 
arouse emotions. A groan will awaken pity in one 
who hears, more quickly and more deeply than the 
signs of suffering that appeal to the sight. 

Sounds have a close connection with emotions not 
only in awakening them, but in expressing them, as 
well. The language of emotion through sounds is a 
natural language ; and it is largely shared by man and 
animals in common. It is easy to tell from the cry 
of a dog whether he is in pain, or is earnest in the 
pursuit of game. The horse knows from the tone of 
his driver's voice whether he is frightened, or is calm, 
resolute, and self-confident. 

Varieties of Sounds. — Sounds differ in pitch and 
in power; and the range of difference is very great. 
It has been estimated that a trained ear can distin- 
guish five hundred variations in pitch, and also five 

(63) 



64 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

hundred variations in power. If this is so, then two 
hundred and fifty thousand different sounds can be 
distinguished, taking account only of pitch and power. 
But sounds also differ in quality, or timbre. The 
sounds of two instruments, — violins, for instance, — 
playing the same tune with the same power, are read- 
ily distinguished by their quality. In the same way 
we distinguish the voices of different persons, without 
regard to pitch or power. From this it will appear 
that the "varieties" of sound are almost unlimited. 

What is Sound? — Sound is the cognised vibrations 
from a sonorous body, conveyed by the air to the auditory 
nerve. From this, it will follow that vibrations which 
do not affect the auditory nerve and become cog- 
nized, do not produce sound. In other words, there 
is no sound without a hearing ear. 

Sounds Express Emotion and Thought. —We have 
seen that natural sounds express emotion; but the 
sounds which express thought are artificial, or con- 
ventional. Such are the words and sentences of a 
human language. But most of our language is in- 
tended to express both thought and feeling. Thought 
is expressed by the right use of the right words ; but 
the feeling is expressed by the tone, pitch, quality, and 
inflection of the voice. This is a matter of great im- 
portance to the public speaker and the oral reader ; 
neither thought nor feeling should be lost. 

Do We Hear Direction and Distance ? — Probably 
we can judge nothing primarily of direction and dis- 
tance, by hearing. But, through long experience, we 
learn to judge in these respects, with much accuracy. 
This, however, is acquired perception. 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 65 

Taste and Smell. — The varieties of savors and of 
odors are very numerous. The odor of the apple 
differs much from that of the orange ; and each dif- 
fers from that of any other odorous body. Nor 
do all apples smell alike, by any means, although all 
have the peculiar odor of the apple. The same is 
true of savors; all teas have a common taste, and so 
have all wines. But the varieties of these common 
tastes are so numerous, and are so closely related to 
the quality of the articles, that the great merchants 
employ professional tea-tasters and wine-tasters. 

Organic and Vital Sensations. — There are sen- 
sations which are purely subjective, and have no direct 
connection with our perception of the external world. 
The organic sensations pertain to the nutritive, cir- 
culatory, and other organs of the body. In health, 
they are hardly cognizable, except as we have a gen- 
eral feeling of comfort ; but, in disease, they are some- 
times the source of most acute torment. The vital 
sensations, like those of health or sickness, rest or 
fatigue, etc. , have much to do with our comfort or dis- 
comfort. But, as they afford no means of knowledge 
concerning the external world, and as they have little 
connection with the mind's operations, except incident- 
ally, it does not seem necessary to spend many words 
upon them, in a book on mental science. 

Some call the power to feel these sensations a sev- 
enth sense. Some also regard the power to perceive 
heat or cold, as a separate sense ; but it seems hardly 
worth while to spend much time on these distinctions. 

What is it to Perceive through Sense? — It is 
to get direct and immediate knowledge of the external 

Psy.— 6. 



66 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



world. What we get directly through each sense is 
rudimentary and elemental ; but, by combining these 
several elements, and by testing what our senses give 
us through our power of motion, by acting upon the 
external world, we build up our whole fabric of knowl- 
edge of the Non-Ego, — so vast, and varied, and useful. 

The word " percept " is used with some lack of defi- 
niteness. An elemental percept is just that item of 
knowledge that one sense gives during its exercise, — 
an odor, a sound, etc. But a percept of an object 
is the notion we get of that object by our senses, at 
the time when we are exercising our senses upon it. 
When our senses have ceased to act upon it, the no- 
tion that persists or returns is a concept of the object. 

Our Perceptions, Intuitive. — Sense-perception 
acts intuitively; that is, it acts immediately, and by 
no roundabout method. This is the case with all 
direct perception ; of course, the case is different with 
what we have called the acquired perceptions. 

Let us distinguish three uses of the word " intuitive." Our per- 
ceptions are intuitive, as just explained. Our consciousness is 
intuitive. Our knowledge of the ideas and truths given us by 
the Intuitive Power, is intuitive. 

THE QUALITIES OF BODIES 

Two Divisions. — Through sense-perception, we 
become acquainted with the qualities of bodies. But 
there are some differences in those qualities which a 
book on mental science must notice. The qualities 
of bodies are broadly divisible into two classes, called 
Primary and Secondary. The first are necessary to our 
conceptio7i of matter; the second are not. 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 6j 

Their distinctive characteristics may be given in 
three corresponding statements, as follows: 

The Primary qualities are: (i) Necessary to our 
conception of the existence of matter; (2) They are 
known without experience; (3) We may conceive of 
them as belonging to empty space, — as existing, even 
if no body should exhibit them. 

The Secondary qualities are: (1) Not necessary to 
our conception of the existence of matter; (2) They 
are known by experience only ; (3) They can not be 
conceived as existing apart from some body to exhibit 
them ; that is, we can not think that they do or can 
exist with no body to exhibit them : but we can in 
thought draw them away from that body ; this we 
do in the process of abstraction. 

Examples of Primary qualities are extension and 
divisibility ; examples of Secondary qualities are hard- 
ness, odor, color, etc. If we are told that a body 
exists in the moon, we know it must have extension 
and divisibility, but we know nothing of its Second- 
ary qualities. 

Primary Qualities. — The Primary qualities are 
extension, impenetrability, size, divisibility, incom- 
pressibility, shape, situation, mobility. Some writers 
add others. We can not think of matter as not pos- 
sessing these qualities, because our ideas of these 
qualities grow out of two necessary conditions of our 
conception of matter. 

Two Conditions. — These conditions are: (1) Every 
body must occupy space; (2) No body occupies all 
space. If matter, or body, must occupy space, then 
it must have extension, for that is the property by 



68 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



virtue of which it occupies space. If a body occupy 
space, no other body can occupy the same space; 
hence, impenetrability. 

Observe that the word " occupy," means to Jill to the exclu- 
sion of everything else. 

If a body occupy space, — that is, if it' is not a mere 
point, — it must have size. If it have size, half of it 
will have half the size, and so on; that is, it can be 
divided, or is divisible. If it must occupy space, it 
can not be compressed so as to occupy no space, — 
it is incompressible. If a body occupy space, but 
does not occupy all space, then it must have limits; 
hence, figure, or shape. If a body occupy space, but 
does not occupy all space, then it must have a place 
in space, or situation. If it does not occupy all space, 
then it may be moved into the space it does not oc- 
cupy ; hence, it has mobility. 

A Further Division. — The Secondary qualities 
may be divided into two classes, called Mechanical 
and Physiological. Weight, hardness, toughness, etc. , 
are examples of the mechanical qualities; and odor, 
color, savor, etc., are examples of the physiological 
qualities. The first have a real existence as suck, in 
the body, whether any one shall deal with them through 
sense or not. The second have no existence as such in 
the body, — they belong only to our subjective expe- 
rience. For instance, what we call sourness in an ap- 
ple, is the name of a peculiar affection of the gustatory 
nerve when we taste it, the name of an effect pro- 
duced on our physiological system. Hence, the qual- 
ity is called a physiological quality. We may make a 
similar remark about odor, color, sound, heat, etc. 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 69 

It is usually difficult for the young learner to realize that the 
physiological qualities have no existence as such outside of our 
organism. But a little careful attention will make the matter 
clear, so that it will not seem strange for one to say that, strictly 
speaking, bodies have no color, nor odor, nor taste, nor sound, 
nor heat. 

An Unknown Something. — Of course, there is 
some quality in the body which produces that effect 
on one's nervous system that we call color, taste, etc.; 
but that something is not known to us : at least, we do 
not conceive it to be the same thing as the subjective 
effect that we call taste, color, etc. The name we 
use is properly the name of the effect of an unknown 
quality on ourselves, and not the name of the quality 
itself. But, as the quality is unknown, and as its effect 
on us is constant, we usually give the same name to 
the quality and to its subjective effect. Hence, we 
say, "The apple is sour," instead of saying, "The 
apple possesses that unknown quality which produces 
the effect on us that we call sourness." 

Another Divisio?i. — Sir William Hamilton divides the qual- 
ities of bodies into Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary. 
His Primary is the same as ours ; his Secundo-primary and 
Secondary correspond respectively to our mechanical and 
physiological. We prefer the division we have given. 

Can we Trust our Senses? — There have been 
philosophers who taught that all which sense gives 
us is purely subjective, and that we have no ground 
for believing that there is anything in the outer world 
that corresponds to these affections of sense; in fact, 
that we have no sure ground for believing that there 
is any outside world to be known. 

In answer to this, it may be said that we have no 



70 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

other guides but our senses, that if we use them wisely 
we get on very well, and that these very philosophers, 
in all the common affairs of life, use and trust their 
senses just like other folk. 

Apparent Deceptions. — But certain cases are often 
cited, in which our senses are said to deceive us. 

i. An oar partly in the water appears to be broken, 
an object viewed in the mirror seems to be behind 
the mirror, a sound seems to come from a direction 
the opposite of the real one, the mirage in the desert 
misleads the traveler, etc. 

2. Again, it is said that in disease we experience 
sensations that are known to have no real outward 
cause. We hear ringings in the ears, we feel prick- 
ings in the flesh, we see strange forms and colors that 
belong to nothing outward, etc. One suffering from 
delirium tremens sees snakes and demons; one in a 
fever sees ghosts and apparitions, etc. 

3. Again, we are told that men differ in their judg- 
ment as to some qualities; what one calls sour,, an- 
other calls sweet. One will assert that a color is blue 
while another pronounces it green, etc. 

Explanation. — Now, all apparent deceptions of 
the senses can be thrown into three classes, as those 
cited above are grouped in the numbered paragraphs. 
It may be said of the first group that there is no false 
report of the senses, — they report just as they would 
if things were as they seem to be. The rays come to 
the eye as they would if the stick were broken, if the 
object were behind the glass, etc. The reason for 
these misleading movements which the senses report, 
is to be sought in Natural Philosophy. Moreover, we 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 7 1 

can correct the apparent deception by further use of 
the senses themselves; we can remove the oar from 
the water, or remove trie water from the oar, and 
sight will correct itself. 

All the trouble in the cases in the second group 
arises from a disordered organism. And, surely, we 
must not hold the healthy sense responsible for the 
errors and weaknesses arising from a diseased organ. 

The differences indicated in the third group are all 
in respect to physiological qualities of bodies. As 
all that we know about such qualities is the effect 
they produce on the nervous organism, and as nerv- 
ous organisms are not all alike, it is not strange that 
men should differ as to tastes, sounds, colors, etc. 
Still it will be noticed that the great mass agree in 
respect to these qualities; hence, we must suppose 
that, when one differs from the generality, his organ- 
ism is in some way peculiar. 

There are some so-called deceptions of sense that are pure 
hallucinations ; the trouble is wholly in the mind, and not at 
all in the senses. For instance, the moon near the horizon 
seems broader than when on the meridian; but it is easily 
shown by actual measurement that the eye really shows it 
broader when on the meridian, — the trouble is wholly in our 
interpretation of what the eye gives us. 

Theories of Perception. — There is an inscrutable 
mystery in the relations of mind and matter. We 
may study the nervous system, we may observe how 
objects affect or stimulate the nerves, we may trace 
this affection from the extremities to the organ of the 
sense, or to the brain, we may even determine the 
time that elapses from the application of the stimulus 
till the effect appears in consciousness; but when we 



72 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ask how the effect appears in consciousness, we ask a 
question that no one can answer, — we have reached 
a bridgeless chasm. 

When men begin to speculate about that of which 
they know nothing, they sometimes reach very queer 
conclusions ; and they are likely to be the more dog- 
matic the less they know. So men have put forth 
very varying theories as to the process of perception. 
The principal theories may be shown in a Scheme, as 
follows : 

™, ( i. The Natural Realists.* 

Theories J 

of 1 , The Idealists { J; ^Stative. { J; g£*a ^ 

The doctrine of each class of theorists may be 
briefly stated as follows : 

The Realists believe that there is an outside world, 
that we take direct cognizance of it through the 
senses, and that it is essentially as the senses report 
it to be. They make no attempt to show how we 
perceive, — that is, to explain the process. 

The Idealists assert that the mind can have no cog- 
nizance of anything outside of itself. They divide 
into two classes : 

The Absolute Idealists assert that we have no evi- 
dence that there is an outside world ; and even if we 
suppose that there is one, we have no reason to be- 
lieve that it really is as it seems to be. 

The Representative Idealists assert that there is an 
outside world, and that it is truthfully represented in 

"*The words Idealist and Realist are sometimes used in different senses 
from those here denned. But philosophers have taught all the doctrines 
here outlined, and some writers have given them the names that we have 
found it convenient to use as we have done. 



THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 73 

the mind ; but that we are cognizant of the represen- 
tation only, not of the world itself. But they divide 
into two classes, as to the mode of representation. 

The Egoistics say that the representation is a mod- 
ification of the mind itself. 

The Non-Egoistics say that the outside world is 
represented by little images, or "ideas," which are 
not exactly mind or matter, but which are real, ob- 
jective existences; and which, as a sort of go-be- 
tween, enter the mind and there represent the objects 
of the outside world. This system was probably sug- 
gested by Plato's doctrine of Ideas. 

Historically, it is probable that the last class arose 
first. Attempting to speculate upon something that 
no one can understand, and assuming that mind can 
take knowledge of nothing outside of itself, they in- 
vented the doctrine of the go-betweens, or ideas. 
Hence, the name Idealist came to be applied to all 
who deny that the mind can know anything about 
what is outside of itself. 

It is easy to see, however, that, beginning with 
this assumption, there is no logical stopping short of 
Absolute Idealism, or complete skepticism. 

It is said that Dr. Reid of Scotland showed this 
inevitable tendency of Idealism towards the absolute 
form, and that he answered the assumption of the 
Non-Egoistics briefly as follows: 

1st. He showed that the doctrine of the little im- 
ages or ideas was pure assumption, without a par- 
ticle of proof of their existence. 

2d. He showed that if it were fully established it 
would explain nothing, for it is inconceivable that the 

Psy.- 7 . 



74 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

images could be neither mind nor matter ; and if they 
are mind they can not represent matter; and if they 
are matter it is as difficult for the mind to cognize 
them as to cognize the matter that they represent. 

Many modern philosophers take the ground of the Natural 
Realists — do not attempt to explain the process by which mind 
knows about matter. Certainly, the facts are more important 
for practical purposes than any theories to explain the facts. 

Cultivation of the Senses. — There are very few 
people whose senses are cultivated as they should be. 
The special time for cultivating sense-perception is in 
early youth ; most of the work of our Primary Schools 
should be in this direction. 

Mrs. Barbauld's story, " Eyes and No-eyes," shows very viv- 
idly how differently people may use their senses. 

What the Teacher Can Do. — As perception is 
an immediate, an intuitive, process, the teacher's work 
is not direct, but incidental. He can 

1st, Arouse an interest in observing objects, among 
his pupils ; 

2d, He can direct them as to what they should 
perceive, can point out the objects to be observed ; 

3d, He can explain the meaning of what is per- 
ceived, and so deepen the interest, and lead to greater 
attention and accuracy. 

It is generally urged by all the best writers on Edu- 
cation, that the training of the pupil's senses should 
be the principal work during the first years of his 
education. This training will consist in putting him 
to using his senses, and to interpreting properly what 
the senses give him. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS MEMORY 

HE Representative Powers give us con- 
cepts of absent objects, but give them 
in two ways ; that is, as they are or 
were, and as they might be. When the 
concept of the object is as that object is 
or was, the mental act is called reproduction. If 
you also know that the thing reproduced is a con- 
cept of some former mental possession, you recognize 
it ; that is, you know it again. These two mental 
acts, — Reproduction and Recognition, — make a com- 
pleted act called Memory. 

Definition. — Memoiy is that Representative Power 
which brings before the mind concepts of absent objects 
as they are or were, and recognises them. 

Concepts of anything the mind has ever possessed, 
— sights, sounds, tastes, thoughts, feelings, former 
concepts, etc., — may thus come before the mind and 
be recognized, for memory can bring before us all 
these things. 

It is probable that a very large share of the concepts that are 
really reproductions, are not recognized ; they may seem to us 
to be original ; often we question when a thing " comes into 

(75) 



7^ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the mind," whether it is something that we remember, or is 
really a new thing. Not long since, a certain eminent preacher 
was accused of plagiarism. It seemed to be clear that he had 
used in his sermon whole sentences just as they are to be 
found in a book, which he admitted he had read. His de- 
fense was that his mind had great tenacity in retaining words, 
and that these words were not recognized when they were re- 
produced. Whatever the fact may have been, his defense was, 
psychologically, a plausible one. 

The Word ' ' Memory. " — We use the word "mem- 
ory"in three distinct senses: — First, meaning the power 
to remember, as when we say, " He has a good mem- 
ory"; second, signifying an act of that power, as 
when one says, "My memory of the affair is clear " ; 
third, signifying the product of that power, as when 
one says, ' ' My memories of the occasion are pleasant. " 

Remembrance and Recollection. — For the sec- 
ond sense here given, remembrance or recollection is 
a better word than memory. Remembrance is prop- 
erly a generic term, meaning any act of memory ; rec- 
ollection is properly specific, meaning an intentional 
act of memory. It may be denned as voluntary re- 
membrance. The distinction is worth observing. 

Conditions of Remembrance. — In order that 
there may be an act of memory, there must be first, 
a mind capable of remembering; second, that mind 
must have had an experience in the past ; third, there 
must be a present concept of that past experience ; 
fourth, the present concept must be recognized as a 
correct representation of that past experience. 

The word "experience" is here used with reference to any act 
or state of the mind. Of course, we can remember nothing of 
which the mind has never had any experience. 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY T] 

Two Elements in Memory. — According to our 
definition, an act of memory is twofold. It includes 
reproduction and recognition. When a concept of 
some former mental possession is before any mind, 
the mind may recognize it, or it may not; that is, 
it may or may not know it as a concept of a former 
mental possession. In the first case, there is a com- 
plete act of memory ; in the second, there is only re- 
production. It is probable that a large portion of 
our reproductions are not recognized. This is often 
true, even when we give attention to the matter. We 
sometimes say to ourselves or to others, ' ' Is this 
thing now in my mind something that I remember, 
or is it something new?" 

Time, Place, and Circumstance. — In such a case, 
the doubt may be resolved, if we can recall the at- 
tendant circumstances of place, time, etc. But it 
should be clearly seen that a recognition of time, place, 
etc., is not essential to a recognition of the thing in 
question, although it may be helpful to such recogni- 
tion in some cases. If we clearly know that the thing 
now before the mind is a concept of something that 
has been there before, we remember that thing, 
whether we also remember the attending circumstances 
or not. 

Other Opinions. — Some writers regard memory as 
including more elements than the two we have named. 
One very eminent writer names four elements, as fol- 
lows : ' ' Retention, recollection, representation, and 
recognition." If we understand him, he uses the 
word recognition to mean exactly what it means in 
the definition that we have given. And we think 



7% ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

that his two words, recollection and representatioii, to- 
gether, cover no more ground than our single word, 
reproduction. We might ask, How can a thing be 
recollected, how can it be before the mind at all, un- 
less it is represented? The distinction seems to be 
founded on no tangible difference. 

Meaning of "Retain." — Retention we should re- 
gard as a condition of memory, rather than an element 
in memory. But, we may ask, What is the exact 
meaning of retention ? What do we mean by the 
mind's power to retain? Has the mind anything to 
do at present with that which is retained but is not 
now before consciousness ? It would seem that we 
can give no precise meaning to the mind's power to 
retain, further than to say that the mind has the power 
to bring into consciousness again that which has been 
there before, but has now passed out of consciousness. 
The mind is said to retain that which it can so re- 
call, but it is not easy to see that the mind performs 
any action in retaining. We can not understand how 
there can be any mental action of which one is un- 
conscious ; we are not conscious of what we retain. 

A Puzzle. — There is an apparent puzzle in an at- 
tempt to recall a thing to mind, which may be pre- 
sented in this way. We want to recall a name, for 
instance; but, it may be said, "You either know 
what you want or you do not ; if you know, it is re- 
called already ; if you do not know it, how do you 
know what to try to recall?" The puzzle is in the 
use of the word " know" ; you do not know the name 
at this moment, but you do know enough about it to 
know what you want to recall. But what can you do 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY 79 

to recall anything into your mind? Briefly, you can 
hold your attention to it, you can seize upon every 
available thing connected with it; and, usually, per- 
sistent effort in this way will bring the desired result. 

Importance of Memory. — A moment's reflection 
will convince us that no power of mind is of more 
value than memory. Conceive of a mind deprived 
of this power — a mind to which that which is past 
is lost forever — a mind having power to deal with 
nothing but the immediate present. In fact, such a 
mind could not deal with the present, properly speak- 
ing, for there is something of the past necessary to 
all our present thinking. In short, such a mind would 
not be at all like the mind we have now, if, indeed, 
it could be a mind in any sense. 

Belief in What We Remember. — How firmly 
may we trust our memories? How confident may 
we be in what we remember ? The true answer is 
that we may trust our memories in the same way, and 
to the same extent, that we may trust our senses. 
When we know that our senses are working clearly 
and correctly, we trust them, as we may do with safe- 
ty ; and in the same way we ought to trust mem- 
ory when it works clearly. In fact, this is the way 
men do in actual life; cases, even of life and death, 
are daily decided in our courts, upon testimony whose 
value rests solely upon the trustworthiness of the 
memories of the witnesses. 

Two Uses of Memory. — It is worthy of note, that 
in practical life we have occasion to use memory in 
two widely different ways. In one case, we desire to 
have it serve us for all time, as when we commit to 



80 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

it the multiplication table, the meaning of words, etc. 
In the other case, it is our desire that it should serve 
only a temporary purpose, as with a lawyer defending 
a case in court. While the case is pending, it is im- 
portant that he should have all the facts subject to a 
ready recall ; but as soon as the case is decided, he 
wishes to dismiss it from memory completely, to make 
room for the next. A similar use for memory will 
often appear in common affairs, as when we wish to 
retain the items of an errand till the errand is done, 
etc. The trouble with the careless student — the stu- 
dent who "crams" — is that he uses his memory for a 
temporary purpose, when he should have aimed at a 
permanent purpose. 

Strong Memory and a Weak Mind. — Because 
some people of feeble intellect in general, like "Blind 
Tom," for instance, have shown extraordinary powers 
of memory, some have been inclined to jump to the 
very foolish conclusion, that a mind having a strong 
power to remember is likely to be weak in its other 
intellectual powers. This is basing a rule on excep- 
tions. It would be difficult, we think impossible, to 
find in all history a person of strong intellect in gen- 
eral, who was markedly deficient in the power of mem- 
ory. But it is often remarked of some of the ablest 
men the world has known, that they were especially 
strong in the power to remember. Many of the 
books on mental science give a list of men who pos- 
sessed remarkable memories, among the most noted 
of whom are Cyrus the Great, Themistocles, the 
blind Euler, Napoleon, and others, all men of remark r 
ably strong intellectual powers. 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY Ol 

A Panorama of Concepts. — A little reflection will 
show us that, in every conscious moment, from the 
beginning of intelligent activity till its close, there is 
passing "before" the mind, or "through" the mind, 
an endless procession of concepts. This is equally 
true whether one is day-dreaming or studying, whether 
he is in joy or in sorrow, whether he is using his 
senses or is reflecting ; it is equally true of the old and 
the young, the learned and the ignorant, the good and 
the bad. In every mind the endless panorama un- 
rolls, the ceaseless procession marches. Stop it we 
can not, if we would ; only in profound sleep and un- 
consciousness do we retire from our position as spec- 
tator, as it were; but, when we awake, or "come to 
ourselves," the tireless movement of varying concepts 
is resumed. We may change the order of the march 
accidentally or intentionally, we may give more or 
less earnest heed to it ; but the march goes on, one 
concept follows another in a ceaseless round. 

Laws of Suggestion. — Now, do these concepts 
succeed each other in a hap-hazard way; does any 
one of them ever get into the procession by chance ? 
Or is the order of movement regulated by law; is 
there always a cause for one thing being before the 
mind rather than another? We believe the answer 
clearly is, that there is nothing of chance or hap-haz- 
ard about it. If a certain concept is before the mind 
at this moment, there is a reason why it is there. It 
has followed in the train of some concept that pre- 
ceded it, or it has been suggested by some sensation, 
percept, emotion, or volition. We may not be able 
in every case to determine why any given thing is be- 



82 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

fore the mind at any given time; but some good 
reason exists, nevertheless. There are no interlopers 
in the mental procession ; every concept in the line 
is there in obedience to some one or more of the laws 
of mental suggestion. 

Writers on Psychology have given lists of these 
laws of suggestion. They have sometimes called 
them "laws of memory," sometimes "laws of asso- 
ciation," etc. The better term is "laws of sugges- 
tion," inasmuch as they account for the ways in which 
concepts are suggested to the mind in general. The 
operation of these laws is not confined to things that 
have been previously associated, nor to the mind's 
working in the act of memory alone. They are gen- 
eral laws of mental activity; they are laws of memory, 
but they are more than that. 

Primary Laws. — As commonly given, these laws 
are four in number : 

i . Similarity or resemblance. — Any percept, concept, 
emotion, sensation, etc. , tends to suggest the concept 
of something like it. 

2. Contrast. — The sight of a palace may suggest a 
hovel ; the snow of winter, a hot day of summer, etc. 

3. Contiguity of Time or Place. — Things associated in 
time or place are likely to suggest, the one the other. 

4. Cause and Effect. — A wound will remind one of 
the instrument which caused it, or the sight of a 
pistol suggests a thought of the effect it is intended 
to produce, etc. 

From Aristotle. — Two precepts worth remem- 
bering have come down to us from Aristotle. The 
first is given in the following words: "Thoughts 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS—MEMORY 83 

which have at any time, recent or remote, stood to 
each other in the relation of co-existence or immedi- 
ate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend 
to reproduce each other." The other precept sug- 
gests that a less important, or less interesting, thing 
is more likely to suggest one more important, or more 
interesting, than the reverse. For instance, a knob 
will suggest a door sooner than a door the knob ; a 
name will suggest its owner sooner than the sight of 
a person will suggest his name. 

Let the student present numerous examples from his own ex- 
perience, illustrating these laws ; and other examples illus- 
trating Aristotle's precepts, also. 

One Comprehensive Lazv. — Some writers have 
maintained that the four primary laws may be reduced 
to one general principle, which may be expressed by 
the word "contiguity." Of course, this requires 
that we give the word contiguity a very broad mean- 
ing, but not broader than its etymology may imply. 
Things that touch each other in any way, in fact or in 
thought, may suggest each other. Contiguity may 
denote all such relations as likeness, contrast, cause 
and effect, relative position in time or place, things 
and their names, quantity and quality, wholes and 
their parts, etc. 

Secondary Laws. — Of these there are eight, at 
least ; some give more : 

1. Continuance of Attention. — The longer and more 
earnestly we attend to a matter, the more likely it is 
to be suggested to the mind afterwards. 

2. Vividness of Feeling. — The more our feelings are 
aroused when a matter is before the mind, the more 



84 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

readily we recall it. This is true whether the feeling 
be one of interest in the thing itself, or simply an ex- 
altation of feeling in general. 

3. Frequency of Repetition. — The more frequently 
a thing is called to mind, the more ready it is to come 
when called. Every school-boy recognizes this when 
he "says his lesson" over and over. 

4. Lapse of Time. — Other things being equal, that 
which the mind has recently attended to is more easily 
recalled than those things which were attended to 
long ago. 

5. Exclusivencss of Association. — When two things 
have always been associated together, one is more 
likely to suggest the other than in case each had been 
associated with several other things. For instance, 
if a certain kind of hat has always been seen on one 
person, the sight of that hat, or one like it, will sug- 
gest that person sooner than it would if many wore a 
hat of the same kind. 

6. Original Mental Differences. — Minds differ much 
naturally in the readiness with which they observe 
suggestions. Besides, some find it comparatively easy 
to recall one class of things, and some to recall other 
things. One can remember numbers readily ; another, 
faces; another, animals, as horses, etc. 

7. State of Mind. — Every one knows that the mind 
sometimes is much more responsive, both in commit- 
ting and in recalling, than at other times. Often this 
is due to the condition of the body ; but, frequently, 
the cause seems to be wholly mental. 

8. Professiojial Habits. — It is comparatively easy 
for any one to remember what belongs to his trade 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY S$ 

or profession ; and anything that he observes is very 
likely to suggest something pertaining to his daily 
business. One can easily guess the business of the 
man who exclaimed, on first seeing Niagara, ' ' What a 
place to wash sheep ! " 

Recall numerous illustrations of each of these laws, from 
your own experience or observation. 

Objective and Subjective. — It will be noticed that 
the Primary Laws pertain to the things to be re- 
membered, or suggested ; hence, they may be termed 
objective : while the Secondary Laws pertain to the 
person remembering, or receiving the suggestion; 
hence, they are subjective. The law of exclusive as- 
sociation seems at first to be an exception ; but if 
we reflect that the association is in the mind of the 
observer, we shall see that the exception is only 
apparent, not real. 



CHAPTER IX 



MEMORY CONCLUDED 




EMORY in the Aged. — It is often said 
that memory is one of the , first of the 
mental powers to fail, especially in recall- 
ing names, etc. And yet it is noticeable 
that many old people, who can not re- 
member the transactions of the last half-hour, can tell 
with perfect clearness and fullness of particulars, what 
occurred fifty or seventy years before. This seems 
to be contradictory of one of the secondary laws of 
suggestion ; viz. , that the lapse of time weakens the 
power of suggestion. The truth is, however, that this 
law is simply outweighed by a combination of two or 
three other laws. The old person's senses are dulled ; 
they report recent things less clearly. For this and 
other reasons, there is less vividness of feeling respect- 
ing recent events. Besides, silently, and often orally, 
the things of the long past have been frequently re- 
viewed, until they have become firmly fixed. 

Effects of Disease on Memory. — Usually, dis- 
ease weakens memory, as it usually weakens all the 
powers of both mind and body. But there are many 
instances on record where disease has had the effect 

(86) 



MEMORY— CONCLUDED &7 

of quickening the memory. Stories are told of per- 
sons who, after long sickness, when near their deaths, 
have spoken and prayed in the language of childhood, 
although they had spoken exclusively another language 
for many years. 

Do We Completely Forget? — Such facts as those 
just given suggest the question whether the mind ever 
completely loses anything it has once possessed ; and 
there are numerous other facts which point in the same 
direction. Persons who have come near death, from 
drowning and otherwise, have often told that, in what 
seemed their last moment, the whole past of their 
lives appeared to come before their minds as in a flash. 
Every one, probably, has at some time been startled 
by the sudden recurrence to memory of something 
not thought of for years. These facts have led some 
to conclude that nothing is ever completely forgotten ; 
but that the "book of remembrance," out of which 
man shall finally be judged, is neither more nor less 
than the tablets of his own memory. This conclusion 
seems to be plausible. 

But, whatever may be true as to the possibility that 
nothing is forgotten, it is certain that one who lives to 
old age will find his life largely sweetened or embit- 
tered by the things memory will surely bring before 
him ; he is daily making his future self. 

Beneficent Law of Memory. — Another curious 
fact about memory is worthy of notice. When we re- 
call things that were both pleasant and innocent, we 
experience a new pleasure, sometimes but little in- 
ferior to that of first experience ; but when we remem- 
ber unpleasant or sorrowful things, if no guilt is con- 



05 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

nected with them, they have lost much of their bit- 
terness. We sometimes laugh at the remembrance 
of that which was anything but laughable in the ex- 
perience. Time assuages even our sorrow for dearest 
friends. This beneficent law of memory seems to in- 
dicate that our Creator intended that this power should 
be a source of happiness, and not of pain. • 

Memory Neglected. — It is often charged that the 
cultivation of memory is neglected in modern times. 
This is probably true ; in fact, the multiplicity of books 
has rendered it less necessary to commit many things 
to memory than it once was. Memory serves us now, 
if we can remember where a thing may be found in 
books, instead of remembering the thing itself. But 
we think that in many of our schools, at the present 
time, there is a very harmful neglect, even a partial 
contempt, of memory. It is probably the reaction 
from the abuse which formerly prevailed, when mem- 
ory seemed to be almost the only faculty that was used. 
The present neglect has gone so far, in many cases, 
that pupils of good natural abilities find it next to 
impossible to recall anything that they have studied, 
readily and exactly. In this matter we think there 
should be a reform, and that more should be done 
to cultivate memory in our schools. 

Cultivating the Memory. — But, how shall we 
cultivate memory? Just as we cultivate any other 
power, that is, by wise use. If we would cultivate 
memory, we must lay demands upon it, and make it 
do its work promptly and accurately. This is not dif- 
ficult, if it be undertaken at the right time of life. 
The child remembers with ease what the man can re- 



MEMORY— CONCLUDED 89 

member only with the greatest labor. Not only so, 
but things learned early in life are held more tena- 
ciously. The author remembers with perfect ease 
many poems and other compositions which he learned 
in childhood, while others committed with much labor 
later in life, seem to have disappeared entirely. It is 
not very difficult for a child to learn the spelling of 
words, the paradigms in grammar, etc. , but such work 
is drudgery of the hardest sort to the man. Child- 
hood, then, is the time for "storing the mind" with 
things that will be needed in after life. The work is 
then comparatively easy, and it is more lasting. 

In order to train the child's memory, he must be 
made responsible for its use. He must be held to 
remember what he is told in the way of command 
and direction, — to remember it exactly, and to ob- 
serve it accordingly. He must be held to remember 
the instruction given to him, in oral form, as well 
as that gained from the book. So tenacious is mem- 
ory at this period that it easily seizes and holds mere 
words, although they make no appeal to the under- 
standing. Here is the root of one of the most glar- 
ing evils in our schools, especially with careless and 
ill-trained teachers. Mere words are caught and re- 
peated by the pupils; and they are glibly recited, 
giving an appearance of knowledge when none exists. 
Of course, this evil should be avoided ; but the oppo- 
site extreme of requiring nothing to be committed in 
exact form, is still worse. 

Because of the facility with which mere words are 
retained at this time, it is not unphilosophical to re- 
quire the pupil to commit to memory some useful 

Psy— 8. 



90 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

things which he does not fully understand. The recent 
movement in favor of memorizing literary "gems" 
is worthy of all commendation. Nor need they be 
fully understood at present. Who can not recall some- 
thing of this kind, dropped into his memory in his 
childhood, that afterwards became a most profitable 
subject of rumination? 

It is a curious fact that certain defects sometimes become 
objects of personal vanity, such as a pale skin, defective eye- 
sight requiring spectacles, etc. It is thought by silly young 
people to be fashionable, and an evidence of "high-tone," to 
have these defects. On this ground we account for the readi- 
ness with which many people declare that they are deficient in 
the power of memory. Certain it is that no one possesses a 
really good mind if his memory is very defective. When stu- 
dents have come to the author pleading complacently this de- 
fect as a reason for failing to retain their lessons, he has some- 
times effectually cut off a repetition of the excuse by fully ac- 
cepting it, suggesting, perhaps, that he had long suspected that 
their minds were not quite sound ! 

There is no need to commit unnecessary or useless 
things, simply for the sake of exercising the memory. 
There is enough that will be of lasting pleasure and 
value, for this. Nor is it necessary that the child fully 
understand all that he commits to memory. Who does 
fully understand? 

The mind will ruminate and feed upon that which 
it remembers, be it good or bad, wheat or chaff; but 
if the memory be well filled with wheat, there is little 
room for chaff. And the value of what is good in 
the memory will appear more and more, the more 
the mind reflects upon it. 

Rules for Committing. — In order to commit to 
memory successfully, certain rules may be given : — 



MEMORY— CONCLUDED 9 1 

1st, Lay rigid demands on the memory; make it 
do its work, and do it well. 

2d, Give close attention to what you wish to re- 
member, and examine it carefully. 

3d, Thus get a clear conception of the exact thing, 
" not something like it nor something about it" — be- 
fore any attempt to commit at all is made. 

4th, Endeavor to arouse the greatest possible in- 
terest in it. 

5 th, Observe the " Laws of Suggestion " already 
given, on pages 81-85. 

6th, Review, Review, Review. 

Attention, Interest, Repetition form the key to 
ready and exact remembrance. 

It may be well for the student who has a lesson to 
learn from a text-book, to go over it first, simply to 
see that he understands it, making no attempt to com- 
mit it. Then let him go over it again, fixing it, slowly 
and with all the links of association he can find ; after- 
wards, by repetition and reviewing, he will find him- 
self master of it, both in sense and in form. He can 
recite it clearly, readily, exactly. 

Systems of Mnemonics. — Many attempts have 
been made to invent artificial systems of memory, 
usually called systems of "Mnemonics." Some of 
these systems are very ingenious, but all are utterly 
worthless. Any system that attempts to aid memory 
by forced and artificial association only, may be termed 
a system of "Mnemonics," such as we have declared 
to be worthless ; and they are worthless, from the sim- 
ple fact that, by their artificial association, they add a 
new element of labor to those necessarily existing. 



9 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Devices to Aid Memory. — There are, however, 
many devices that can frequently be used, which are 
not open to the same objections as the systems of 
"Mnemonics." We will mention: 

ist, The use of the senses or the muscles. A class 
will remember the order of the bodies in the solar 
system better if one child stands for the sun, and 
others revolve around him at the proper distances, to 
represent Mercury, Venus, and the rest. A child will 
remember the number three better by taking three 
steps, making three jumps, bringing three books, etc. 
This is helping memory through the muscles. On 
the use of the senses, also, depends the value of charts, 
tables, diagrams, genealogical trees, etc. 

2d, The use of rhyme and meter. Who has not 
recognized the value of 

" Thirty days hath September," etc. ? 

No doubt many have helped to fix the multiplication 
table by singing it. The conjugations of the Latin 
verbs are more easily held on account of the jingle, 
"bam, bas, bat," etc. 

3d, The use of short, pithy, comprehensive forms 
of speech, such as proverbs and formulae. 

4th, Seizing upon any fact of natural association, 
however accidental it may be ; as the association of 
Bacon's Rebellion in 1676, with the Revolution in 
1776, and the Centennial in 1876. 

It may be noted, also, that the ' ' Laws of Sugges- 
tion," especially the Primary Laws, will furnish many 
forms of natural association. 

Observations on Memory. — There are, doubtless, 
great differences in minds as to their power to remem- 



MEMORY— CONCLUDED 93 

ber. And yet the absolute amount retained by each, 
probably, does not vary so greatly as appears at first 
sight. The eminent linguist, historian, or man of 
science, carries in his memory a vast amount of matter 
pertaining to his specialty; but his mind is likely to 
be free from the mass of gossip and triviality which 
is retained by his illiterate neighbor. Those who are 
wont to complain of their "poor memories," often 
show that their memories are fairly well-stored when 
exercised upon matters that interest them. 

Without doubt, the power to retain can be im- 
proved, by thorough practice, both as to the amount 
retained and the accuracy and readiness with which 
it may be recalled. But, as Mr. Bain suggests, there 
is probably in every individual a definite limit to the 
power, beyond which no training or effort can carry 
him. Mr. Bain also holds that "committing" to 
memory consumes more mental force than any other 
form of mental activity. 

Verbal Memory. — Some minds have great facility 
in recalling and reproducing words without any re- 
gard to their meaning; this is a characteristic of the 
memory of a child, in most cases. The man of 
thought and of culture finds such a use of memory 
difficult, sometimes almost impossible. He needs to 
see the meaning and the logical relations of what he 
commits, in order to retain it well. Education should 
lead from the childish form of verbal memory to that 
of memory by reference to significance and relation. 

Committing and Remembering. — Committing is 
not remembering, but it is closely related to it. The 
success of memory depends very largely upon care 



94 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

in committing; hence, the rules for remembering, or 
for improving the memory, must include rules for com- 
mitting. In general, probably, the mind that commits 
Avith great ease does not retain so well as the mind 
that finds more difficulty in committing. Such a mind 
is easily " crammed, " but does not hold things so well 
permanently. " Lightly come, lightly go, " describes 
the action. 

Nor is that always the best memory that is most 
ready in recalling. In general, the memory that holds 
mere words is more ready in recalling them than the 
memory that retains by an observance of significance 
and of logical relations. 

Instances of Remarkable Memory. — As a mat- 
ter of some interest, we add an account of some per- 
sons who are said to have shown remarkable memo- 
ries. Some of these stories have been given by many 
authors ; we quote from Dr. Brooks : 

" Historians, and writers on mental philosophy men- 
tion some remarkable examples of the power of mem- 
ory. Cyrus, it is said, knew the names of all his of- 
ficers, — Pliny says, of all his soldiers. Themistocles 
could name every one of the twenty thousand citizens 
of Athens. Hortensius, after sitting all day at an auc- 
tion, could at night recall every article sold, the pur- 
chaser, and the price. Dr. Wallis, while in bed in 
the dark, extracted the square root of a number of 
fifty-three places to twenty-seven terms, and repeated 
the result twenty days afterwards. Euler, blind from 
early life, carried in his memory a table of the first six 
powers of the series of natural numbers up to one 
hundred. Two of his pupils, in calculating a con- 



MEMORY— CONCLUDED 95 

verging series, found, on reaching the seventeenth 
term, that their results differed by a unit at the fiftieth 
figure; and to decide the question he made the calcu- 
lation mentally, and his result was found to be correct. 
"Hamilton tells us that Muretus saw at Padua a 
young Corsican, who could repeat thirty-six thousand 
names, in the order in which they were given to him, 
or repeat them in the reverse order, or begin at any 
point in the list and repeat both ways. The cele- 
brated Magliabecchi, Librarian of the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany, it is said, could name all the authors who 
had written upon any subject, giving the name of the 
book, the words, and often the page. A gentleman 
of Florence, to test his memory, lent him a manu- 
script to read, and afterward, pretending to have lost 
it, requested him to endeavor to recall it, which he 
did with great exactness. It is also stated that upon 
being asked by the Grand Duke if he could procure 
for him a copy of a certain book, he replied, ' No, 
sir, it is impossible ; there is but one in the world : 
that is in the Grand Seignior's library at Constanti- 
nople, and is the seventh book, on the seventh shelf, 
on the right hand as you go in. ' " 




CHAPTER X 

IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 

EFINITION. Imagination is that Repre- 
sentative Power which gives us concepts 
of absent objects, not as they are or were, 
but as they might be. 
Illustrations. — You turn your face towards 
a church and notice carefully how it looks ; you are now per- 
ceiving it by sight. You turn away, and before your "mind's 
eye " stands the same form as clearly as before; the Represen- 
tative Power has reproduced a concept of what was perceived. 
You know that your concept is of the church as it was. So you 
recognize the concept, — you remember the building. 

You now begin to play with this concept; you replace the 
brick with stone ; you give it extra towers ; you elevate the 
spire to twice its present height, etc. You are now conceiving 
of the absent object as it might be. Imagination is at work. 

The Word "Imagination." — We would remark 

that the word "imagination" may be used like the 

word ' ' memory, " to signify a power of the mind, or it 

may signify an act or a product of that power. The 

grand difference between imagination and memory is, 

that the latter gives us concepts as wholes which are 

true to previous experience, while the former gives 

us wholes that correspond, not to fact, but to our 

subjective fancy. 
(96) 



IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 97 

The Occupation of Children. — Every one who 
is at all familiar with the ways of children, knows 
that imagination begins to ' be active at a very early 
age, and that its action, or "play," makes up a large 
part of the intellectual activity of a child's life. It is 
for the mother and the teacher to accept this fact, 
and to be guided by it, instead of foolishly trying to 
counteract nature in this respect. There is no end to 
the ways in which the imagination of the child may 
be used to aid in all his school tasks, as well as in the 
training of his will, and in the building of his char- 
acter. On this point we know of no more helpful 
book than Dr. Jacob Abbott's " Gentle Measures in 
Training the Young " ; and yet there is room for other 
good books on the same theme. 

Will Training. — A word about the use of imagi- 
nation as a means of developing the child's freedom 
of will. The child is under authority as to his be- 
havior ; he is equally under authority in his acquisi- 
tion of a knowledge of facts. But in his "play" in 
his imaginings, he is his own master, — he is a law unto 
himself. In this lies a large part of the charm of all 
his play. Let some superior power undertake to dic- 
tate how he shall play, and the fun is over. This 
consideration shows us why the battered rag baby is 
dearer to the little girl than her fine china doll, — she 
can do what she pleases with it. When we remem- 
ber what a free will is to an adult, it will be seen that 
its first unfolding and proper exercise is a thing of no 
mean importance. 

In What Sense, Creative? — Imagination is often 
called a creative faculty, but it is creative in a very 

Psy.-9. 



98 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

limited sense only. Sense-perception, through mem- 
ory, gives all the original material with which imagi- 
nation builds. This material may be used without 
modification, or it may be modified and then used ; 
but, in either case, the whole that is constructed from 
it must differ from any whole that memory gives — it 
may be a kind of creation, but only in respect to the 
ideal which that whole bodies forth. 

Four Forms of Product. — Imagination may be 
used in four different ways, to which different names 
have been given. It may combine the elements it 
uses, in such a way as to give a result that is weird, 
unearthly, monstrous, or grotesque ; it is then called 
phantasy. It may combine them so as to give a whole 
that is light, playful, pleasing, but still showing noth- 
ing of high purpose or of noble and cultivated taste ; 
it is then called fancy. Again, it may combine them 
so as to give a whole that meets the demands of a 
high purpose or a noble taste ; this is artistic imagi- 
nation. Or, finally, it may combine according to 
principles of fact, of science, so that the conception, 
when realized in material forms, gives us the steam 
engine, the telegraph, the sewing machine, etc. ; this 
is invetitive imagination. Find illustrations. 

What is a Fine Art? — Imagination lies at the 
basis of the whole realm of fine art. This is equally 
true in poetry, fiction, music, architecture, painting, 
sculpture, or any other fine art, if there be another. 
There is one aspect — an essential one — in which all 
these arts are alike; viz., in the completed work, an 
ideal of its author is so bodied forth, or symbolized, 
that the symbol — poem, novel, anthem, temple, pict- 



IMAGINATION.AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 99 

ure, or statue — awakens in the mind of another an 
ideal, kindred to that from which it sprung in the 
mind of the author. 

Let us remark, in passing, that the true work of the teacher 
belongs among the fine arts, because it conforms to the essen- 
tial of all fine art, in that it attempts to realize an ideal as its 
result. But how little of the work done by teachers is thus ar- 
tistic or true work ! 

Uses of Imagination. — All admit that imagination 
is important in the realm of art, but some seem to sup- 
pose that, outside of art, it serves little or no good 
purpose. Some seem even to doubt whether we should 
not be better without this power ; but let us name 
six very important uses of this power : 

1. Pure enjoyment. — To child and man the play of 
imagination, both in building its castles and day-dreams 
and in responding to the magic touch of others, often 
gives great enjoyment; and when nothing impure or 
malicious enters, such enjoyment may be entirely in- 
nocent if indulged moderately. 

2. Imagination may lighten life's burdens. — A little 
boy, walking with his grandfather, complained of being 
tired, and asked his grandfather to carry him. ' ' No, " 
said the grandfather, ' ' take my gold-headed cane and 
make a horse of it." He bestrode the cane, and gal- 
loped away happy. Many a weary man at his daily 
toil finds his task less heavy when imagination points 
to the comforts which that toil may bring to wife or 
child. Many a poor, tired mother, as, late at night 
she repairs the tattered clothing of her little ones, may 
find the task sweetened as she pictures the possible 
future of those objects of her care and toil. The teacher 



100 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

may well imagine what her troublesome little ones 
may become. Almost every cloud has its ' ' silver 
lining," but imagination must find it. 

3. Imagination gives vividness and force to language. 
— Without the touch of fancy, and poetry, and illus- 
tration — all dependent upon imagination— what a dull 
and fruitless thing were language, written or spoken ! 
On this point, Dr. Haven happily illustrates, by the 
language he uses, the very thing he is describing. He 
says : ' ' Imagination gives vividness to our concep- 
tions, it raises the tone of our entire mental activity, 
it adds force to our reasoning, casts the light of fancy 
over the somber, plodding steps of judgment, gilds 
the recollections of the past and the anticipations of 
the future, with a coloring not their own. It lights 
up the horizon of thought, as the sunrise flashes along 
the mountain tops and lights up the world." 

Wit, humor, and illustration would be impossible in 
speech or literature without an appeal to Imagination. 

4. Imagination is essential to success in some of the 
most practical affairs of life. — Without it, the lawyer 
could not construct his "theory," the inventor could 
not make his discovery, nor the pushing man of busi- 
ness plan those "ventures" which result in foreign 
commerce, transcontinental railways, and great manu- 
factories. In fact, it is not easy to see what enter- 
prise, even the simplest, could be conceived or carried 
forward without the help of this power. 

5. Imagination makes possible all that Art gives us, both 
of enjoyment and of culture. — We have already said 
something bearing on this point. As the creation of 
works of Art is impossible without imagination, so it 



IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 10 1 

is impossible that they should produce any effect ex- 
cept through the imagination of the beholder. 

6. Imagination gives the idea of personal excellence 
towards which we strive. — This is its highest and no- 
blest use. Without such ideals, no progress is pos- 
sible. Like the rainbow, ever moving before us as 
we follow, they lead on in every path of progress. 
When one no longer has before his mind an ideal of 
personal excellence towards which he is striving, he 
would better die; life is not "worth living" to him. 

It is clear, we think, that imagination is not an enemy to its 
possessor ; it is not a power to be " crushed out." It is to be 
cultivated and put to a good use. In this respect, it is much 
like all the other powers of the mind, but hardly any other is 
more useful, on the one hand, or more dangerous on the other. 

Abuses of Imagination. — For, on the other hand, 
there is no mental power whose abuse can work more 
mischief. And the abuses lie alongside of the uses. 

i. Too great indulgence in the "play" of imagina- 
tion xvastes time and weakens the mind, even when 
nothing impure is indidged in. — This is the danger of 
the day-dreamer and the too-ardent lover of fiction. 

2. Imagination may add to life's burdens, as it does 
in the case of those who habitually ' ' look on the dark 
side." — No one works happily when he looks only for 
failure or disaster in his work. 

3. Imagination leads one astray, if he mistakes the 
ideal for the real. — This is the trouble with the wild 
dreamer or the "visionary"; his imagination seizes 
on the ideal, and he thinks it real. It is, also, the 
temptation of the reckless speculator, of the gambler, 
and of the "sharper's" dupe. 



102 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

4. Vile art and vile imaginings are both the parent 
and the product of debased characters. — Nothing is 
more harmful, especially to the young. And one of 
the saddest things is that, when a mind has been once 
polluted in this way, the evil remains even against the 
will. Such a person may reform, and come to hate 
the vile thing and to shrink from it, and yet be utterly 
unable to free his mind wholly from it. If the wound 
be healed, the scar and disfigurement remain. Hence, 
it is doubly important that the minds of youth should 
be protected against corrupting art, literature, and 
companionship. 

5. As Imagination gives high and holy ideals of char- 
acter and achievement, so, on the other hand, it may give 
those that debase and destroy. — Here is the danger to 
boys, of all highly "sensational" literature, — the 
"dime novel," the accounts of the exploits of the 
"James boys" and of other criminals. Here is the 
danger to girls, of the overwrought, sensational novel. 
One grows to be like those whom he chooses for his 
models, — and he is likely to choose for a model some 
one whose character and career he admires. 

Special Use to the Teacher. — To the teacher, 
imagination may be of special use in three ways, at 
least : First, It may help him in imparting knowledge. 
How a dull, abstract problem in arithmetic may glow 
with interest when imagination has illustrated the dry 
relations by a story ! What a tone and power are 
given to reading, when imagination has prepared the 
way ! Second, Imagination may assist greatly in govern- 
ing, especially in the case of small children. Let us 
refer again to Dr. Abbott's little book, for excellent 



IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION IO3 

illustrations. Third, Successful building of good charac- 
ter is not possible without appeal to the imagination. 
This follows from what was 'said of its sixth use. 

Culture of Imagination. — The same means, — 
viz., wise use, — serve for the culture of Imagination, 
as for the culture of all the other faculties. But the 
sort of use must be determined by the constitution 
of the individual; here, as everywhere, the teacher 
must take account of the individuality of his pupil. 
With some, the power needs first to be aroused, 
with others, it needs to be repressed ; in all cases 
something must be done to refine and chasten it. 

For definiteness, we may say that this power may 
be cultivated: (i) by observations of nature, (2) by 
study of imaginative literature, (3) by exercise in 
writing, (4) by study of works of art. 

The child's imagination readily enough sees in nat- 
ure more than the natural, as in the case of the little 
one who wanted to sit on the summer cloud. It is 
easy for the loving and skillful mother or teacher to 
cultivate this tendency until the common aspects of 
nature shall speak to the soul as clearly as to the 
sense. The one of whom the poet said, 

"A primrose by a river's brim 
A yellow primrose was to him ; 
And it was nothing more," 

had never received such training, we are sure. 

A good exercise for boys and girls ' ' in their teens " 
is to take some highly imaginative passage in litera- 
ture, and attempt to rewrite it, in statements devoid 
of all imagination. For this purpose, Dr. Haven 
chooses the following lines from Mrs. Welby : 



104 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

" The twilight hours like birds flew by, 
As lightly and as free ; 
Ten thousand stars were in the sky, 

Ten thousand in th-; sea ; 
For every wave with dimpled cheek, 

That leaped upon the air, 
Had caught a star in its embrace, 

And held it, trembling, there." 

Had the poet said: "It was a quiet, pleasant even- 
ing ; there were many stars visible, and each one was 
reflected in the sea, which was slightly agitated," it 
would seem that all the ideas would have been ex- 
pressed in plain prose. 

Find other examples in your own reading ; show in what ways 
there is an expression of imagination ; then rewrite without 
any imaginative expression. 

Space will not permit us to take up the study of art ; but 
every earnest student, in these times, can find some opportunity 
for such study, and some books that will aid him. 



CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 

What is It? — It differs from simple memory in 
that it strives to give its possessor a whole which is 
new to him, while memory strives to recall his former 
possessions only. When one, by means of maps, 
models, pictures, and words, seeks to give another a 
correct notion of some object in nature that he has 
not seen — Niagara, for instance — the appeal is made 
to his constructive conception. And if the work is 
successfully done, there grows up in his mind a pict- 
ure that would be realized were he to go and see the 
object for himself. 



IMAGINATION,AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 105 

Mr. Bain says : " It passes above memory, as being an ex- 
ercise of constructiveness, and falls below imagination proper, 
as containing no originality or invention." 

Not Imagination. — This is often spoken of, im- 
properly, as the work of imagination; but, unlike im- 
agination, it aims to produce a result which corre- 
sponds to fad, and not to fancy. Like imagination, 
it builds with material that memory must furnish from 
the stores given to it by sense-perception. No de- 
scription could ever lead one born blind to conceive 
of the colors of a painting or a landscape — he has 
never gained a knowledge of them through sense. 
Nor would description be any more successful with 
one who knew colors in his youth, if he has since be- 
come blind, and has lost his memory of colors. 

Its Use. — A moment's reflection shows that this 
power plays a large part in our intellectual activity; 
by it alone are we able to form just notions, through 
description of any kind, of anything beyond our ex- 
perience. Our schools should carefully train this 
power wisely and systematically. 

Unless this power be active, reading becomes dull 
and mechanical, geography is a collection of words 
without meaning,^ history is lifeless, mathematics a 
mere form, and astronomy, beyond the bare aspect 
of the heavens, is impossible. Illustrative apparatus 
of any kind has a value just in proportion to the aid 
it furnishes to the constructive conception, and no 
whit further. By this power only can illustrations il- 
lustrate, for it is the nature of an illustration to de- 
mand that conception should give the meaning to it; 
that is the very purpose for which it is used. 



106 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Use, in Relation to Words. — All words that 
have any meaning are at first symbols of the concepts 
of the one using them ; but, in order that they may 
serve any good purpose, they must awaken similar 
concepts in him who hears or reads them. 

Often the chief difficulty with the student in arith- 
metic is that he has not properly construed — conceived 
of — the words in which his problem was stated. The 
unprofitable work in geography, — so often and so 
justly criticized, by saying that the pupils have learned 
mere words, — is due simply to the fact that the pu- 
pil's maps and text have failed to awaken the proper 
concepts in his mind. The successful student of his- 
tory sees, in his "mind's eye," the movement of the 
army, as he reads the description in his text. A 
large part of the unskillful teacher's effort is wasted in 
the fruitless attempt to deal with concepts in the pu- 
pil's mind, which have not been correctly built up 
from the percepts derived through sense-perception. 

Gaining Concepts. — These statements will show 
what should be the first aim of the teacher in these 
and in other school studies ; viz. , helping the pupil to 
gain correct concepts, first from sense-perception, and 
then through language. The main purpose of all 
"language lessons," as the phrase has come to be 
used, should be the just fitting of words to the concepts 
for which they stand. The foundation of all right 
concepts is laid in sense-perception ; hence, the first 
work with the child, — the first work with any one 
who takes up a subject in natural science, — should 
be the getting of the concepts for future thinking, 
through a right use of the senses. 



IMAGINATION.AN D CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION IO7 

Value of Right Concepts. — It is apparent that 
the facts of nature, the words of a speaker or writer, 
and all works of art, mean much more to some minds 
than they do to others. The difference is due to the 
mental preparation of the observer or hearer. An 
active mind well furnished with the proper concepts, 
which arise in it readily on occasion, will carry away 
proportionally more from any speech, book, or ob- 
servation of nature. 

No flower, book, sermon, or statue can have any 
meaning to one beyond what he is able to put into 
it. What we carry to the field or the forest, the 
church, library, or picture-gallery, must determine 
very largely what we shall bring away. 





CHAPTER XI 

THE REFLECTIVE POWER, CONCEPTS AND TERMS 

l TS Forms. — The Reflective Power acts 
in several ways ; writers do not agree 
fully in respect to their number. We 
may safely indicate five of these ways 
of acting; viz., Comparing, Abstracting, 
Judging, Generalizing, and Reasoning. 

By some, the Reflective Power is called the Understanding ; 
by others, it is called the Elaborative Faculty. 

Because writers on Psychology do not agree as to the exact 
number of forms in which the Reflective Power acts, we have 
placed the abbreviation " etc." after our list, in the Scheme. 

Comparing. — As the Reflective Power deals with 
the relations of things, or of the concepts of things, 
rather than with the things themselves, it will be ob- 
vious that much of its action must be in the form of 
comparison. It notes the relations of size, length, 
position, density, value, purpose, cause and effect, 
agreement, and a multitude of others. 

Comparison is clearly involved in abstracting, judging, gen- 
eralizing, reasoning, etc. ; hence, some writers regard compari- 
son as including all the various forms of the Reflective Power. 

Its Products. — The products of the Reflective 
Power are concepts and thoughts. A thought is a 

(108) 



THE REFLECTIVE POWER— CONCEPTS, ETC IO9 

logical judgment. Not all concepts are the product 
of the Reflective Power, nor are all judgments. This 
power gives us only such' concepts as are abstract or 
general, and such judgments as are logical. A con- 
cept of an object of sense, or of a quality in connec- 
tion with its object, is not a product of the Reflective 
Power, nor is a primitive judgment, such as is nec- 
essary to the cognition of any sensation or perception. 
See page 22. 

Analysis and Synthesis. — Comparison is the first 
step in an act of this power. From comparison, we 
may proceed to find the elements of any object of 
thought, — this is analysis. Or, we may proceed to 
combine certain elements which we judge to belong 
together, — this is synthesis. Frequently, both proc- 
esses are combined in one operation. 

Abstraction. — A concept of a quality is abstract 
when that quality is not associated in thought with 
any other quality nor with any object to which it be- 
longs. Some writers consider the process one of ab- 
straction when the attention is directed to one of the 
qualities which an object possesses, as when looking 
at a rose I fasten my mental activity solely on its 
form. But this is not abstraction, — the quality is 
not "drawn away" from the object; this is simply 
analytic attention. 

It is seen that the process of abstraction is a very 
common one, when we observe the large number of 
abstract terms which are used even by children and 
uncultivated people. This process has sometimes been 
illustrated in this way : You look at several objects 
having a common color, as a red ribbon, a red book, 



I IO ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

a red necktie, etc. You note their color in connection 
with the other qualities of those objects. You now 
perceive the color in the concrete. You turn away or 
shut your eyes, and think of what you have just seen ; 
you now conceive the color in the concrete. Again, 
you drop out of thought all the other qualities of the 
several objects, but still think of the color in connec- 
tion with each object ; you are now conceiving of the 
color in the discrete. Once more all thought of the 
object disappears, and you think of the color only, 
apart from every object and from all other qualities. 
You are now conceiving of redness in the abstract, — 
that is, drawn away from everything else. It is proba- 
ble that some such process as this is often gone through 
with by those who have no thought of the peculiar 
form of mental activity they are exercising. 

Logical Concepts. — These are concepts not of ob- 
jects, nor of single abstract qualities, but of a group 
or collection of qualities which belong to several objects 
in common ; all the objects possessing these common 
qualities constitute a class. The expression for any con- 
cept is a term. The term for a logical concept is said 
to be both abstract and general; it is abstract because 
it is not applied to any individual of a class, and it is 
general because it may be applied to any individual of 
the class. Recall what was said about the terms 
"man" and "a man," on page 44. 

Steps in Forming Logical Concepts. — One per- 
ceives a large number of animals, including horses, 
dogs, etc. ; he compares them, noting their resem- 
blances and differences. He perceives, for instance, 
the particulars in which horses differ from the other 



THE REFLECTIVE POWER,— CONCEPTS, ETC 1 1 I 

animals ; dropping out the points in which the indi- 
vidual horses differ from one another, he selects the 
particulars in which they -are all alike ; these particu- 
lars he withdraws from the individual horses and com- 
bines them into a whole, which is a logical concept 
expressed by the term "horse." Here we note four 
distinct mental operations. The first is attentive per- 
ception ; this is no part of the forming of a logical 
concept, but is preparatory for it. The next step is 
comparison, resulting in a discrimination of resem- 
blances and differences. The third step is the process 
of abstracting, from the concepts of the individual ob- 
jects, — those qualities which they possess in common. 
The last, the characteristic, step, is the synthesizing 
of these common qualities into one complex concept, 
— the logical concept. 

Rarely, if ever, does the mind proceed to take these 
steps with the logical distinctness which we have sup- 
posed ; the operations are more or less involved one 
with another. But we need to separate them thus, in 
thought, in order that we may see what is really done. 

We must distinguish, with much care, the concepts from the 
terms which express them, or we fail to mark the distinction 
between things and their symbols. The result always is lack 
of clearness, or confusion. 

Characteristics of Concepts. — An abstract, gen- 
eral concept may embrace few elementary concepts ; 
in that case, it is said to be " broad," and it may be 
individualized in a large number of objects. And 
the class to which such a concept may be applied is a 
"high" class. Thus, the concept expressed by the 
word ' ' man " is broader than the concept expressed by 



112 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the word "Caucasian"; and the class to which it may- 
be applied is a higher class, and includes more indi- 
viduals. So Caucasian is higher than European. 

Higher and Lower Classes. — Thus, we see that 
broader concepts may be formed from narrower, by 
dropping out some of the elementary concepts, or 
"marks," which they contain. And the class to 
which the broader concept is applied is the higher 
class. Thus polygon signifies a broader concept and 
a higher class than quadrilateral ; and this is broader 
than parallelogram, etc. 

Genus and Species. — The higher class is a genus, 
of which the next lower class is a species ; and a 
class which was species to a genus may become a 
genus to a lower species. Thus polygon is a genus 
of which quadrilateral is a species ; but quadrilateral 
is a genus of which parallelogram is a species. 

Clear and Obscure. — A concept is clear when it 
is sharply distinguished from every other concept ; 
when it is not so distinguished, it is obscure. 

Distinct and Confused. — A concept is distinct 
when its marks are clearly seen ; thus, A quadrilateral 
is a polygon bounded by four straight lines. The 
concept denoted by quadrilateral is distinct when we 
clearly comprehend the two parts of the above defini- 
tion. But the concept is still inadequate, unless we 
see clearly all the "marks" denoted by the terms 
"polygon" and "four straight lines." Thus, it will 
be seen that a concept may be clear, and still be in- 
distinct; and it may be both clear and distinct, and 
yet be very inadequate. 

It should here be noted, that our concepts become 



THE REFLECTIVE POWER,— CONCEPTS, ETC I 13 

more and more adequate, the more faithfully we study 
what is involved in them ; complete knowledge is nec- 
essary to a perfectly adequate concept. 

Comprehension and Extension of Terms. — The 
comprehension of a term relates to the number of ele- 
mentary concepts, or "marks," embraced in the con- 
cept to which it applies ; thus, the term quadrilateral 
has a greater comprehension than the term polygon, 
the term European than the term Caucasian, etc. 
The extension of a term relates to the number of ob- 
jects to which it may be applied, that is, to the 
number of individuals belonging to its class ; thus poly- 
gon has greater extension than quadrilateral, etc. 

The comprehension and extension of a term always 
bear an inverse ratio to each other, — the greater the 
comprehension, the less the extension, and vice versa. 

This distinction between comprehension and extension is 
very important, and it should be fully comprehended by the 
student. Let him name terms of great comprehension and 
little extension, also terms of little comprehension and great 
extension. See if you can find a term which has less exten- 
sion and greater comprehension than any other, or the reverse. 

Notative and Symbolic Terms. — A notative term 
signifies, by its form, the marks of the concept to 
which it applies; such terms are polygon, quadru- 
ped, etc. By a careful study of the literal and exact 
meaning of words, many terms which are merely sym- 
bolic at first, will become notative. 

Absolute and Relative. — A term is relative when 
it implies another term to which it is related ; thus, 
debtor implies creditor; master implies servant, etc. 
An absolute term suggests no other as corresponding 
to it ; such terms are sun, corn, etc. 

Psy. — 10. 



114 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Positive, Contrary, and Contradictory. — A posi- 
tive term may be opposed by a contrary term, or by 
a contradictory one. It is very important that these 
distinctions be understood. A contradictory denies 
the positive merely, but a contrary asserts the oppo- 
site of the positive. Thus, the contrary of good is 
bad ; but its contradictory is not-good. Often, terms 
are used as contrary in sense, when they are merely 
contradictory in form. Thus, the term unkind is only 
contradictory in form, to kind ; but it is often used to 
signify its contrary, cruel. So, unlearned is used to 
mean ignorant, unwise, foolish, etc. 

It is important to notice that two contradictory 
terms always include the universe between them; 
thus, everything is either good or not-good, either 
man or not-man, either Ego or Non-Ego, etc. There 
is nothing in the world of things or of thought that 
can not be put into one or the other of the two classes 
denoted by any two contradictories. 

Logical Analysis. — This is analyzing a term with 
respect to its comprehension, as when we find that 
surface is a necessary element of the concept expressed 
by the term "polygon." 

Logical Division. — This is analyzing a term with 
respect to its extension, as when we find that the 
quadrilateral is included in the class of figures de- 
noted by the term "polygon." 

Distribution of a Term. — A term is "distrib- 
uted " when it is used in its widest extension ; thus, 
"all men," or " every man, " is a term distributed, be- 
cause it includes every one of the class to which it 
may be applied. 



THE REFLECTIVE POWER— CONCEPTS, ETC I I 5 

Logical Definition. — In defining a thing logically, 
we put it into a class, and then point out the differ- 
ence between it and other objects in the same class. 
Thus, a quadrilateral is a polygon having four sides. 
Here quadrilateral is put into the class "polygon "; it 
is then distinguished from other polygons by its hav- 
ing four sides. Every such definition, therefore, con- 
sists of the generic part, which puts the object into a 
class ; and of the specific, which marks it off from oth- 
ers of the class. In the given definition, " polygon " is 
the generic part, and "having four sides, " the specific. 
The specific part is called the differentia. 

Importance of General Concepts. — Without gen- 
eral, or logical, concepts, language would be impos- 
sible. Most substantives are general terms, and the 
same is true of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. 

Nor would anything like science be possible with- 
out the power to classify ; and classification depends 
upon the power to form logical concepts, according 
to which objects can be arranged in classes. 

Progress of Scientific Classification. — In all 
the natural sciences there is a marked progress from 
a classification that is more or less loose, towards that 
which is more truly scientific. This progress results 
from a knowledge of deeper and more important char- 
acteristics, which are discovered by closer study. In 
Zoology, no importance is now attached to such a 
class as quadrupeds, for it is found that the fact of 
having four feet is not very significant. So, in other 
sciences, progress in knowledge often leads to new 
classifications on a more scientific basis, — that is, on 
distinctions that have a more profound meaning. 



n6 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Thus, thought in its progress comes more and more 
into harmony with things ; if man shall ever attain 
complete knowledge, the harmony will be perfect. 

It must be remembered that classes, as such, do 
not exist in nature; there are found only individ- 
ual objects, with their peculiarities and qualities, 
some of which are obvious, but unimportant, while 
others may be profoundly significant, but their sig- 
nificance appears only after careful study. It is held 
by some that these significant peculiarities express the 
profound thought of the Creator ; and that classifica- 
tion is the more scientific, the more nearly it harmon- 
izes with this creative thought. 

Generalizing. — According to some writers, the word "gener- 
alize" means the forming of logical concepts. Others use the 
term to signify scientific classification. It is in the latter sense 
that we have used it as designating one form of the Reflect- 
ive Power. 

Significance of General Terms. — Some have 
maintained that there is no such thing as a logical 
concept, such as we have defined it; some declare 
that general terms, such as "man," are empty of 
meaning, — mere names. Those who take this posi- 
tion are, therefore, called Nominalists. One branch 
of the Nominalists, however, claims that, when the 
term is not a mere name, the corresponding concept 
is a concept of some individual of the class, which is 
a type, or representative, of the class. On the other 
hand, some have held that classes have a real, object- 
ive existence as such, — that is, that there is a real 
thing, not merely a product of thinking, that corre- 
sponds to such terms as "man," "horse," etc. Fierce 
discussions have been waged over these questions. 



THE REFLECTIVE POWER, — CONCEPTS, ETC I lj 

Answers. — Doubtless, abstract, general terms are 
often used as mere words, and sometimes it may be 
that a concept of an individual of the class does re- 
spond to the term. But many know, from their own 
consciousness, that such words do awaken in their 
minds concepts that are real, and that are clear, but 
which are not concepts of any individual, — which are 
not images at all. The Nominalists seem to assume 
that there can be no concepts that are not images. 
Further, how can an individual represent a class, if 
the mind can not conceive of a class for it to repre- 
sent? The concept of the class, however, is purely 
subjective, — it is a product of the mind; classes, as 
such, have no objective existence. Only individuals 
exist; no horse can be found that is not "a horse." 
The notion of an objective existence that corresponds 
to a general term, is kindred to that notion of "ob- 
jective ideas," out of which grew the "little images" 
of the Non-Egoist (page 73). 




CHAPTER XII 

JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING 

UDGING. — In forming a logical judg- 
ment, or thought, the mind holds be- 
fore itself two concepts, or a concept 
and a percept, and decides that these 
do, or do not, agree ; the concepts may 
be simple or very complex. You bring before your 
mind a concept of the thing called snow, and a con- 
cept of the quality whiteHess ; you decide that they 
agree, and you say, "Snow is white." You bring 
before your mind a concept of the act called murder, 
and a concept of the quality tightness ; you decide 
that they do not agree, and you say, "Murder is not 
right. " Every judgment, then, involves two concepts, 
and the decision respecting them. 

Proposition. — The expression of a judgment is a 
proposition. 

This definition is often expressed in a false form by 
saying, ' 'A proposition is a judgment expressed. " We 
deny that a proposition is a judgment expressed or 
unexpressed ; the judgment is the thing, the propo- 
sition is its symbol. Here, as everywhere, the teacher 
can not afford to confound a thing and its symbol. 

(n8) 



JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING I 1 9 

As a judgment involves three things, so a proposi- 
tion must have three parts; these we call subject, at- 
tribute, and copula. The subject is the word or words 
denoting the principal concept; the attribute is the 
word or words denoting the related concept ; and the 
copula is the word or words expressing the decision. 
Both copula and attribute may be expressed by a single 
word, as in the proposition, Water flows. The sub- 
ject and the attribute are the terms of the proposition. 
In this relation of judgment and proposition is the 
foundation of all grammar. All complete language is 
in the form of propositions; hence, every kind of 
mental activity results in a kind of judgment ; if it 
were not so, all language would not take this form. 
Sense-perception is a form of judgment called a prim- 
itive judgment (page 22). Only such a judgment as 
we have defined above results from reflection. 

Kinds of Propositions. — Every proposition must 
contain two terms, a subject and an attribute. With 
the same two terms, four different propositions may 
be made. 

By the quantity of a proposition, we mean its char- 
acter as universal or particular ; if its subject is dis- 
tributed, it is universal, otherwise it is particular. 

By the quality of a proposition, we mean its char- 
acter as affirmative or negative ; this is determined by 
its copula. 

With the same two terms, then, we may make a 
universal affirmative proposition, as, All A is B. This 
proposition is symbolized by the letter A. 

We may also make a universal negative, as, No A 
is B ; this is represented by the letter E. 



120 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

We may make a particular affirmative proposition, 
as, Some A is B ; this is represented by I. 

Finally, we may make a particular negative, as, Some 
A is not B ; this is represented by O. 

Distribution of Terms. — In a universal proposi- 
tion, the subject is distributed, for this is what marks 
it as universal ; the subject is not distributed in a par- 
ticular proposition. Every negative proposition dis- 
tributes the attribute, for every part of the attribute 
must be denied of the subject. 

Opposition. — Any two of the four propositions made 
with the same terms are in opposition ; but different 
names are applied, according as 'the propositions differ 
in quantity or quality, or both. 

The different forms of opposition are clearly shown 
and named in the accompanying fig- 
ure. 

I, the particular, corresponding to 
A, is called its subaltern ; O is the 
subaltern of E. 

Laws of Opposition. — Universal and Particular. — 
If the universal is true, its subaltern is true. If the 
particular is false, its universal is false. 

Contraries. — Two contraries can not both be true; 
both may be false. 

Sub- Contraries. — Two sub-contraries can not both 
be false ; both may be true. 

Contradictories. — Of two contradictories, one is al- 
ways true, and one is false. 

Let the student be prepared to give the reasons for these 
laws. Let him take two terms, make the four propositions, 
A E I O, with them, and illustrate the Laws. 



A CONTRARIES 

I — SUB-CONTRARIES — O 



JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING 121 

Conversion of Propositions. — A proposition is 
said to be converted when its terms are exchanged. 
The original proposition is then called the convertend ; 
the new proposition is called the converse. The con- 
version is improper unless the converse is a logical 
inference from the convertend. This is the rule of 
conversion : No term must be distributed in the converse 
that was not distributed in the convertend. 

There are three kinds of conversion ; viz. , Simple, 
by Limitation, by Negation. In simple conversion, 
the terms are exchanged without modifying them. In 
conversion by limitation, the quantity of the proposi- 
tion is changed from universal to particular. In con- 
version by negation, the quality is first changed from 
negative to affirmative, by removing the negative par- 
ticle from the copula and joining it to the attribute: 
then the terms are exchanged by simple conversion. 

How Converted. — A is converted by limitation. 
The attribute of A is not distributed ; hence, it can 
not become the subject of a universal, therefore A 
must be converted into I. Example : All birds have 
wings; converted, it becomes, Some (creatures) hav- 
ing wings are birds. 

E is converted simply, into E. For, as it is uni- 
versal and negative, both its terms are distributed. 
Example: No men are dogs; converted, it becomes, 
No dogs are men. 

A substitutive proposition may be converted simply, 
also ; for both of its terms have the same comprehen- 
sion and extension ; any logical definition is an example 
of a substitutive proposition. 

I is converted simply, into I. For, as it is particu- 

Psy.— ii. 



122 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

lar and affirmative, neither of its terms is distributed. 
Example: Some sheep are black; converted, it be- 
comes, Some black (creatures) are sheep. 

O is converted by negation; it is first changed to 
its equivalent I, and then that is converted, simply. 
Example : Some trees are not oaks, is first changed to 
the equivalent I as follows : Some trees are not-oaks ; 
then, by simple conversion, it becomes, Some (things) 
not-oaks are trees. If you recall what was said about 
contradictory terms, such as oaks and not-oaks, you 
will readily understand how O may be thus changed 
to its equivalent I (see page 1 14, second paragraph). 
Every tree must be oak or not-oak. 

If the student will carefully reflect upon these Laws of Oppo- 
sition and Laws of Conversion, he will soon see that he can not 
make the simplest assertion of any kind without, at the same 
time, saying several other things by logical inference. For in- 
stance, if one asserts A, he asserts its subaltern, and denies E 
and O in the same breath ; if he asserts O, and in so doing 
speaks falsely, then A and I must be true, and E must be 
false. Every proposition asserts its converse. 

REASONING 

Inference and Reasoning. — One truth may be 
drawn from another by inference ; as, when the truth 
of one proposition is seen, the falsity of its contradict- 
ory may be known by inference ; or when an animal 
is found having no eyes, it may be inferred that such 
an animal can not see. 

But true reasoning establishes a relation between two 
concepts, through a comparison of each with a third ; 
thus, A equals B, and B equals C ; hence, A equals C. 



JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING 123 

The Syllogism. — When a process of reasoning is 
reduced to a systematic form, it appears as a syllogism, 
or a chain of syllogisms. 

Not that all reasoning is put into the syllogistic 
form ; in fact, it is not generally in this form. But 
all reasoning may be put into the form of a syllogism ; 
and this it is well to do, when we would test its va- 
lidity. A syllogism consists of three propositions so 
related that one necessarily follows from the other two. 

Of course, as a syllogism contains three proposi- 
tions, it must contain six terms. But, as each term 
appears twice in the syllogism, only three separate 
terms are used; they are known as major, minor, and 
middle terms. 

The major term is the attribute of the conclusion; 
the minor term is the subject of the conclusion; the 
middle term is the one with which the other two terms 
are compared, — it does not appear in the conclusion. 

The major premise compares the major term with 
the middle ; the minor premise compares the minor 
term with the middle. 

The order of the propositions in a syllogism is im- 
material ; any one of them may occupy the first, sec- 
ond, or third place. For instance: 

Socrates is a man ; 
Therefore he is mortal, 
For all men are mortal; 

Or, All men are mortal ; 

Therefore, Socrates is mortal, 
Because he is a man, etc. 

Two Kinds of Syllogisms. — By one process of 
reasoning, we derive a particular truth from a general 



124 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

truth ; this process is called deduction. It is based upon 
the principle that what is true of a whole, is also true 
of its constituent parts. 

The formula for a deductive syllogism is this : a is 
b, c is a; therefore c is b. 

By another process of reasoning, we derive a general 
truth from several particular truths; this process is 
called induction. It is based upon the principle that 
what is true of the constituent parts, is true of the whole. 

The formula for induction is this : a, b, c, etc. , are 
x ; a, b, c, etc., represent y; therefore y is x. 

These abstract formulas should be thoroughly learned; and 
then, in any given case, the student should fix the value of 
each term, and then fill the syllogism. 

The Deductive Syllogism. — Taking the "stock" 
example to illustrate the deductive syllogism, let a 
equal man ; let b equal mortality or certainty of death ; 
let c equal Socrates. Our abstract syllogism now be- 
comes, 

All men are mortal; 

Socrates is a man ; 

Hence, Socrates is mortal. 

Such a syllogism is made in this way : We take the 
logical concept denoted by the term ' ' man, " and we find 
by logical analysis that mortality is one of the ' ' marks " 
or elements of that concept ; hence, we make the first 
statement. By logical division, we find that Socrates 
is one of the class to whom the term " man " applies ; 
hence, we make the second statement. From these 
two statements, we derive the conclusion, on the prin- 
ciple already stated, that what is true of the whole is 
true of each constituent part. 



JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING I 25 

When a Conclusion May Be Trusted. — Before 
a conclusion can be trusted, we must be sure of two 
things : First, we must be certain that our premises 
are true ; Second, we must be sure that the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the premises. The syllogism 
itself gives us no power to test the truth of the prem- 
ises ; this must be done in some other way. But the 
validity or conclusiveness of the syllogism must be 
determined by observing whether it conforms to all 
the "Laws of the Syllogism," 

Not all syllogisms are sound or valid, as we shall 
see by a study of the Laws of the Syllogism. Eveiy 
conclusive syllogism is sound; that is, the soundness 
or validity of a syllogism depends solely on its conclu- 
siveness. But, if the premises are one or both false, 
the conclusion from a sound syllogism is untrustworthy ; 
it may be true or false ; our reasoning gives us no ground 
of knowledge as to its truth, although we may be sure 
that our syllogism is valid. For instance, take this: 

Every tyrant is a good man ; 

Washington was a tyrant ; 

Therefore, Washington was a good man. 

Here we know, from other sources, that the conclusion 
is true ; we also know that the syllogism is valid. But, 
as the premises are false, the truth of the conclusion 
does not follow from our reasoning at all. 




CHAPTER XIII 

REASONING, CONCLUDED 

S^gpgjAWS of the Syllogism. — In order that 
we may determine the validity of a syl- 
logism, the following laws are given : 

i. The Middle Term Distributed. — The 
middle term must be distributed, in one 
of the premises, at least. Otherwise, the major term 
may be compared with one part of the middle, and 
the minor with another part, and so no conclusion 
follows. Example : 

Oaks are trees ; 
Maples are trees ; 
Therefore, oaks are maples. 

2. The Middle Term Unequivocal. — If the middle 
term is equivocal, it may have one meaning in one 
premise and another meaning in the other, in which 
case it would be no true middle, but such in appear- 
ance only. Example: 

All light bodies are easily lifted ; 
The sun is a light body ; 
Hence, the sun is easily lifted. 

3. Distribution in the Conclusion. — No term must be 

distributed in the conclusion that was not distributed 

(126) 



REASONING— CONCLUDED 1 27 

in the premise. Otherwise, the conclusion would as- 
sert more than the premises would warrant. Example : 

All birds breathe air ; 

No dog is a bird ; 

Hence, no dog breathes air. 

4. Affirmative Premises. — If both premises are af- 
firmative, only an affirmative conclusion can be drawn. 
For the premises have asserted agreement of minor 
and major terms with the middle ; hence, the conclu- 
sion must assert agreement between major and minor 
terms, if it assert anything. 

5. Negative Premises. — If both premises are nega- 
tive, there is no conclusion. For the premises having 
asserted, merely, that both the minor and the major 
terms do not agree with the middle, of course we 
know nothing about their agreement with each other, 
from such assertion. 

6. Negative Conclusion. — A negative conclusion re- 
quires one negative premise. For the agreement of 
one term of the conclusion with the middle term must 
have been asserted, and the non- agreement of the 
other, in order that we may assert their non-agree- 
ment with each other in the conclusion. 

7. Particular Premises. — If both premises are par- 
ticular, there is no conclusion. If both are /, there 
is no conclusion, by Law 1. If both are 0, there is 
no conclusion, by Law 5. If one is /and the other 
0, then the conclusion, if any, must be negative, by 
Law 6. But this negative conclusion would distrib- 
ute at least one term ; by Law 3, this term must be 
distributed in the premise; and by Law 1, the mid- 



128 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

die term must be distributed; this would require the 
distribution of two terms in the premises, which is 
impossible if the premises are I and 0. 

8. Universal Conclusion. — In order that the conclu- 
sion may be universal, both premises must be universal. 
If the conclusion be A, both premises must be affirma- 
tive, by Law 4; the conclusion A distributes one 
term ; hence, two terms must be distributed in the 
premises ; these affirmative premises must both be A, 
in order to distribute the terms. 

If the conclusion be E, both of its terms are distrib- 
uted ; hence, three terms must be distributed in the 
premises ; but, as one premise must be affirmative, by 
Law 5, no premises but A and E will distribute three 
terms. Therefore both premises must be universal, 
in order to have any universal conclusion. 

The Inductive Syllogism. — Returning to the ab- 
stract inductive syllogism, let us give value to its 
terms, and then fill the syllogism. ' 

Let a, b, c, etc., stand for all bodies whose ex- 
pansibility we have tested ; let x stand for the quality 
of expansibility by heat ; let y stand for all bodies, 
including a, b, c, etc. Then the syllogism will read : 

All bodies, as iron, lead, etc., that I have tried as 
to their expansibility by heat, are expanded by heat. 

But these bodies represent all bodies; hence, all 
bodies are expanded by heat. 

The word " represent" here must be taken to mean 
fust like, in respect to the thing in question. 

It will be noticed that the first premise states the 
result of observations ; the second premise states an 
assumption. Hence, the first premise may be false, 



REASONING— CONCLUDED I2Q 

if our observations have not been carefully made ; and 
we can never be absolutely sure that the assumption in 
the second premise is not false. The only possibility 
of absolute certainty in the second premise would be 
to make a, b, c, etc., equal to y, that is, to try the 
experiment with every one of the class. But in 
that case there would be no induction at all; the 
conclusion would be identical with the first premise, 
and both would merely state a truth discovered by 
observation. 

We do Trust the Assumption. — Although we 
can never be absolutely certain that the several cases 
examined do represent the class, in the sense in which 
we have defined the word " represent " as used in an 
induction, yet the human mind is so constituted that 
we do constantly trust this assumption, and make our 
inductions. And, in many cases, we find it perfectly 
safe to do so. Most of the laws of Natural Science 
are established by induction. 

For instance, the law that all horned and cloven-footed ani- 
mals ruminate, that all metals are expanded by heat, that all 
magnets attract iron, etc. Let the student see if he can take 
the abstract formula for induction, and so fill the terms as to 
make these inductions. 

The conclusion of an induction may become the 
major premise for a deduction. For instance : 

All horned and cloven-footed animals ruminate ; 
The cow is a horned and cloven-footed animal ; 
Hence, the cow ruminates. 

The major premise of a deduction is usually the result 
of an induction; or it is a necessary truth, to be de- 
fined Jiereafter. 



I30 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Not Always Safe to Do So. — But some induc- 
tions are found to be false, because the assumption of 
the meaning of "represent" is unwarranted. Some- 
times the reason is that not enough cases are exam- 
ined before the assumption is made ; then the induc- 
tion is said to be too narrow. Sometimes circum- 
stances prevent us from examining such cases as would 
show the falsity of the assumption. It is said that a 
traveler from a cold country once told the King of 
Siam some very strange and improbable stories about 
things in his own country. However, the King be- 
lieved all that he said until the traveler told him that 
sometimes in his country water became hard like a 
rock. This was too much for the King's credence. 
Why did he reject it? Because he had made an in- 
duction with which it was in conflict. 

Many superstitions, as that Friday is an unlucky 
day, Thirteen is an unlucky number, etc. , and many 
of the so-called "signs," as that a certain position of 
the horns of the new moon indicates a wet month, 
are the result of careless or false inductions. 

Let the student see if he can put the King of Siam's induction, 
or any of the others, into the formula. 

The Enthymeme. — An argument in which one of 
the premises is suppressed, is called an enthymeme. 

This is often done in the deductive argument; and 
usually the suppressed premise is the major, — it may 
be supposed to be so well understood as to need no 
statement. Four pencils cost twelve cents because one 
pencil costs tJiree cents, is an enthymeme of this kind, 
the suppressed premise being that four pencils cost 
four times as many cents as one pencil. 



REASONING— CONCLUDED 1 3 1 

Often an enthymeme which seems plausible will be 
seen to be faulty if the suppressed premise is supplied. 
For instance, some one shows you that a certain habit 
or opinion is working great evil among men, therefore 
he urges that it is your duty to give your whole time 
and energy to the overthrow of this habit or opin- 
ion. His argument is an enthymeme, the suppressed 
premise being that it is your duty to give your whole 
time and energy to the overthrow of bad habits and 
opinions among your fellows. A sophistical advocate 
will sometimes put his argument in the form of an 
enthymeme purposely, because the statement of the 
suppressed premise would show the misleading nature 
of his argument. 

Hypothetical Reasoning. — This is "of two forms, 
conditional and disjunctive, represented as follows : 
If A is B, C is D ; but A can be shown to be B; 
hence, C is D; or, Either A is B, or C is D; but it 
can be shown that A is not B; hence, C is D. These 
are not, properly, forms of reasoning at all, because 
there is no middle term ; they are, rather, .forms for 
drawing an immediate inference. 

Let the student be careful that he does not assume that, in 
the first of these cases, Cis not D, when it can be shown that 
A is noti?,- the condition gives no ground for this conclusion. 
Nor does it follow, in the hypothetical form, that C is not D, 
when A is found to be B. 

Two Kinds of Truth. — There are two kinds of 
truth ; viz. , necessary and contingent. Necessary truth 
is independent of time and place ; and its contradict- 
ory is unthinkable or absurd. Such truths belong 
mostly to Mathematics and Logic (page 48). 



132 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Contingent truth is no less truth than the other, but 
it is dependent on time, place, and circumstance ; nor 
is its contradictory unthinkable. Napoleon was Em- 
peror of France, is a contingent truth ; so is the truth 
that The Nile flows northward. The sum of t/te three 
angles of a triangle equals tivo right angles, is a neces- 
sary truth. 

Two Kinds of Reasoning. — Reasoning upon nec- 
essary truth is demonstrative reasoning ; reasoning upon 
contingent truth is probable reasoning. It is not meant, 
however, that probable reasoning may not lead to re- 
sults that are just as certain as those reached by de- 
monstrative reasoning. But the results of demonstra- 
tive reasoning are always certain, or they are worth- 
less ; while the results of probable reasoning may range 
from certainty down to the barest possibility. 

Demonstrative Argument, Peculiar. — Demon- 
strative arguments have two peculiar characteristics: 
First, every argument is perfect, or it is worthless ; 
Second, one conclusive argument is as good as an- 
other, and one is as good as a thousand. It is not meant 
that all arguments are equally neat, or concise, or in- 
genious ; but an argument is conclusive, or it has 
no force ; and all conclusive arguments are equally 
strong, and one is sufficient. 

Direct and Indirect Demonstration. — In demonstra- 
tive reasoning, there are two modes of procedure ; 
one shows the truth of a proposition directly, and 
the other shows its truth by proving that no in- 
consistent proposition can be true. For instance, 
if a geometer wants to prove that the line a is equal 
to the line b, he may be able to show that each is 



REASONING— CONCLUDED 133 

equal to the line c, and hence they are equal to each 
other ; this is direct reasoning. Or, he may show 
that if he supposes a to be either longer or shorter 
than b, such a supposition will lead to an absurdity. 
If, therefore, a can not be longer nor shorter than b, 
they must be equal in length ; this reasoning is indi- 
rect. Both are equally conclusive. 

Probable Reasoning. — Reasoning concerning con- 
tingent truth is probable reasoning. In this kind of 
reasoning, different arguments may carry different de- 
grees of weight, and the more arguments tending to 
the same conclusion, the stronger becomes our confi- 
dence in the truth of that conclusion. Sometimes 
we may trust the conclusion as implicitly as we trust 
the result of a mathematical demonstration. From 
this certainty, the degree of probability established by 
this kind of reasoning may diminish to a conclusion 
that is simply possible. 

The sources of evidence in probable reasoning are 
three ; viz. , Testimony, Observation or Experience, and 
Analogy. 

Testimony. — It is natural for men to put confidence 
in the testimony of others ; and it is reasonable to do 
so. For men tell the truth much oftener than they 
tell falsehoods ; if it were not so, society could not 
be held together. Even the worst liars speak the 
truth more than they lie. 

Weighing Testimony. — Nevertheless, men do often 
tell untruths, sometimes by mistake, and sometimes 
from purpose; hence, it becomes us to weigh testi- 
mony. The value of testimony is determined by the 
following considerations : The number of the witnesses, 



134 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

their competence, and their honesty, the independence 
of their statements, the degree in which their state- 
ments concur, and the question whether the witnesses 
have any motive to falsify. All these points must 
be taken into account in deciding how fully we are to 
receive what is told us. Nor must the one who weighs 
testimony forget that if he has any bias in his own 
mind, any leaning towards one side rather than the 
other, he is likely to be misled; he is in danger of 
receiving too readily that testimony which accords 
with his bias, and of unreasonably rejecting the testi- 
mony opposed to it. 

Degree of Probability. — We must believe, if we 
are reasonable, what rests upon the testimony of a 
sufficient number of competent, honest, independent, 
concurrent witnesses. It is said that an eminent math- 
ematician has demonstrated that a sufficient amount 
of such testimony should cause us to believe any story, 
no matter how improbable it may be ; in other words, 
it is mathematically more improbable that a certain 
amount of such testimony should be false than any 
possible improbability in the story told. 

Fact and Inference. — A careful distinction, how- 
ever, must be made between the testimony of a wit- 
ness as to fact, and the statement of his inferences from 
that fact. If a sufficient number of witnesses say that 
they have seen a ghost in a grave-yard, we are bound 
to believe that they have seen something; but that 
does not bind us to receive their inference that it was 
a ghost. Witnesses in court are often cautioned to state 
only facts, and not their opinions concerning those facts, 
— to tell what they know, not what they think. 



REASONING— CONCLUDED 135 

A few years ago, a story was started that a farmer in eastern 
Illinois, being in his field one day, cursed the Almighty, be- 
cause of the drought or something else; and that he was struck 
dead, and his body stood there for days after, with a constant 
stream of fire issuing from his mouth and nostrils. It was said 
that many different persons had seen the body standing thus. 
Now, should we be justified in believing such a story? Un- 
doubtedly we should believe the story as to the body, if it was 
supported by sufficient evidence ; but that would not oblige us 
to believe the inference that the man's death was a judgment 
inflicted by the Almighty, for his blasphemy. 

Observation or Experience. — The evidence of 
our own senses is observation, and it may be trusted 
under fair conditions. But we are guided in respect 
to the present and the future, largely by knowledge 
derived from past experience. This knowledge is al- 
most entirely in the form of inductions which we have 
made from that experience; and often they have al- 
most the force of intuitions. 

Analogy. — By analogy we mean the inference that, 
because two things are alike in certain particulars, 
therefore they are alike in some other particular. Of 
course, the more known points of resemblance, the 
stronger the analogy. But analogy is very untrust- 
worthy as an argument when taken alone ; joined to 
other arguments, it strengthens the case more or less. 
For instance, our observation that some of the other 
planets are flattened at the poles, adds to the force 
of other arguments for believing that the earth is 
flattened at the poles. 

Analogy as a Defense. — But, while analogy weighs 
but little in support of a proposition, it may be a most 
powerful instrument in destroying the argument of an 



136 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



opponent. For instance, if the opponent has built up 
a plausible argument in support of a certain position, 
and we can make another argument just like it, but 
which leads to a palpably false conclusion, we have 
destroyed the force of his argument. The original 
question remains as it was before. 

Example. — Some years ago, a skeptical writer con- 
structed a famous argument to show that the miracles 
of the New Testament are incredible. He was an- 
swered by an argument precisely similar, showing that 
it is incredible that such a man as Napoleon Bona- 
parte ever lived. 

Much of what we have said here concerning the Reflective 
Power, strictly belongs to Logic ; but it claims a place in Psy- 
chology because it has to do with the necessary action of the 
human mind. 





CHAPTER XIV 

THE SENSIBILITY, GENERAL STATEMENTS 

NTER ACTION of Powers.— The hu- 
man being is a unit. We may divide 
Man's powers into physical and psychic- 
al ; again, we may divide the latter in- 
to Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, — we 
may subdivide still further. In thought, we may dis- 
tinguish these different activities and states ; some- 
times, in fact, one or more of them may be especially 
prominent, while the others are comparatively quiet or 
unnoticed. But after all, it is the one Ego, the one 
indivisible human being, that knows and feels and 
acts, — body and mind both concerned in it all. And 
each of the powers and susceptibilities interacts with 
all the rest, and influences them all. 

Studying, in different chapters and under different 
heads, the several powers, susceptibilities, and activi- 
ties of man, there is danger that we shall forget or 
overlook his unity, and the interdependence and in- 
teraction of all with each, and of each with all. So, 
as we take up the study of the Sensibility, we must 
remember that we have not passed over into a foreign 
realm, independent of the one we have left, and un- 

Psy.— 12. (137) 



138 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

connected with it. We have simply brought under 
consideration another part of the same mind's activi- 
ties and susceptibilities, blended in actual life with all 
the rest, — acting upon them all and modified by their 
action in return. ' ' The action of the soul in feeling 
depends more or less upon its action in knowing and 
willing ; its action in knowing depends on its action 
in feeling and willing ; and its action in willing de- 
pends on its action in feeling and knowing." 

The teacher, especially the young and inexperienced teacher, 
is in great danger of forgetting the essential unity of the child, 
— unity in all his bodily powers and capacities, together with 
all the distinct but dependent capacities and activities of his 
mind. Only as all are duly regarded in their relation to one 
another and to the sum total which makes the individual pupil, 
can education be truly symmetrical. 

Not Definable. — We can not define Sensibility, 
or Feeling in general. Professor Bowne says: "We 
can only identify and name it." It is one of the 
primary things in human experience, — easily distin- 
guished from all others by its subject, readily ex- 
pressed by tone, sign, or word. But, as in the case 
of all first things, we have nothing simpler on which 
we can frame a definition. We know when we feel, 
we distinguish the peculiarities of the experience ; but 
that is the end of it, — we can not define it. 

Nor is there any certain test by which we can be 
absolutely sure that the experience is the same to 
others that it is to ourselves, although there are many 
reasons for inferring that it is so. Least of all, is 
there any sure measure of the relative intensity of our 
feelings as compared with those of others. Nothing 



THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS 139 

seems more certain than that many who are the most 
vehement in expressing their feelings, are most shallow- 
in their experience of them. 

Sensibility Begins Where? — The lowest form of 
Sensibility is found in what we have known as a sen- 
sation, that is, a cognized affection of the nerves ; 
but it must be kept in mind that the nerves do not 
feel, the mind feels through the nerves. No matter 
how great the stimulus to the nerves, if the mind is 
not affected by it, there is no sensation. Hence, 
what is sometimes called physical feeling is really a 
psychical affection. And it is quite certain that the 
first movements of mental activity in the babe begin 
in the cognition of these nervous affections. From 
this lowest form of Sensibility, its range extends to 
the highest flights of sublimity, duty, and adoration. 

We have noted that all our terms in Psychology are borrowed 
from sense ; notice such terms as tasteful, loathsome, disgust- 
ing, sweet, fragrant, insipid, etc. All have a secondary mean- 
ing which has no reference to sense, although all are borrowed 
from sense. Again, conscience is said to prick us, or to buffet 
us ; joy elates us ; grief depresses us ; love warms us, etc. We 
use the term "warmth " to apply to fullness of feeling in general ; 
and coldness signifies lack of feeling. From the lower forms 
of Sensibility, then, we borrow terms for the higher. 

Two Classes. — In a very true sense, any move- 
ment or form of Sensibility is psychical ; but it is 
easy to draw a distinction between two well-marked 
forms. The first is the feeling that arises solely from 
the condition or functions of the nerves of the body, 
as in the sensations. This we may call physical feel- 
ing ; and it is the ground of a large part of our com- 
fort or discomfort. 



I4-0 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The feelings which have a purely mental source are 
much more numerous and important. These do not 
arise from the organic functions, but from some ' 'con- 
ception or mental state. " Such are psychical feelings 
proper ; but it may be observed that physical sensa- 
tions may be their remote cause, as when the hearing 
of a noble piece of music gives rise to exalted emo- 
tions. We must note, however, that in proper 
psychical feeling some act of the intellect is the immedi- 
ate cause. We feel sorrow, or joy, or anger, or pity, 
because of something we know, or think we know. The 
feeling of the ludicrous arises from the juxtaposition 
of incongruous concepts ; take away the concepts, and 
the feeling passes. If one insult us never so grossly, 
we feel no anger if he speak in an unknown tongue, 
— there is no act of the intellect to give rise to anger. 

All Feeling, Pleasurable or Painful. — Dr. 
Haven says : ' ' One general distinction lies at the out- 
set, patent and obvious, running through all the forms 
and modes of Sensibility; namely, the difference of 
agreeable and disagreeable." The quality of pleasure 
or pain may exist in almost infinite degrees ; some 
feelings may even partake of both characteristics. 
But perhaps we can not conceive of any feeling that 
should be strictly indifferent ; as Dr. Haven says : 
"The state of indifference is not an exercise of Sen- 
sibility, but a simple want of it, as the very name de- 
notes by which we most appropriately express this 
state of mind, i. e., apathy." Professor Bowne says: 
' ' We might define feeling as the state of consciousness 
which consists in some form of pleasure or pain, like 
or dislike, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Of course 



THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS I4 1 

this is not a definition, but only an identification. 
What the terms mean can be known only in experi- 
ence." 

We may notice that painful feelings — fear, dread, suffering, 
are always costly ; they diminish the vigor and efficiency of the 
mind. Hence, such feelings should be used, or appealed to, 
as motives only when nothing better can be done. This fact 
has an important bearing in reference to a government by force 
and punishment. 

Source of all Joy and Sorrow. — It is not in 
knowing or willing that we find our happiness or un- 
happiness, our pleasure or our pain ; these belong to 
our feelings alone, or rather, they are our feelings. 
For, as has been said, all feeling has one or the other 
of these characteristics, which are not found any- 
where else. To be sure, the feeling may arise in con- 
sequence of knowing or willing in a certain way ; but 
the joy or sorrow, the pleasure or the pain, is not in 
the knowing or the" willing. For this reason, it may 
even be said that feeling is more vital to us, concerns 
us more, as it were, than any other form of mental 
state or movement. So far as our personal interest is 
involved, it may perhaps be said that the chief reason 
why we should know rightly, and choose and act 
rightly, is because in that way alone we shall secure 
to ourselves a feeling of happiness. Neither know- 
ing nor willing has come to fruition as to its subject 
till it has been followed by the appropriate feeling. 

Motives to Action. — Not only are our feelings the 
source, or seat, of all our happiness or unhappiness, 
but they furnish the motives in view of which we choose 
and act. "The springs of human action lie here. 
Here we find the motives which set the busy world 



I4 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

in action, the causes which go to make men what they 
are in the busy and everchanging scene of life's great 
drama." It seems possible that knowledge alone 
might lead us to will and to act ; but it seems certain 
that it never does. It is only when desire or aversion 
has arisen in consequence of what we know, that there 
is anything affecting the will, soliciting it to act. 
Many know well enough in respect to right behavior, 
whose feelings in respect to the right are too slug- 
gish to urge the will effectually. 

Professor Bowne says: "The desires and their opposites 
form the transition from knowing to willing. In knowing and 
feeling, we have the conditions of desire ; and in desire we 
have the condition of proper volition. Our feelings and inter- 
ests are the deepest things in us. Will and understanding 
have no significance except as instruments of this throbbing 
and aspiring sensitive life." 

In common language, "the heart" is the term to express the 
sum total of our feelings ; hence, we see the philosophic cor- 
rectness of the Wise Man when he says, " Keep thy heart with 
all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life." 

Close Relation to the Body. — The relation of 
the Sensibility to the body, if we may say so, is more 
intimate than that of the intellect or the will. Its lowest 
form arises simply from the affections of the nerves. 
In their reaction, our feelings have an astonishing ef- 
fect on the vital functions of the organism. Shame 
reddens the cheek, joy quickens the pulse, fear some- 
times paralyzes the muscles. Not unfrequently ex- 
cessive feeling has been fatal in its results. 

We have noted before, that nearly or quite all 
forms of mental activity have an appropriate bodily 
expression ; but, while this is true, it will be found 



THE SENSIBILITY —GENERAL STATEMENTS 1 43 

that the bodily expression of the feelings is far more 
striking than any expression of the intellect or the 
will. Many of the bodily expressions of feeling are 
common to man and brute. 

Expression and Repression. — A feeling is often 
induced, or at least intensified, by indulging in its ex- 
pression. Hence the wisdom of restraining the ex- 
pression of unlovely feelings. One may not be able 
to overcome his anger at once; but it will help him 
to do so, if he refrains from showing the feeling. De- 
sirable feelings, on the other hand, may be induced 
or strengthened by their free expression. 

However, sad and depressing feelings are sometimes 
prolonged if their expression is repressed; while a full 
expression is found to be a relief. This is seen in the 
benefit sometimes found in a "good cry." The tend- 
ency to deepen a feeling by restraining its expression 
is also seen in the case of one moved to mirth in a 
place where laughter would be unseemly. In such a 
case, that is sometimes found to be irresistibly funny, 
which in other circumstances would be only slightly 
diverting. Teachers will generally do better to let 
pupils indulge in a reasonable laugh when there is any 
cause for it, instead of trying wholly to suppress it. 

Sensibility and Intellect. — We have seen that 
cognition is necessary to the lowest form of physical 
feeling ; also, we have seen that knowledge, or a move- 
ment of the intellect, is a necessary condition for the 
higher forms of psychical feeling. On the other hand, 
the intellect does its best work only when it is favored 
by helpful feeling. Conditions of bodily comfort, in- 
terest in what is attempted, a buoyant and hopeful 



H4 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

frame of mind, are necessary to the best accomplish- 
ment of any intellectual task. Such work is greatly 
aided, also, by love for one whom it will please, or 
by the hope of applause or reward. All these and 
similar facts have great significance for the teacher. 

In order, however, that feeling should be helpful to 
intellect, it must be moderate in degree ; a mind per- 
turbed by feeling of any kind can not think well. In 
such a case, Intellect and Sensibility may be said to 
be opposed to each other, or to ' ' exist in an inverse 
ratio." It is sometimes said that the highest intel- 
lectual power is not found in persons susceptible to 
the most intense feeling. Probably, however, the 
opposite is generally true ; the great intellect and the 
keen sensibility usually go together, but such persons 
are rarely the most demonstrative of their feelings. 

Temperaments. — Much has been written, both in 
ancient and in modern times, about the so-called tem- 
peraments. Not a little of what has been said is 
purely fanciful ; but marked differences do exist among 
men in those respects which the word has been used 
to designate. The word itself seems to refer to the 
tempering of the man by the proportionate blending 
of the several parts which go to make up his nature 
or disposition. These differences of temperament are 
seen conspicuously in the feelings. 

Many names have been applied to the different tem- 
peraments ; but perhaps the most common are : First, 
the bilious or choleric ; Second, the sanguine or nerv- 
ous ; Third, the melancholic ; and Fourth, the phleg- 
matic or lymphatic. There are certain physical char- 
acteristics which are said to indicate these different 



THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS 145 

temperaments ; and these are accompanied by cor- 
responding mental characteristics. It is said that com- 
paratively few pure and unmixed types of tempera- 
ment exist; but that in most people two or more 
types are blended. 

We have not space to dwell on this topic, concerning which 
there is much confusion ; but it appears to be worth mention, 
because it is clear to every observer that differences do exist in 
human constitutions, corresponding more or less fully to what 
these names of the temperaments have been held to express. 
And any one who has to attempt the management of human 
beings would do well to remember that different temperaments 
require different treatment. Hence, this is a matter worthy of 
the careful attention of the teacher. 

Moods. — Every one who has observed much of 
his own mental states, or those of others, knows that 
they are not uniform. At one time he feels a special 
tendency to be joyful, at another to be sad. No ap- 
parent reason may be known ; like Antonio ; he may 
have to say, ' ' I know not why I am so sad. " He may 
be in a jubilant frame of mind, or in a peaceful, se- 
rene state, with just as little knowledge of the cause. 
Doubtless, in many cases the mood depends upon the 
physical condition ; but often no complete reason can 
be found here. 

Some people are much more subject to varying 
moods than others; but probably no one is wholly 
free from their influence. A teacher should recognize 
this fact, and watch with great care both his own 
moods and those of his pupils. In this way, very 
much friction may be avoided, and fewer causes for 
subsequent regret will arise. 



Psv. 



CHAPTER XV 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 




NALYSIS, Not Exhaustive. — A recent 
writer says : ' ' The doctrine of the feel- 
ings is the most confused part of Psy- 
chology, and has been least developed." 
One reason is that the subject itself is 
very complex ; the feelings are many and of many 
kinds, and they are intermingled almost inextricably. 
It would be difficult to make a complete list of them, 
and much more difficult to make a complete classifi- 
cation, if the list were made. 

One attempt to classify the feelings results as fol- 
lows: First, the Ego-feelings; Second, the social feel- 
ings; Third, the impersonal feelings, — embracing the 
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The ground 
of this classification is clear enough; but it would be 
very difficult to arrange all the feelings properly under 
these heads. We shall not attempt an exhaustive 
analysis nor a complete list, still less, a perfect classi- 
fication. We shall speak only of such of the feelings 
as it concerns the teacher especially to regard. 

The Usual Classification. — The feelings are com- 
monly divided into three classes ; viz. , Emotions, Af- 
(i 4 6) 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 147 

fections, and Desires. The emotions are simple feel- 
ings, as comfort, joy, etc. The affections are feelings 
that go out towards an object; as love, etc. The de- 
sires go out towards an object with the wish of pos- 
session, as a desire for food, money, etc. 

Each of these classes has its two poles, as they may 
be called; the emotions range from bliss, joy, happi- 
ness, down to sadness, sorrow, misery. The affec- 
tions extend from profound love to the deepest hate ; 
and the desires, from a passionate wish to possess, to 
a mortal aversion or dread. 

In each class, too, there is the feeling that results 
immediately from sense, and the higher feelings based 
on ideality, knowledge, or thought. We experience 
the satisfaction that attends the simple gratification of 
any of the senses, and the delight that follows the 
contemplation of beauty, truth, and goodness. Love 
reaches from the low plane of a mere liking for some 
object of bodily appetite, to the most absorbing love 
for the Highest. Desire may have for its object some- 
thing that will gratify a bodily craving, — perhaps a 
base one, — or it may earnestly seek the best good of 
others, or the perfection of one's own personal char- 
acter in its noblest form. 

Affections and Desires. — The affections are often 
classified as benevolent or malevolent ; but this seems 
to be a bad use of terms. We have noticed the two 
poles of the affections, which may be named, compre- 
hensively, love and hate ; but love does not necessa- 
rily and always imply good will, or goodness in any 
form : so there may be a hate which is entirely proper, 
and has no mixture of ill-will. 



14^ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

There is a logical order in this arrangement of the 
three classes of feelings; enjoyment, preference, de- 
sire, — these words express the natural order of the 
movement of the feelings. That which gives us pleas- 
ure, we come to like ; and we desire to possess it 
more fully. Hence, desire is a secondary feeling, in 
that it is preceded by another feeling, enjoyment, 
or liking re-enforced by the knowledge of previous 
experience. One would not be expected to desire 
anything which he has never experienced as a gratifi- 
cation, or source of enjoyment; but often imagination 
may be found in place of actual experience, as leading 
to desire. In this way we can explain why desire, 
not seldom, turns to its opposite, aversion, after the 
object of desire has been gained. 

Passions. — When the affections or the desires be- 
come violent, taking possession of the mind, as it 
were, spurning the control of reason and conscience, 
they are called passions. The exhibition of passion 
does not betoken strength, as it is sometimes supposed ; 
the passionate man is not the strong man, but the suf- 
fering man, as the word "passion" clearly implies. 

Motives. — In the form of affection or desire, the 
Sensibility furnishes the motives, soliciting the will to 
act in conformity with the feeling. In this fact lies 
the great importance of a knowledge and control of 
the feelings, both in one who wishes to shape his own 
conduct aright, and in one who wishes to influence or 
guide the conduct of others. 

Work of the Teacher. — The teacher's success 
or failure in the most valuable part of his work will 
be largely determined by his power or weakness in 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 1 49 

dealing with the sensibility of his pupils, — not solely, 
nor chiefly, in dealing with their intellect, as many 
seem to think. The Sensibility, as we have seen, is 
the seat of happiness or its opposite ; here, also, mo- 
tives to action are found, and from motives and actions, 
character results. Intellectual success, too, is impos- 
sible unless the Sensibility is enlisted in behalf of the 
work attempted. No child is likely to make much 
progress in a study which he thoroughly dislikes, es- 
pecially if he dislike his teacher at the same time. 
Even the mature man finds his intellect will work with 
redoubled power and success when the glow of emo- 
tion accompanies its action. 

We will now note some of the forms of Sensibility 
that demand the teacher's careful attention. (See 
Scheme, page 28). 

Love of Self. — This is a feeling altogether natural 
and proper. St. Paul says : ' ' No man ever yet hated 
his own flesh" ; nor is it his duty to do so, notwith- 
standing all that is truly said in decrying selfishness. 
For true self-love is not selfishness. Selfishness is 
either a regard for self to the injury of the rights or 
the feelings of others, or it is the purblind wish to 
gratify some present personal desire at the expense 
of personal good in the future. In either case, it is 
opposed to the truest self-love. We hear much of 
the virtue of self-denial ; it is a virtue of a noble kind, 
when some present demand for self is denied, in order 
for a higher good, either for self or for others. But, 
in itself alone, self-denial is no virtue ; there is no 
merit in mere self-tormenting. An appeal to self-love, 
then, is entirely proper, whether the purpose be phi- 



15° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

lanthropic, or the acquisition of some worthy good for 
one's self. Self-love, rightly viewed and directed, is 
a powerful aid in building a desirable character. 

Love of Others. — Genuine love for others, — even 
unworthy persons, or animals, — is one of the noblest 
virtues ; and it is significant that the " Golden Rule" 
makes self-love the measure of love for others. 

Love of Country. — In a greater or less degree, 
a love of country seems to be natural to every nor- 
mally constituted human being ; and, strangely enough, 
it is often exceptionally strong in those whose native 
land would have few attractions for a stranger. There 
are abundant reasons why this feeling should be es- 
pecially strong in the people of our country ; and 
there are special reasons why our young people should 
be carefully taught to do well their part in promoting 
the well-being of our country, for under our institu- 
tions the well-being of the country depends upon the 
right actions of its citizens. 

Love of Beauty, Truth, and Right. — The first 
of these lies at the foundation of all aesthetic culture ; 
the second, at the foundation of all right thinking ; and 
the third, at the foundation of all right behavior. 
Hence, to the teachers of the young, all these feelings 
appeal for development and guidance ; nor can teachers 
do more important work. 

Training the Pupil's Love. — The child's love for 
good things, for his fellows, and for his teacher, must 
be carefully trained and strengthened. Here is a 
worthy field for the power of the teacher with the 
wisest head and the noblest heart. But it is no place 
for pretense or sham ; all work here must be genuine. 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 15 I 

If you wish to arouse a child's love for anything, or 
for any person, your efforts will be successful only as 
you show a genuine love in the same direction. If 
you wish to awaken the child's love for yourself, ex- 
pect it only in return for genuine love for him. Stage 
smiles and honeyed words, with no heart back of 
them, will not serve. It is easier to deceive a grown 
person than a child in this respect. In the old poem, 
the child says : 

" I do not love thee, Doctor Fell ; 
The reason why, I can not tell." 

No doubt, there was a good reason which the child 
felt, although she could not tell it. And we think 
that an equally good reason generally exists for the 
child's personal likes and dislikes. 

But perhaps some teacher is ready to say : ' ' Well, 
it is of no use; I never did love children, and I can 
not; at least, I can not love uninteresting and dis- 
agreeable children." Then, we say, you ought to do 
one of two things : either set about acquiring this 
power at once, or forever forego any attempt to teach 
children. One of the surest ways to develop a love 
for any person or thing is to make that person or 
thing the object of your special care, interest, and ef- 
fort. If persistence in such a course will not beget a 
love for its object, we think the case is hopeless. 

The Feeling of Hate. — But the child's capacity 
to hate or dislike needs attention, as well as its oppo- 
site. We remember with what earnestness and effect 
an old associate of ours used to say to his pupils, 
"Boys, hate mean things." That they have not been 
trained to hate mean things is the trouble of to-day 



I5 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

with too many of our boys, and girls as well. But 
the child should be carefully shown that the hatred 
of mean things must not be allowed to pass over into 
a hatred of the persons who do them. He should be 
taught that hatred towards persons is never right. 

The Appetites. — Such desires as are bodily crav- 
ings, we commonly call appetites. Little ever needs to 
be done to strengthen them ; but young people need 
careful training as to their regulation and control. We 
believe these appetites are given us, not only for the 
purpose of sustaining life and propagating the race, 
but that they are intended to be a source of inno- 
cent enjoyment, — as they are always found to be when- 
ever they are not abused. 

Desire of Society. — This is a very strong pro- 
pensity; it is often called an instinctive feeling, and 
this seems reasonable when we reflect that most ani- 
mals share it with man. But it is more than an in- 
stinct, for the more a person grows in knowledge, 
the more he realizes both the necessity and the pleas- 
ure of companionship. But, because of the moment- 
ous interests and influences that inevitably pertain to 
society, pupils need special care and instruction that 
they may both receive and impart nothing but good in 
their social relations. 

Desire of Power. — This desire seems to be uni- 
versal. And, when properly guarded and controlled, 
it is most fruitful in usefulness and happiness, although 
its abuse may lead to the gravest evils. 

Desire of Approbation. — Much the same may be 
said of the desire of approbation that was said of the 
desire of power; and, because both its use and its 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 153 

danger are so great, the teacher needs to use all his 
wisdom and tact in dealing with it. 

Curiosity. — This feeling is a compound of a desire 
for novelty and a desire for knowledge. Both these 
desires are proper to a well-constituted mind, and 
both are combined in what we call curiosity, although 
their relative proportions vary in different cases. Not 
unfrequently, the pupil's curiosity is the teacher's 
greatest annoyance ; but it should be his greatest friend 
and helper. Woe to the unwise teacher who attempts 
to crush it, instead of stimulating and directing it. In 
every true sense, such a teacher is a complete and 
predestined failure, whatever literary or scholarly qual- 
ifications he may possess. 

Hope and Dread. — Hope is compounded of de- 
sire and some degree of expectation ; while its oppo- 
site, dread, is a compound of aversion and expecta- 
tion. Hope and dread maintain a kind of warfare, 
perhaps in nearly all minds ; but, in some minds, hope 
seems to be generally in the ascendant, while dread 
is quite as predominant in others. The result is a 
radical difference as to the happiness or unhappiness 
of the individuals ; and at the same time it is a cause 
of great difference in their power and usefulness. Both 
these feelings are powerful motives to action ; but one 
is buoyant and helpful in its influence, while the other 
has a depressing effect. Remember that dread or 
fear is a painful feeling, and that all pain is costly. 

Interest. — This word is not easy to define, but it 
is seldom misunderstood. It always involves a more 
or less conscious recognition of some relation to self. 
Interest is essential to the best success of any mental 



154 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

effort ; and, other things being equal, that is always 
the best teacher who can best arouse, hold, and direct 
the interest of his pupils. 

Admiration. — The word "admiration" was formerly 
nearly synonymous with wonder. It retains some- 
thing of the same meaning still, but there is added to 
wonder a feeling of approbation, as well. As we now 
use the word, we admire that which seems to us won- 
derful and pleasing at the same time. 

The child's power of admiration, and his tendency 
to admire, demand careful attention. Owing to the 
activity of imagination in children, the persons that 
seem to them admirable are thought to be perfect. 
Children are born hero-worshipers. And the things 
that they admire are likely to be thought ' ' altogether 
lovely." There is a psychological reason why, in the 
vocabulary of young persons, " splendid " and " hor- 
rid" exhaust the list of descriptive adjectives so often. 
Now, because admiration always contains the element 
of approval, it is easy to see that one's character is 
indicated by the persons and things he admires ; not 
only is his present character indicated in this way, but 
his future character is largely determined as well. In 
the admiration that boys conceive for the characters 
depicted in the robbers and Indian killers of the 
wretched "dime" literature of the day, lies the chief 
danger of the poisonous stuff. And the young girl's 
admiration of the vain, vapid character of the heroine 
in the trashy novel she reads, is likely to work lasting 
injury to her, for the same reason. There is little 
danger threatening the character of any young per- 
son whose admiration is thoroughly fixed only on 



SPECIFIC FEELINGS 155 

such people as are noble, and such things as are 
"pure, honest, lovely, and of good report." 

Reverence. — By reverence, we mean a profound 
regard for what is great or good, or both. When the 
feeling becomes intense, we call it veneration. 

There is special need in this country, and in this 
age, that the reverence of children should be culti- 
vated and thoroughly trained. In the abounding life 
and freedom of this new country, we seem to forget, 
to a great extent, that there is anything to be treated 
with reverence and respect. And it is a serious ques- 
tion whether this tendency is not on the increase. 
Much of the flippant nonsense in our newspapers that 
passes for wit, would lose all its point if the irreverence 
were taken out of it. And the children and youth are 
not slow to imitate the example of their elders. The 
"old man," or "the governor," is the boy's frequent 
appellation for his father, nor does the "old woman" 
signify the mother much less frequently. Similar dis- 
respectful terms are ready to apply to men and women 
who, by age, or character, or position, should be 
treated with special respect. 

The reverent attitude of mind or speech, towards 
God or man, seems to be very unpopular just now. 
This fact does not augur well for the future of our 
people ; and the best efforts of our schools should be 
turned to its correction. 

Sympathy. — This word literally means fellow-feel- 
ing, or feeling with another. It is often mistakenly 
used as synonymous with pity; nor is commiseration 
much nearer to its meaning. For, by sympathy, we 
may enter into any feeling which another has. 



156 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Like the desire for society, sympathy is both in- 
stinctive and rational ; in its lower forms, it is possessed 
by the brutes. Young children are especially suscept- 
ible to sympathy; and it is an element so essential to 
successful dealing with them that one who wholly lacks 
it may as well make no attempt to teach or to guide 
them. Nor does it cease to be very important to any 
one who attempts to teach or to guide, no matter what 
age or class he may work with. One with quick sym- 
pathies can readily "put himself in another's place, " 
— a thing that must always be done before the most 
efficient help can be given. 

The heart that will not respond to real sympathy 
in any of its exhibitions, is rarely found ; its possessor 
lacks an almost essential element of humanity. Through 
the magic power of sympathy, the show of any feel- 
ing is likely to be met by a similar feeling in the be- 
holder. No teacher should fail to recognize, at all 
times, this grand principle of human nature : That the 
exhibition of any feeling is likely to awaken the same 
feeling in another. 




CHAPTER XVI 

CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 

10T Well Defined. — Few topics have 
been discussed more than conscience, and 
its relation to life and conduct ; but the 
discussions are rarely or never clear and 
consistent. The difficulty seems to be 
the want of a clear and consistent definition of con- 
science, — a definition in which all will agree, and to 
which all will adhere. 

Mr. Bain would make conscience only the recogni- 
tion of the claims of custom and law ; he says : ' ' Duty 
is the line chalked out by public authority or law, 
and indicated by penalty or punishment." Others 
seem to regard conscience as the everpresent and in- 
fallible voice of God in every human soul, both in- 
structing and urging in regard to duty. However, 
such a conception is usually intimated in a vague and 
loose way, rather than clearly stated. In fact, we have 
observed that vague and loose statements about con- 
science seem to be the rule, even with writers of ability. 
An Instance. — A celebrated writer on education 
says : "Conscience, that inherent, instinctive sense of 
right and wrong." What does he mean? Does he 

(157) 



158 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

mean the intuitive notion that there is such a distinc- 
tion as right and wrong? But is that conscience? 
Does he mean an inherent, instinctive sense which 
knows right from wrong in every case? Is there such 
a sense ? If so, why do conscientious men differ re- 
specting right and wrong? Does he mean a feeling 
of personal obligation, or oughtness, in regard to the 
choice between right and wrong ? Or, does he mean 
two or more of these, or something different from 
any one of them ? In fine, is there evidence that he 
had any clear meaning to express? 

A Feeling. — Amid all the clashing opinions of psy- 
chologists, there is almost universal agreement in teach- 
ing that mental activity has the three distinct forms 
of knowing, feeling, and willing ; and that these are 
all. Now, in which class shall we put that form of 
activity called conscience ? We unhesitatingly put it 
among the feelings, and restrict it to the feelings. It 
is certain that in every act of conscience as treated by 
any writer, a feeling is involved. We believe that 
feeling to be all that should receive the name of con- 
science. If, however, one chooses to make the term 
cover the intellectual action that goes with the feeling, 
the question is simply one of terminology. But we 
think obscurity is the consequence. 

Definition. — We offer the following definition: 
Conscience is that feeling which prompts its to do what 
we believe to be right, and to shun what we believe to be 
wrong; which commends us when we obey it, and con- 
demns us when we disobey it. 

This definition contains all that we think should be 
covered by the term ' ' conscience "; and, if it were gen- 



CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY I 59 

erally accepted and adhered to, it would settle many- 
disputes, and simplify others. 

The definition indicates a double act- of conscience, 
— an act of prompting before a choice is made, or a 
volition is put forth ; and an act of commendation or 
condemnation following the choice or volition. Does 
not every rational human being recognize in his own 
consciousness a feeling that acts thus ? This feeling we 
mean by the term " conscience," and we mean noth- 
ing more nor less by the word. 

Relation to Judgment. — Like every other rational 
feeling, conscience requires an intellectual basis ; a ra- 
tional feeling arises in consequence of something we 
know, or think we know; that is, a judgment always 
precedes a rational feeling and forms its basis. The 
judgment that gives rise to the feeling of conscience 
is a judgment that a certain thing is right or wrong, 
and that we have a duty in regard to it. As soon as 
this judgment is pronounced, conscience responds with 
its imperious " You ought." 

Judgments Differ. — In respect to judgments of 
this kind, men differ widely ; not seldom they are dia- 
metrically opposed to each other. Education, habit, 
and custom have much to do in determining such 
judgments; bias arising from desire or inclination, often 
clouds one's view in relation to the ethical character 
of a choice or course of action. In such a case, too 
often "the wish is father to the thought." 

Yet, in respect to the right or wrong of many things, 
the judgments of men almost universally agree ; this 
is true in respect to truth, honesty, kindness, good- 
will, oppression, injustice, cruelty, murder, etc. 



l60 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Universal and Identical. — We believe conscience 
to be a universal feeling among men ; otherwise, we 
can not account for the feeling of guilt or ill-desert, 
which we suppose every one has felt, at some time in 
his life, at least. And history intimates very clearly 
that this feeling has' always been common to human- 
ity, in every age and every stage of culture. The 
strength of conscientious feeling varies greatly with 
different men, and at different periods in the lives of 
the same men. With some, it is a ruling power ha- 
bitually; others seem to regard it as little more than 
an impertinence more or less troublesome. 

Moreover, it is very important to notice that the 
action of conscience is always the same, in all men 
and at all times. This imperious and imperial feeling, 
which is within us and yet hardly seems to be of us, 
which assumes supreme authority to guide and then 
to reward or to punish, never changes the nature nor 
the direction of its action. 

We often hear that the Hindoo woman conscien- 
tiously throws her babe into the Ganges, while the 
Christian woman as conscientiously preserves and cher- 
ishes her offspring. This is the ' ' stock " illustration to 
show that conscience acts differently in different peo- 
ple. Looked at carefully, it illustrates exactly the 
opposite. Both women do what they believe to be 
right ; they differ in their judgments, but agree per- 
fectly in their consciences. 

A Safe Guide? — If conscience rests upon judg- 
ment, and judgment is fallible, is conscience a safe 
and sufficient guide ? Will it always lead us aright ? 
Of course not; if the judgment is wrong, conscience 



CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY l6l 

must necessarily urge us towards the wrong. Many 
men have been wrong-headed and exceedingly con- 
scientious; and such men are among the most mis- 
chievous and the most intractable. No amount of 
sincerity can make that right which is inherently wrong. 

But is a person who conscientiously does wrong, to 
be blamed? Or, to put the question in another way, 
ought one to follow his conscience at all times? It is 
inconceivable that it should be one's duty to violate 
his conscience ; nor, strictly speaking, can we believe 
that one is ever to be blamed for obeying his con- 
science. But, if his judgment is wrong through any 
neglect or perverseness of his own, he is to be blamed 
for his wrong judgment ivith all its consequences. 

What is Morality? — With some, morality seems 
to be only some form of refined self-interest, — pru- 
dence, for example. With others, like Mr. Bain, it 
seems to be nothing more than conformity to custom 
or law. It is restricted to its literal signification, as 
derived from the Latin moves, or manners. We be- 
lieve that morality in the full meaning of the term 
signifies a supreme regard for the right ; hence, it rests 
upon a habitual conformity to conscience. In order 
to train one, then, in ways of morality, it is necessary 
to cultivate his judgment and conscience. 

How Cultivated? — But how shall conscience be 
cultivated and made sti onger ? In the same way that 
every other power is cultivated and strengthened, — 
by wise use. Every time that the voice of conscience 
is heard and heeded, it gains strength to speak with 
more clearness next time. Every time it is disre- 
garded, it is shorn of some of its power ; this may be 

Psy. — 14. 



1 62 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



continued until conscience will sleep quietly while one 
does things that would once have caused the keenest 
anguish. Thus, conscience becomes ' ' seared as with 
a hot iron", — it withers and decays like an unused 
muscle. And yet, sometimes, it wakes after a long 
slumber, with a fearful power, and stings like a scor- 
pion. This is remorse. An educated conscience, 
then, is a conscience that is habitually obeyed ; but it 
must follow a judgment rightly educated, if the result 
is to be a high type of morality. 

Four Elements. — The psychological elements of 
morality are four in number, and four only. These 
are: First, the intuitive idea that there is such a dis- 
tinction as that of right and wrong ; Second, the 
judgment that decides whether any particular thing is 
right or wrong ; Third, the conscience which moves us 
towards the right and away from the wrong ; and 
Fourth, the will that chooses or refuses the right. 
All true moral training must regard all these ; it must 
recognize the underlying idea ; it must develop and 
train the judgment; it must appeal to the conscience; 
and it must lead the will to a proper choice. 

With Young Children. — With quite young chil- 
dren frequent appeal to conscience is the proper way 
to awaken and strengthen it. Let the parent and 
teacher assume that the child has a conscience; — 
press upon him the word ought in all the fullness of 
its meaning. If there is any doubt as to whether one 
ought, or ought not, to do a certain thing, the only 
safe way is to give conscience ' ' the benefit of the 
doubt." A very young child understands such an 
appeal, for conscience begins its work almost as soon 



CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 163 

as the earliest perceptive powers. "Is it right?" 
"Then ought you to do it?" These are questions 
that he will appreciate ; and it is sad that such ques- 
tions so often give place to mere appeals to expedi- 
ency, or self-interest, or pride, or custom. In view of 
this fact, it is not strange that so few grown persons 
are able to stand boldly for what they believe to 
be right, even if they have to stand alone. How 
can the moral fiber be otherwise than flabby if it has 
never been strengthened? 

With Older People. — The same method should 
continue with older persons. But little good will 
follow lessons on morals, or the learning of moral 
precepts, or the reading of books on the subject, un- 
less some course is taken to lead the student to in- 
dividual action in conscientious behavior, or into the 
formation of moral habits. Every act has its moral 
significance when viewed rightly, for we are so bound 
together that every act of ours has an influence to 
benefit or to harm others directly, or through its in- 
fluence upon ourselves. There is an ethical value in 
the smallest and most trivial actions ; for instance, 
the cleaning of one's shoes on the scraper and mat. 
If one neglects this small thing, he defiles the house ; 
and some one must perform additional and need- 
less labor on his account. So of other matters which 
we commonly regard as insignificant ; some of them 
are right or wrong in themselves, and some have 
this quality by virtue of their relation to other things 
or to other persons. As we learn to put conscience in- 
to everything we say or do, we shall make real advance- 
ment in a true morality. 



164 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Force of Habit. — Here we see the pedagogical 
value of habit ; for, by constant attention to the eth- 
ical quality of all our words and actions, — even 
those commonly thought insignificant, — we form the 
habit of obeying conscience in all things. Nothing 
more is wanting to a perfect morality, except that 
judgment shall be trained to decide correctly as to the 
ethical quality. 

Every student will notice the resemblance of the words con- 
science and consciousness ; this is due to the fact that they are 
derived from the same roots. By some old writers, one is some- 
times used for the other ; but modern writers make a distinc- 
tion which should never be disregarded. 

We have insisted thus strongly on the supremacy of con- 
science, because, unless its promptings are obeyed, correct 
behavior will not follow, however clear the judgment may be. 
But, as is intimated in the first paragraph on page 162, judg- 
ment must decide rightly and conscience must be obeyed, in 
order that the man may be right. 




■"'■tmxi 




CHAPTER XVII 

THE WILL 

EFINITION. — The will is the power by 
which we choose and execute. 

Or, we may perhaps better say, The 
will is the mind, or soul, or Ego, choos- 
ing and putting forth effort, or force, to 
execute its choices. A completed act of the will in- 
cludes both the choice of an aim or object and the 
putting-forth of energy to accomplish that aim, or to 
attain that object. To expend energy in executing 
without any choice would show will no more than a 
machine shows will. But if we choose without mak- 
ing any effort in the line of that choice, that is no act 
of the will ; it is a mere preference, or wish. Dr. 
Samuel Harris says : ' 'A choice is not a mere prefer- 
ence of one thing to another, but it is the choice of 
an object to which the activity is to be directed.''' 

That which makes the human animal a man, is his 
power to select an object of choice, in view of delib- 
erate judgment and in the presence of motives, and 
then to exert force in the line of the choice thus made. 
In these acts, or in the power to do these acts, re- 
side man's personality and his responsibility. 

(165) 



1 66 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

In the process of knowing, man has no choice. 
True, he may elect to put himself in the proper rela- 
tions in order that he may know, or he may deliber- 
ately refuse to do so. But this election is not an act 
of knowing ; if he puts himself into the proper rela- 
tions, knowing follows in accordance with unchange- 
able laws. So the feelings come and go in obedience 
to fixed laws, although it is not always possible to 
trace these laws perfectly ; the will has even less power 
in respect to feeling than in respect to knowing, be- 
cause we have less power to control our relations here. 
But, in the act of willing, man becomes a law unto 
himself. Hence, in this act alone, man shows himself 
a personal, responsible agent. 

Man, A Cause. — In exercising his power to choose 
and to execute, man shows himself to be a cause. 
Whatever may be his intellectual judgments, or his 
desires and motives, in view of which he makes his 
choices and puts forth his volitions, these judgments 
and desires do not cause his will to act as it does. In 
thus acting, he is himself a cause, and the results 
which follow, he causes to be different from what they 
would have been had his will acted otherwise. 

' ' The will (or the Ego willing) is the cause of its 
own determinations." "The will is the source of 
its own actions, and thus the cause of its own ac- 
tions. " "In knowing himself as possessed of will, 
man must know himself as a cause ; and whenever 
he sees causation exerted in connection with evi- 
dence of intelligence, he naturally attributes it to 
mind." " Here is a being capable of interposing his 
own free choice and his power of volition, and thus 



THE WILL 167 

purposely causing that to be which, but for him, would 
not have been." "A free act has a cause as much 
as any other. Its cause is the free spirit." 

Spontaneity, Not Will. — It is important to dis- 
tinguish will from some things which have been con- 
founded with it, even by eminent writers. 

Many of our acts are performed spontaneously, as 
the foot kicks when it is tickled, or the thirsty man 
rushes instinctively to the water. Perhaps all the acts 
of brutes which seem to be the result of will, are of 
this nature. But human will — rational will — always 
acts from judgment and motive. The judgment reaches 
certain conclusions, motives are present in the form 
of desires, and then the mind freely chooses, in the 
presence of these judgments and motives. Will stands 
above spontaneity, and watches over and controls it. 
The thirsty man may believe that drinking water at 
this time would injure his health; and so, however 
much he may desire it, prompted by a regard for his 
health, he wills to refrain from drinking. 

Desire itself has sometimes been confounded with 
will. But this is a mistake ; one never wills a thing 
until he chooses it, no matter how much he may de- 
sire it. Doubtless he may be led to a final choice of 
the thing itself by first choosing to harbor the desire 
for it; this is the danger of one who permits himself 
to dally with temptation. Otherwise than in choos- 
ing to entertain or to reject his desires, one has little 
or no control over them directly. But, through sheer 
force of his will, he may deny himself that which he 
desires most ardently; his will is his own, — it is the 
exhibition of his deepest selfhood. 



1 68 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Free Will. — The discussions about freedom of the 
will are endless ; nor need we wonder at it, for no 
question is more fundamental as respects human ac- 
tion, character, and destiny. We hold that the hu- 
man will is free ; but it is very important that we con- 
ceive clearly just what we mean by freedom of the 
will. When we say that man's will is free, we mean 
that, having in his consciousness certain decisions of 
the intelligence and certain motives in the form of de- 
sires, he is able to select for himself his own course 
of action and to put forth force or effort for the exe- 
cution of the course he has chosen. For illustration : 
One may be conscious of some desire of sense prompt- 
ing him to act for its gratification ; at the same time 
he may be moved to some different act by the known 
preference of a friend and by his desire to please that 
friend ; furthermore, his reason and conscience may, 
at the same time, urge him to do something still dif- 
ferent. In this state of things, because his will is 
free, he is able to choose any one of the three courses. 
Or he may arbitrarily refuse them all, and decide to 
do something quite different from any one of them. 

Evidences of Freedom. — We have evidence of 
this freedom in that most trustworthy of all witnesses, 
our own consciousness. Every man is conscious that 
he makes a free choice and acts accordingly, scores 
of times, every day of his life. For this reason he 
holds himself responsible for his actions, and blames 
or praises himself accordingly. If one believes that 
there was no alternative for his action, that he could 
not have done otherwise than he did, no power can 
awaken in him any feeling of responsibility for the act. 



THE WILL 169 

Furthermore, the universal consciousness testifies to 
the same fact. We hold others responsible for their 
acts, and we praise or blame them accordingly, be- 
cause we believe their acts are the results of their own 
free choices. On this ground rest all law, all notion 
of desert of any kind, and all punishment. Here, 
too, is the ground for the reasonableness of any ex- 
hortation, or argument, or appeal designed to influ- 
ence another's conduct. 

To blame a machine, or a stick, or any inanimate 
object for an undesirable result, is well regarded as an 
act of supreme childishness, or folly. Xerxes has been 
held up to the ridicule of the ages for chastising the 
sea because it wrecked his fleet ; but every magistrate 
who punishes a criminal is equally ridiculous, and far 
more blameworthy, if that criminal has no free will. 
If man is a machine, his responsibility is at an end, 
or never existed. But the fact that men everywhere, 
and in all ages and in all states of society, hold them- 
selves and others responsible, is proof positive that man 
has free will ; because it is a fact sustained by the uni- 
versal consciousness of the race. In truth, there is 
little doubt that any philosopher whose system denies 
free will to man, would blame the thief who should 
steal his purse. 

Two Sides. — Our definition recognizes two parts, 
or two sides, in every completed act of the will ; viz. , 
the choice and the volition, — which is the putting- 
forth of force or energy in the line of that choice. 
Both choice and volition are self-determinations. 
But, as has been well said, " Choice is self-direction; 
volition is self-exertion or self-restraint" 

Psy.— 15. 



I70 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

In the element of choice man has perfect freedom, 
nor can such freedom be destroyed and the man re- 
main. But in volition, or the outward act, he is only 
partially or relatively free. To accomplish our choices 
we must work in accordance with the fixed laws of 
nature. For instance, one may choose to have the 
force of gravitation grind his corn. But, in order to 
make his choice effective, he must select a stream of 
water which has a suitable fall, he must construct his 
dam properly, he must put his wheel in the right place, 
he must arrange his machinery according to the laws 
of physics, and he must turn on the power at the 
proper time. If he fail in any of these respects, he 
will fail to realize his choice, however ardently he 
may desire to do so. Or he may be prevented from 
executing his volitions by human interference, by the 
conflict of some stronger will opposing his own. But, 
so far as the choice extends, he is subject to no limi- 
tations, — here he is autocrat. 

Dr. Hopkins well says of choice and volition : "The 
one is absolute, and so belongs to us, that to be de- 
prived of it we must be destroyed. The other is con- 
tingent, and we can be deprived of it by accident, or 
disease, or by the will of others. The one is the es- 
sential element of freedom manifesting itself in the 
spiritual realm, and is the immediate object of the 
divine government; the other is simply instrumental 
and executive, and is that of which human govern- 
ments chiefly take cognizance." 

When a man proves to be what we commonly term " a fail- 
ure in life," the reason for his failure can generally be found 
in lack or misdirection of his will-power. Not many fail solely 



THE WILL I7 1 

because circumstances are against them; fewer succeed by 
sheer good fortune, or a combination of fortuitous circumstances. 
"Good luck" is largely a myth. Often the trouble is a want of a 
well-considered, fixed choice or dominant purpose in life. Such 
a person labors in one direction to-day and in another to-mor- 
row. We say he has no aim in life ; often the reason he has 
no aim worthy of the name, is that he has too many aims. 
"Unstable as water, he shall not excel." 

But some fail who have a worthy choice firmly adhered to, 
because they lack will-power on the volition side. They are 
feeble, or wavering, or unreasonable in their attempts to ac- 
complish their choices ; opposing circumstances appal and de- 
feat them, where a stronger will would readily have overcome 
these very opposing circumstances, or would have changed 
them into helpers. No man ever accomplished much in this 
world who had not a strong will on both sides of its manifesta- 
tion. We should add, also, that this strong will needs the aid 
of a sound judgment in all cases. 

Motives. — The will, especially in its choices, is 
perfectly free ; but it never acts without some motive 
to prompt its action. These motives are always in 
the form of desires of some sort, soliciting the will to 
act. No conclusion of the judgment or reason, noth- 
ing purely intellectual, is a motive till it has been fol- 
lowed by a feeling of desire. Nothing from without 
can prompt to a choice or an act of the will, till it has 
awakened a desire within. 

The will is often solicited by opposing desires, in 
various degrees of conflict. But these desires do not 
move the will one way or the other, as the heavier 
weights draw down their arm of the scales. The will 
is no such inert thing as that implies; the process of 
willing is not a mechanical obedience to the strongest 
force. The motives simply solicit or influence the 
will, which, in its regal capacity, freely determines for 



I7 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

itself to which of the opposing motives it will yield, 
with which it will put itself in accord. There are 
philosophers who deny this freedom of the will, and 
declare that it obeys the strongest motives. 

' ' The determinations of will are always made under 
the influence of motives " ; but the motives do not 
determine, the will does not obey. But, under the 
influence of motives, the will freely chooses ; and it 
often chooses in defiance of what seem to be the 
strongest impulses. Here is, probably, the difference 
between the human will and the will of the brute ; 
the brute always yields to the strongest impulse, and 
the only way to change his action is to induce in him 
a stronger impulse than the one he now obeys. But 
man, endowed with reason and conscience, has the 
power to put any impulse or desire under his feet, 
and to choose freely. 

We think that any one who will examine the move- 
ments of his own mind, in the light of consciousness, 
ought to see the truth of what has been said. He is 
conscious of the actions and judgments of the intel- 
lect, he is conscious of the awakening of desires seek- 
ing gratification, he is conscious of the appeals of con- 
science, and he is conscious of a free choice; and, 
furthermore, he is conscious that every one of these 
differs from all the others. 

Choices Give Character. — Because man is per- 
fectly free as to his choices, it is his choices that deter- 
mine the moral quality of all his actions. Without 
this freedom our actions could have no moral quality 
whatever ; and to this fact of our constitution alone, is 
due all responsibility, and all character so far as it re- 



THE WILL 173 

spects morality. Yet choice alone, — that is, as indi- 
cating mere preference, — is far from working out a 
character in harmony with itself. It must be a choice 
followed by volition, making a complete act of the 
will. To be moved again and again towards a worthy 
choice, to choose so far as simply to approve, but noth- 
ing more, is a weakening and a deadening process as 
regards the forming of a worthy character. For this 
is the very thing we mean by that properly contempt- 
uous word, sentimentalism. 

It is by his choices and volitions that man builds his 
character as a moral being. A supreme choice is fol- 
lowed by a multitude of subordinate choices in line 
with itself. And, out of these repeated and continued 
acts of the will, grow habits. So our subsequent 
choices are influenced by those we have already made. 
Furthermore, these choices bias our judgments, and 
largely give rise to motives that influence our wills to 
future choices. Hence, by the very freedom of his 
will, man comes to limit it. "The outcome of voli- 
tional action is_ habit, fixed disposition, settled char- 
acter. Freedom may choose the seed, but it can 
neither determine nor escape the harvest." 

True Freedom. — We have used the word ' 'freedom" 
to mean man's ability to choose freely, even though 
his choice should be a choice of wrong, or should be 
purely arbitrary. But, as we have just seen, the wrong 
exercise of this freedom may result in bitter bondage. 
One has attained to true freedom only when his free 
choices are habitually in accord with the right, or the 
highest reason. ' ' Real freedom exists only in the 
complete harmony of the rational and natural motives 



174 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

with one another and with reason." This is a will 
acting in "self-conscious freedom"; its outcome is a 
righteous character, in which the soul is in peace. In 
so far as a man reaches this stage, in so far he is really- 
free. He is no longer under the law, for he has be- 
come a law unto himself; and this law is no bond, for 
he is in harmony with it. He has realized the divine 
words, "The truth shall make you free." 

Training the Will. — Like all the rest of our pow r 
ers, the will is rightly trained by right use. Nothing 
is more desirable than a strong will, if only it is rightly 
used. A man with a weak will is a pitiable object. 
It is the will which gives one his moving force ; that 
makes him a power rather than a mere helpless thing. 
One who lacks will-power is like a log floating at the 
mercy of the current ; while one with a strong will 
is like a steamboat, that can not only stem the cur- 
rent, but can make headway against it. There is no 
danger that one will have too much will, if only it is 
joined with right motives and sound judgment. The 
man of strong will is not necessarily willful in the bad 
use of that word. A man of strong will need not be 
mulish. 

There has been much discussion of the question 
whether a child's "will should be broken? " The an- 
swer turns wholly upon what is meant by " breaking" 
the will. If by this is meant simply that the child 
must be taught to bend his will to rightful authority, 
then it is one of the first lessons to be learned ; it is 
an act of the greatest kindness to the child to break 
his will in this sense. But if, by breaking the will, 
we mean to destroy its power, or to diminish it, then 



THE WILL 175 

it is a heinous crime to do it. For, one with his will 
broken, in this sense, is like a watch with the main- 
spring broken. Instead of this, special effort should 
be made to strengthen the child's will-power. Use 
all reasonable means to lead him to cease saying "I 
can't," and to cultivate the habit of saying " I can" 
and ' ' I will. " Of course he should be taught to judge 
rightly as to whether a thing ought to be done, before 
he says "I will do it." Even kindly ridicule or gen- 
tle sarcasm may be used with good effect here, and 
sometimes resort may well be had to something a little 
more vigorous. 

Give the child the opportunity to exercise his will 
within all reasonable limits, and then hold him to the 
responsibility that belongs to a free will. Above all 
things, never thwart or cross a child's will unless there 
is a very good reason for it. Many a well-disposed 
child has had his will wantonly denied, or needlessly 
thwarted, by a thoughtless or tyrannical parent or 
teacher until the result has been deplorable weakness 
or a settled perversity. 



CHAPTER XVIII 



CONCLUSION 




OR Young Teachers. — As it is stated 
on the title-page, this book is designed 
for young teachers. It has grown out 
of the author's efforts to prepare young 
persons for the teacher's work. In the 
course of nearly forty years in the school-room, he 
has been led to give much attention to the phenom- 
ena of mind. He has also read many books treating 
of the human mind more or less directly. From these 
years of observation, reading, and reflection, he has 
come to certain conclusions respecting the facts of the 
mind, — its powers, its laws of working, and of growth. 
These facts, especially such as relate to the work of 
teaching, he has endeavored to state in the fewest and 
plainest words he could command. He has stated 
these facts as they appear to him ; of course, he will 
not be surprised to find that, in some respects, they 
may appear differently to others. It is urged again, 
upon all who read the book, that they test the truth 
of its statements by their own observation, and es- 
pecially by referring to the testimony of their own 

consciousness. 

(176) 



CONCLUSION 177 

Writers on Psychology often give much time and 
space to theories and speculations ; but the author has 
aimed, as far as possible, to avoid all discussion of 
theories, and to confine himself to what, -in his view, 
are the facts of the science. Again, in many books, 
much space is given to controversy, to the stating 
and refuting of the opinions of other writers. In 
this book we have aimed to write nothing controver- 
sially excepting in cases that we deemed essentially 
vital to truth. Nor have we given space to the his- 
tory of the science or to the history of the opinions 
that different men have held concerning its facts. 

In brief, we have endeavored to put the facts of the 
science before young people in such a way that, by 
study and thinking, they may understand them ; hop- 
ing that they will be able to apply them in the work 
of teaching. We have tried to make a text-book, — 
that is, a book of texts, — striving to give what may 
be of immediate value, at the same time that it will 
awaken a desire for further investigation, and will aid 
in making that investigation profitable, both by guid- 
ing personal observation and by aiding to understand 
other books upon the same subject. 

Sources of Information. — A student of mind has 
three sources of information, three fields in which he 
may glean. The first and most important is found in 
his own mind, studied in the light of his own con- 
sciousness. As we said in a former part of the book, 
Psychology differs from almost every other study in 
this respect. But it must be remembered that one's 
own mind is an important object of study, not only 
because here is found an original source of informa- 



178 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tion, but also because it furnishes a test for all the in- 
formation gained from every other source : such in- 
formation has a value for us only as it is interpreted 
and tested in the light of our own conscious experi- 
ence. We know about other minds only in the light 
of what we know of our own minds. 

But the teacher, who has to deal with minds that 
are in the process of development, not only needs to 
study carefully his own mind as its activities are re- 
vealed in present consciousness, but he needs to call 
to his aid all that memory can give him, of his mental 
experiences when he was in the stages of transforma- 
tion or growth. If a person has forgotten his own 
childhood, he is not fit for a teacher of children. 

Another very important field for study is found in 
observing the mental operations of others, as they are 
revealed by gestures, words, and the different forms 
of behavior. The teacher has extraordinary oppor- 
tunities for this kind of study, especially as it relates 
to juvenile and growing minds. His pupils are con- 
stantly before him as specimens ; he is in most inti- 
mate relations with them, and these relations are most 
largely in the sphere of their mental activity. If he 
will observe carefully, he will not only discover the 
characteristics in which all minds are alike, but he 
will be strongly impressed with the fact that no two 
minds are exactly alike ; — each is marked by individ- 
uality, peculiarities, and idiosyncrasies. These differ- 
ences call for special care and attention. Probably 
Garfield was thinking particularly of them when he 
said that a teacher should study the boy more than 
he studies the book. 



CONCLUSION 179 

Thirdly, the student of mind can find access to won- 
derfully rich stores of literature relating to the sub- 
ject. Many of the ablest men in all the ages have 
given profound attention to this study, and they have 
left in books abundant records of the result of their 
labors. And, dry as such books often are to the be- 
ginner, they become strangely fascinating to one who 
has already made some progress in the study, and 
who is thus* able to comprehend their contents and 
to enter into their meaning. 

Unity and Diversity. — As was just said, no two 
minds are exactly alike ; then the question may arise, 
whether there can be any science of mind in general. 
Science deals with classes and uniformities. Psychol- 
ogy, however, is not singular in this respect ; no two 
horses are just alike, nor are any two oaks ; and the 
same may be said of two objects in any class in nat- 
ure. But it is found that, notwithstanding all the 
differences, there are certain well-marked and invari- 
able likenesses, which are the ground of scientific 
classifications and laws. The same thing is true of 
human minds ; it is found that all sane and sound 
minds are alike in all those grand general character- 
istics which form the subject-matter of Psychology. 
These general truths must be recognized as such, and 
they must be carefully distinguished, especially by 
the teacher, from such mental facts as are individual 
and peculiar. 

Are All Powers Good ? — If one may judge from 
statements he sometimes meets in books, or hears in 
conversation, it would seem that some people, im- 
pressed with the evil results following the abuse of 



180 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

some of the mental powers, are inclined to believe 
that some of our powers are better than others, that 
some even are bad in themselves, and that it might 
be better for us if we lacked them. Such persons 
make a great mistake; all our powers are evidently 
designed to serve a good and useful purpose, but ah 
may be abused. Let us ask, however, in what sense 
a mental power can be called good or bad. Evi- 
dently not in any moral sense ; morality* relates only 
to the use that is made of the powers, — it has noth- 
ing to do with their nature. Our powers are all good, 
in one sense, if they are certain and efficient in pro- 
ducing their results, just in the same sense that a knife 
is good when it is made of good steel. But good 
powers may be put to a bad use, just as the good 
knife may be. 

Education should aim to render all the mental pow- 
ers efficient ; but, more than that, it should endeavor 
to lead to such a use of them as shall promote right 
thinking, right living, a harmonious subjection of the 
lower appetites and impulses to reason and conscience, 
and to such a use of the will as shall lead its subject 
into true freedom, as its meaning has been explained. 

Body, Soul, and Spirit. — We have divided man's 
powers into two classes only ; viz. , physical and psy- 
chical. But we often hear it said that man has a 
threefold nature : body, soul, and spirit. We accept 
this division, using the word "soul" to mean such of the 
lower psychical powers as the nobler brutes possess, in 
some degree, in common with man. These will not 
include reason, conscience, and a free will. In the 
possession and exercise of these higher powers, man 



CONCLUSION l8l 

shows his real spiritual nature, — a* nature that in- 
cludes personality, morality, and responsibility. 

Dreams, Insanity, Etc. — In many books on men- 
tal science, much space is given to the discussion of 
questions respecting the action of the mind in dream- 
ing, insanity, and abnormal manifestations. Many of 
these questions are very fascinating, perhaps, because 
of the veil of mystery that hangs about them. But we 
have purposely ignored all such questions. We are 
writing a book especially for teachers, who have to do 
with minds only in their waking activities, and in their 
sane and normal manifestations. 

Man, a Unit. — Once more, we desire to impress 
on our readers, as we leave them, that man is a unit; 
he is not a sum of powers and activities; he has many 
powers and activities, but these do not constitute the 
man. Nor are these powers and activities entities in 
themselves. If our language sometimes seems to im- 
ply actual existence of the powers as things, it must 
be remembered that such language is used simply for 
convenience, and it must not be taken literally with all 
its apparent implications. These powers are simply 
different manifestations of the man, — a complex unit, — 
acting in various ways. Furthermore, in these actions 
the powers are blended ; rarely or never is the man 
showing himself in one of these forms of activity alone. 
In thought, the powers are distinct and separate, but 
in fact, they are inextricably blended and interwoven, 
in their action. 

Precepts. — We conclude by giving twenty-four 
short precepts, for the consideration and guidance of 
teachers especially. With respect to most of them, 



1 82 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

it will be easy to see that they are deductions from 
what has been said in the previous pages. They are 
given here in this compact form, in order that they 
may be remembered and applied the more easily : 



EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF MIND-ACTIVITY AND MIND-GROWTH 

1. Health. — The mind can not do its best work un- 
less the body and brain are in good condition. 

2. Attention. — No mental activity is of any value 
without careful attention to the thing in hand. 

Corollary : One thing at a time. 

3. Self- Activity. — There is no way in which a mind 
can increase in knowledge or power except by its own 
activity. 

4. Growth. — Mental acquisition, and mental power 
or skill, are forms of growth ; and all growth requires 
time. 

5. Origin of Ideas. — Ideas and thoughts are never 
conveyed from one mind to another ; they are formed, 
or awakened, in that mind where they exist. 

6. The Senses. — The mind gains the crude material 
for all it knows or thinks, through the use of the senses. 

7. Habit. — Neither knowledge nor skill is fully ours 
till it has taken the form of habit ; frequent repetition 
tends to produce a habit. 

8. Expression. — One can express intelligibly what 
he understands clearly; one can not express clearly 
anything that is not clear in his own mind; the at- 
tempt to make a clear statement helps towards clear- 
ness of thought. 



CONCLUSION 183 



EIGHT GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUNG CHILDREN 

1. Attention. — The attention of children is intense, 
but volatile ; they have little or no power of voluntary 
attention. 

2. The Senses. — The mental activity of children is 
chiefly shown in the use of their senses. 

3. Muscular Activity. — Children delight to use their 
muscles, when they can use them according to their 
own will or fancy. 

4. Imitation. — Children have a strong propensity to 
imitate, especially in things that please them. 

5. Faith. — Children instinctively believe what is 
told them, especially when told by one whom they 
esteem. 

6. Curiosity. — The curiosity of children is very act- 
, ive ; but, for the time being, it is easily satisfied on 

any one point. 

7. Memory. — Children remember well what they 
understand clearly, and what they have an interest in. 

8. Imagination. — Children delight in the play of 
imagination, — a fact which the teacher may make good 
use of, both in teaching and in governing. 

EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING 

1. Teaching? — Teaching is causing another to know 
what he did not know before. 

2. Begin Where ? — Begin where the pupil now is ; 
use the pupil's present knowledge for a foundation. 

3. Attention. — Make no attempt to teach till you 
have the pupil's attention ; stop, if you lose it. 



1 84 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



4. Interest. — Aim first to arouse the pupil's inter- 
est in what you propose to teach, and to awaken his 
curiosity in respect to it. 

5 . Symbols. — Do not allow meaningless symbols to 
be used ; do not confound the symbol with what it 
represents ; be sure that all symbols mean the same 
to teacher and to pupil. 

6. Fixing. — Fix exactly in the pupil's memory what 
ought to be there; but never load the memory un- 
necessarily. 

7. Responsibility. — Hold the pupil strictly responsi- 
ble for all that he ought to know or do. 

Corollary: Do nothing for him that he can do for 
himself. 

8. Individuality. — In teaching, always have regard 
to general principles, but respect the pupil's individ- 
uality in their application. 




INDEX. 



INDEX. 



PAGE 

Abnormal Consciousness, 35 

Abstraction 109 

Abuses of Imagination. . . . 101 

Acquired perception 59 

Admiration 154 

Affections, the „. . . 147 

Analogy 135 

Analysis and Synthesis. . . . 109 

Appetites, the 152 

Artistic Imagination 98 

Arts, fine 98 

Assumption in inductive syl- 
logism 129 

Attention, cultivation of. . 39 

defined 36 

illustrated 36 

objects of 39 

to several things 38 

Bodies, their qualities. ... 66 

Body, soul, and spirit 180 

Cause, man is a 166 

Cerebration, unconscious. . 32 

Children, characteristics of, 183 

Choice 169 

is perfectly free 170 



PAGE 

Choices give character. ... 172 

Classification 1 1 5 

Classes, higher and lower.. 1 12 

not found in nature 116 

Committing, to Memory, 

rules for 90 

and remembering 93 

Comprehension of terms.. 113 

Concept, defined 43 

logical 44, 1 10 

the, an intellection 43 

Conception, cultivation of. 45 

constructive, defined . 104 

" not imagination. 105 

" uses of. 105 

defined 40 

Concepts, a panorama of. . 81 

clear and obscure 112 

distinct and confused. . . 112 

how formed no 

how gained 106 

importance of 115 

logical, characteristics 

of in 

Conclusion, when trust- 
worthy 125 

Conscience, always the same. 160 
(187) 



i88 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



PAGE 

Conscience, defined 158 

not always safe 160 

not well defined 157 

relation to judgment. ... 159 

universal 160 

Consciousness, abnormal.. 35 

as a test 178 

defined 30 

necessary to mind 30, 32 

objects of. 31 

testimony of 31 

Contiguity, law of 83 

Contrary and contradictory 

terms 1 14 

Conversion of propositions. 121 

" Cramming " 80 

Cultivation, of attention. .. 39 

of conception 45 

of imagination. 103 

of memory 88 

of morality 161 

of the senses 74 

of the will 174 

Culture, mental, ten pre- 
cepts 27 

Curiosity 153 

Deceptions of sense, ap- 
parent 70 

Deductive syllogism 124 

Definition, logical. ...... . 115 

Demonstration, direct and 

indirect 132 

Demonstrative reasoning. . 132 

Desire, of approbation.... 152 

of power 152 

of society 152 

relation to will 167, 171 

Desires, the 147 



PAGE 

Devices to aid memory. .. . 92 

Distribution of terms 114 

Dreams, etc 181 

Education of the mind. . . 180 

Ego, and Non-Ego 54 

and the body 61 

Emotion, expressed by 

sound 64 

Emotions, the 147 

Enthymeme, the 130 

Extension of terms 113 

Faculty, a, defined 29 

Failure in life, causes of. . 170 

Fancy, defined 98 

Fear 153 

Feeling, the sense of 55 

Feelings, physical and psy- 
chical 139 

Fine art 98 

Forgetting, impossible, per- 
haps 87 

Free will 168, 173 

Generalizing, defined 116 

General terms 116 

Genus and species 112 

Habit 33 

and morality 164 

and will 1 73 

Hate, its use 151 

Hearing, and emotion 63 

sense of. 55 

the most internal sense. . 63 

Hope 153 



INDEX 



189 



PAGE 

Ideas, intuitive 49 

Imagination, abuses of . . . . 101 

artistic 98 

cultivation of 103 

defined 96 

four forms of product. . . 98 

in childhood 97 

in relation to free will.. 97 

inventive 98 

in what sense creative. . . 97 

uses of. 99 

uses of to teachers espec- 
ially 102 

Inductions, false 130 

Inductive syllogism 124, 128 

Insanity, etc .... 181 

Instances of remarkable 

memory 94 

Intellect, defined 47 

observations on 51 

Intellectual process, three 

steps in 53 

Interest 153 

" Intuitive," how used. ... 66 

Intuitive power, defined,. 47 

Judgment, defined 118 

Judgments, primitive 22 

Knowing, what is it ? 34 

Knowledge, can not be im- 
parted 52 

common and scientific. 16 

primitive and developed. 53 

Law, in science, defined.. 11 

of contiguity 83 

Laws, of opposition 120 



PAGE 

Laws, of suggestion 81 

of suggestion, primary.. 82 

of suggestion, secondary. 83 

of the syllogism 1 26 

Logical, concepts 44, no 

definition 115 

Love, of beauty, truth, and 

right 150 

of country 150 

of self. 149 

of pupils, how trained.. 150 

Man, a cause 166 

a unit 19, 137, 181 

Mechanical qualities of bod- 
ies 68 

Memory, belief in ....... . 79 

beneficent law of 87 

defined 75 

devices to aid 92 

effects of disease on.... 86 

elements in 77 

how cultivated 88 

importance of 79 

laws of 81 

neglected 88 

observations on 92 

of the aged 86 

remarkable cases of 94 

strong, with weak mind. 80 

three meanings of word. 76 

two uses of 79 

Mental activity, and atten- 
tion 38 

power of will over 38 

Mental, habit 33 

philosophy, defined 9 

Mind, and body related. . . 25 

and brain 26 



190 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Mind, and matter, differ- 
ences of 24 

a unit 23 

human, is like what?.. 52 

knows by its own activity. 51 

nature of . . 23 

Minds, unity and diversity 

of 178 

Mnemonics, worthless 91 

Moods 145 

Morality 161 

four elements in 162 

habit of. 164 

how cultivated 162 

Motion, an aid to sense... 58 

Motives, and will 171 

found in sensibility. . . 141, 148 

Necessary truth 48, 132 

Nominalists 116 



Objects, of attention 

of consciousness 

Observations, on the intel- 
lect 

on the memory 

Opposition, of propositions. 

laws of 

Passions, the 

Patriotism 

Percept, denned 

Perception, direct and ac- 
quired 

intuitive 

theories of 

through the senses 

Perceptives, defined 



39 
3i 

51 

92 

120 

120 



150 
66 

59 
66 

7i 

65 

47 



PAGE 

Phantasy, defined 98 

Philosophy, means what ?. 9 
Physiological qualities of 

bodies 68 

Power, defined 19 

intuitive, defined 47 

intuitive, products of. . .. 48 
Powers, mental, are they 

all good? 179 

grand divisions of 20 

observations on 22 

order of their action. ... 21 

scheme of. 28 

two stages of 22 

Powers, presentative, de- 
fined 47 

presentative, described. . 51 

reflective, defined 47 

representative, defined.. 47 

Precepts of mind-activity.. 182 

Premises, defined 123 

Primary qualities of bodies. 67 

Principles of teaching.... 183 

Probability, degrees of . . . . 134 

Probable reasoning 133 

Probable truth 131 

Proposition, defined 118 

Propositions, conversion of. 121 

kinds of. 119 

opposition of 120 

quality and quantity of. 119 
Psychology, aim of this 

book 176 

a mental discipline 16 

an inductive science. .. . II 

a noble science 12 

defined 9 

peculiarity in 12, 177 

personal value of 13 



INDEX 



I 9 I 



TAGE 

Psychology, relation to edu- 
cation 180 

study of other minds.. 178 

tests in 12 

value to different profes- 
sions 14 

why neglected 16 

Qualities of bodies 66 

Hamilton's division. .. . 69 

how divided 66, 68 

mechanical 68 

physiological 68 

primary 67 

Reasoning, denned 122 

demonstrative 132 

hypothetical 131 

probable 133 

Reason, natural 51 

Recognition 77 

Recollection, denned 76 

Reflective powers, defined. 47 

forms of 108 

products of 108 

Reflex action, natural 3^ 

Reid's answer to idealists. 73 

Remembrance, conditions of j6 

defined 76 

Representative powers, de- 
fined 47 

discussed 75 

"Represent," in inductive 

syllogism 128 

Reproduction 75> 77 

Resistance, sense of 56 

" Retention," meaning of. 78 

Reverence 155 



PAGE 

Scheme 28 

Science, deductive 10 

defined 10 

inductive t 10 

facts in, how gained .... 11 

how developed 10 

Seeing, sense of 55 

Self-consciousness 35 

Selfishness 149 

Sensation, and cognition.. 60 

defined 57 

Sensations, organic and vi- 
tal 65 

Sense-perception, defined.. 56, 65 

Senses 54 

cultivation of 74 

deceptions of, . . , 7° 

to be trusted 69 

Sense, what each gives.... 57 
Sensibilities, analysis not 

complete 146 

classification of 146 

motives to action 141 

related to the body.... 142 

Sensibility, begins how?.. 139 

expressing and repressing. 143 

importance of, to teacher. 148 

its relation to intellect. . 143 

not definable 138 

of two kinds 139 

painful or pleasant 140 

source of joy or sorrow. . 141 

Sentimentalism 173 

Sight, questions about . 61 

Smelling, sense of 56, 65 

Soul, the 180 

Sound, defined 64 

Sounds, natural and arti- 
ficial 64 



192 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



PAGE 

Sounds, varieties of. 63 

Spontaneity, is not will... 167 

Suggestion, laws of 81 

Syllogism, deductive 124 

defined 1 23 

inductive . 124, 128 

laws of 126 

two kinds 123 

Sympathy 155 

Synthesis 109 

Tasting, sense of 56, 65 

Teaching, a fine art 99 

principles of 183 

Temperaments 144 

Terms, absolute and relative 113 
comprehension and ex- 
tension of. 113 

distribution of. 1 14 

division of. 114 

logical analysis of 114 

notative 113 

relation of. 1 14 

Testimony, as to fact and 

inference 134 

value of . . 133 

Theories of sense-percep- 
tion 71 



PAGE 

Thought, expressed by 

sounds 64 

Touch, sense of 55, 59 

Truth, kinds of 131 

Truths, necessary, self-evi- 
dent 48 

Unconscious cerebration.. 32 

Unit, man is a 19, 137, 181 

Unity and diversity in 

minds. 178 

Uses of imagination 99 

Varieties of sounds 63 

Volition 169 

What each sense gives. . 57 

What we know 34 

Will, cultivation of 174 

defined 165 

free 168, 173 

its power over mental 

action 38 

relation to habit 173 

relation to motives 171 

two elements 169 

makes responsible 166 

not desire 167 

not spontaneity 167 



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